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We examine dynamic mutual choice mating games: members of two 
populations (males and females) are randomly matched in successive peri­
ods and form couples only if they mutually accept each other. Players are 
heterogeneous and their “types” are distributed in an interval. The utility 
that a player obtains from a mating depends on both his type and the type 
of his partner.
We consider three type of preferences: (i) homotypic (preference for 
similar types), (ii) common (preference for high types) and (iii) age depen­
dent preferences.
In case (i), we explore the equilibrium behaviour when the sex ratio r 
is 1 : 1. We extend the results of Alpern and Reyniers (1999) two period 
continuous type game. Next, we develop an algorithm, for reducing the 
potential equilibrium strategies in the two period discrete type model. Us­
ing this algorithm, we are able then to determine the equilibria in some 
discrete type models; we find multiple equilibria in some cases. Even when 
we do not assume the sexes adopt identical strategies, we find that this 
always occurs at equilibrium.
We also explore the equilibrium behaviour and the mating patterns 
when players have mixed preferences (combination of mixed and common 
preferences) with the help of a discrete type model.
In case (ii), we extend the Alpern and Reyniers (2005) common pref­
erences model to the case of a sex ratio r > 1. Males remaining unmated 
after the end of the game have negative utility — c. We analyse how the 
equilibria of this mating game are formed, depending on the parameters 
r and c. It is proved that males are not always choosy at equilibrium 
and for some (r, c) there are multiple equilibria. In a region of (r, c) space 
with multiple equilibria, we compare these, and analyse their "efficiency" 
in several respects (stability and welfare).
Finally in (iii), based on an idea of Alpern and Reyniers (1999) and 
Alpern (2008) we analyse the equilibrium strategies in a steady state model 
where individuals have age dependent preferences and they seek partners 
who provide to them the longest possible common fertile life. We deter­
mine the equilibrium strategies as the sex ratio of the incoming population 
changes and comment of the efficiency of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The forming of couples and partnerships is a common occurrence in everyday 
life. Individuals form couples for multiple reasons and in a variety of contexts: 
animals and people search for mates to reproduce; people need partners to ex­
change goods or information, to play games, to  socialise or to share experiences; 
companies or organisations seek individuals or other organisations to collabo­
rate, to create partnerships, to make social or commercial transactions. Mating 
of individuals is a continuously recurring process and it has a strong impact 
on the decisions and relationships of both humans and animals. Therefore it 
does not come as a surprise that many disciplines try  to explore the dynamics 
of mate selection. Mating has been analysed extensively by biologists, social 
scientists and economists, all trying to understand its underlying mechanisms. 
Its analysis permits us to explore, influence or even improve the products of the 
mating process. Furthermore, it allows us to make forecasts and analyse the 
effects of the mating behaviour of individuals on themselves, their partners and 
their opponents.
Depending on the availability of data and the complexity of the situation, dif­
ferent techniques have been used in order to study mate selection. Observation, 
laboratory and field experiments and simulation are extremely common, espe­
cially in the analysis of sexual selection (Kalick and Hamilton (1986), Breeching 
and Hopp (1999), Kodric-Brown and Nicoletto (2001)). In addition, especially 
lately, a plethora of game theoretical models has been developed, analysing mat­
ing behaviour in a variety of contexts. It is interesting to note th a t Johnstone 
(1997) proposes the use of game theoretic analysis when both sexes are selective 
because it can model the inter-dependency of the strategies of the two sexes at 
equilibrium.
We focus on the game theoretical study of the mating procedure, analysing 
mating as a dynamic situation. Game theory investigates m ate selection as a 
game played between two populations. For simplicity, we call the two popula­
tions males and females. The aim of the game is the formation of couples and the 
game outcome is a couple pattern (mating structure). We use the term "pair­
ing” or "matching" to denote the random meeting of two unm ated individuals 
and the term "mating" to denote the permanent coupling of two individuals.
Players are characterised by "types". Types are a measure of the quality of 
players. They may represent quality, size, colour, hue, age etc.
The utility of a mating (a;, y) between a male of type x  and a female of type 
y is determined by the types of both partners and may be different for male 
and female. Hence the payoff tha t players expect to receive depends on the 
probability of finding a partner by the end of the game, on their type and on
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the type of their potential partner.
Game theory studies the strategies tha t players use in order to maximise their 
payoffs. It investigates the effect of competition and population distribution on 
players’ decisions and examines the formation of choices and strategies under 
different circumstances. Additionally, it provides a better understanding of the 
effect of preferences, types and utilities on the mating behaviour of individuals. 
Therefore, it has proved to be a very useful and flexible tool in the examination 
of mating process and it is extensively used by different disciplines.
1.1 M ain Background: The Alpern and Reyniers MHomotypic"  
and "Common" Preferences M odels (1999, 2005)
Kalick and Hamilton’s (1986) simulation motivated Alpern and Reyniers (1999, 
2005) to produce two papers focusing on the use of game theoretical analysis 
for the prediction of behaviour of humans/animals under homotypic or common 
preferences. Under homotypic preferences individuals prefer partners similar 
to themselves, while under common preferences individuals prefer partners of a 
high rank or of a specific characteristic. Alpern and Reyniers analysis of both 
type of preferences has applications in biology and ecology, as well as in social 
sciences and in some economic problems. Their work has provided us with the 
theoretical framework to develop our own analysis.
Hence, we regard it as necessary to present briefly Alpern and Reyniers’ 
results, before illustrating our own models. This will help the reader to under­
stand the ideas on which our models were built. (A description of the Kalick 
and Hamilton (1986) model can be found in chapter 5.)
1.1.1 A lpern and R eyniers (1999, 2005)
Alpern and Reyniers constructed a decentralised dynamic game, where cohorts 
of males and females meet randomly in sequential periods and form couples 
only when they both  accept each other. Following the assumptions of Kalick 
and Hamilton (1986), they assumed that the sex ratio in the beginning of the 
game is 1 : 1. They did not permit remarrying or divorcing. Therefore mated 
individuals in each period leave the game, without being given the opportunity 
to enter the game again; otherwise they remain in the game and continue in 
the next period unmated. All players are better off by being mated than by 
remaining unmated after the end of the game.
Alpern and Reyniers used a notion of equilibrium similar to a Subgame Per­
fect Nash equilibrium in a continuum of players. At equilibrium, given players’ 
utility functions, players accept those types which provide them with at least as 
high utility as their expected utility in the next period.
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They constructed two basic models; in the first (1999), they assumed tha t 
players seek partners similar to themselves (homotypic or similarity preferences) 
and in the second (2005), tha t players search for high quality partners (max­
imising or common preferences).
•  Alpern and Reyniers (1999)
Alpern and Reyniers analysed a model with no replacement played over n  pe­
riods. In the beginning of the game, types are uniformly distributed in a continu- 
ous interval [ - 1, 1] or a discrete interval {5= ^ ,  5^ ,  0 , s g n  }•
Two kinds of symmetry are assumed: symmetrical behaviour of males and fe­
males and of negative and positive types. The cost of a mating (x ,y ) is the 
same for both partners and it is the absolute distance \x — y\ between the two 
types a;, y. Players are minimisers, seeking partners close to their own type.
Alpern and Reyniers found equilibrium conditions for the continuous type 
game for any initial type distribution. Specifically in the continuous type game 
where types are initially uniformly distributed, they partly determined the equi­
librium strategies. Furthermore, they calculated numerically the equilibrium for 
a discrete type game.
In the same paper, they also constructed a similar model with replacement 
(allowing a fixed number of individuals to enter the game in each period). They 
proposed, without analysing it, tha t it would be interesting to analyse another 
model with replacement where "preferences over mates include the number of 
periods since mate has entered the model". Alpern (2008) proposed an age 
preferences model based on this idea, assuming tha t the sex ratio is 1 : 1.
•  Alpern and Reyniers (2005)
Alpern and Reyniers (2005) examined the effect of common preferences on 
the equilibrium behaviour. They studied a model with no replacement played 
over n  periods. Types are non negative and they are uniformly distributed in a 
continuous interval [0,1] or a discrete interval {0, £,..., 1}. The symmetry
around the central type 0 is no longer im portant for the analysis. The utility of 
a mating (x, y) for a type x  is the type y of his partner (respectively for y it is 
type x). Players are maximisers, seeking high type partners.
Alpern and Reyniers showed th a t in the n period model there always ex­
ists an equilibrium. Furthermore they proved tha t strategies are decreasing 
sequences (of lower bounds of acceptable partners) over time.
They focused on the two and three period model, where types are uniformly 
distributed in [0,1]. They showed tha t when when the sex ratio is 1 : 1, there 
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Finally, they analysed the effect of learning on the equilibrium behaviour.
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1.2 Brief Presentation o f our M odels
Our work extends and in some cases generalises Alpern and Reyniers’ models 
(1999, 2005) and Alpern’s model (2008). We present three basic models and 
some extensions of them. Our interest is focused on the existence and differences 
of multiple equilibria, as well as on the effect of a skewed population sex ratio 
on the equilibrium behaviour.
1.2.1 E x ten s io n  o f A lp e rn  a n d  R ey n ie rs  (1999)
In chapter 2 we extend the analysis of the homotypic preferences models of 
Alpern and Reyniers (1999) and offer some additional computational results on 
a discrete type game with mixed preferences (combination of homotypic and 
common preferences). The majority of the results concerning homotypic prefer­
ences appearing in this chapter are presented in LSE-CDAM-2006-20 research 
report "Multiple equilibria in a Dynamic Mating Game with Discrete Types and 
Similarity Preferences".
Alpern and Reyniers analysed only the equilibrium behaviour of a limited 
range of types of the two period model where types are uniformly distributed 
in [—1,1]. We extend their results, exploring the behaviour of the remaining 
types. This analysis is presented in Alpern, Katrantzi, Reyniers (2005).
Next we examine the equilibrium behaviour in the discrete type two period 
game. We find only symmetric equilibria, even in the cases where we relax the 
assumptions of symmetry of Alpern and Reyniers (1999) and permit to players to 
behave independently. In the case where symmetry is assumed between negative 
(types in [—1, 0)) and positive types (types in (0 , 1]), and between males and 
females, we develop an algorithm which reduces the number of strategies needed 
to be checked in order to find all existing equilibria. Using this algorithm, we 
are lead to the most im portant finding of this chapter, which is tha t multiple 
equilibria exist in some discrete type games. The la tter result has not yet been 
encountered in any of the models presented in the relevant literature, where it 
is implicitly assumed tha t equilibrium is unique. In all the discrete type games 
examined, we compare the intra-couple correlation and the marital stability of 
the equilibria found. (We say tha t a pair of couples (£1, 2/1) and (£2, 2/2) is marital 
unstable if a male from one couple and a female from the other both prefer each 
other to their current partner.) Furthermore, we calculate the expected payoff 
tha t each equilibrium offers to different types of players, drawing conclusions on 
the effect of the number of types on the equilibrium strategies.
In chapter 3 we also study how strategies and mating patterns would change 
in a model where players have a combination of homotypic and common pref­
erences, as the impact of either preference becomes stronger. We present our
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computational results on a discrete type game played over 2 and 3 periods. Our 
conclusions for both two and three period models are similar. Higher types find 
a mate more quickly when common preferences are stronger. On the other hand, 
when players have strictly homotypic preferences, extremely high and low types 
have slightly lower probabilities that the rest of the types to find a partner be­
fore the last period. In general, a random player has higher chances to be m ated 
before the final period of the game when homotypic preferences are stronger. 
Focusing especially on the three period model, it becomes obvious tha t under 
all combinations of preferences, the probability that two random types mutually 
accept each other is higher in the second period than in the first period. An 
exception is the case where players have purely homotypic preferences, since in 
this case mating takes place between the same types in both periods.
1.2.2 E xtension  o f A lpern and R eyniers (2005)
In chapter 3, we investigate in detail the effect of common preferences on equilib­
rium behaviour when the sex ratio is not 1 :1 .  The second section of the chapter 
is a modified version of the LSE-CDAM-2007-32 research report "Equilibria of 
two-sided matching games", presenting our joint work with Steve Alpern on 
common preferences. A shorter version of this report is accepted by the Eu­
ropean Journal of Operational Research (Alpern and Katrantzi (2008). In the 
same chapter, we also explore the effect of the equilibrium strategies on social 
and individual welfare. Finally we comment on how the model could be amended 
so that it is more applied in biological problems.
In the second section of chapter 3, we extend the mutual choice model with 
common preferences of Alpern and Reyniers (2005) by assuming a male biased 
sex ratio r and a penalty c for players (males) who leave the game unmated. 
We offer analytical results for the 2 and partially for the three period model. 
We prove tha t under specific conditions males are better off by being unchoosy, 
even when they are given the chance to be selective, offering an answer to  the 
question of "when do we have mutual and when do we have one sided choice?". 
However, the most significant result of this chapter is the existence of multiple 
equilibria for specific combinations of sex ratio r and non-mating penalty c. In 
the two period game, we divide the (r, c) space into three regions, I, I I  and I I I .  
We prove th a t in the first two regions, a unique equilibrium exists. However, in 
region I I I  there are always three equilibria: two mutual choice and one female 
choice equilibrium. At mutual choice equilibria, both sexes are choosy, while at 
the female choice equilibrium, males are unchoosy and accept all female types.
We prove tha t at equilibrium choosiness moves in the same direction for 
both sexes. Hence in area I I I ,  we call "choosy" the mutual choice equilibrium 
where both males and females have high acceptance standards and "easy" the
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mutual choice equilibrium where both sexes have lower acceptance standards. 
The existence of multiple equilibria seems to be a quite robust result, since 
the exhaustive analysis of the three period discrete type problem and the non 
exhaustive analysis of the 4 period discrete type problem revealed the existence 
of multiple equilibria under specific combinations of (r, c).
We are particularly interested in the comparison of the "efficiency"of the 
equilibria in region I I I , studying their dynamical stability and their m arital 
stability. We suggest tha t both choosy and female choice equilibria are dynam­
ically stable, while easy equilibrium is dynamically unstable. Our initial results 
on basins of attraction in area I I I  indicate tha t the choosy equilibrium has a 
significantly larger attracting area and hence it might be more likely to appear 
than female choice equilibrium. However, this observation is based on specific 
cases and it should be examined further. Furthermore, we note tha t the choosy 
equilibrium has the highest marital stability, while the female choice equilibrium 
has in all cases a marital stability of 0.5, which is the lowest possible. So, it is 
expected tha t when players are choosier, they have higher probabilities to be 
content with their partner.
In section 3.3, we complete the analysis of the "efficiency" of the equilibria in 
area I I I ,  by examining the social and individual welfare at equilibrium. Males 
are proved to be equally content at all equilibria, while females are better off at 
the female choice and worst off at the choosy equilibrium. The payoff of different 
female and male types varies at each equilibrium. As a result, specific types may 
prefer that different equilibria appear given their expected payoffs. High male, 
low male and high female types are better off at the choosy equilibrium, whilst 
medium male, medium female and low female types prefer the female or the easy 
equilibrium. This result, in combination with our results on stability, provides 
important information to researchers for making inferences on which equilibrium 
would appear under different circumstances.
The biological implications of our results on common preferences are mul­
tiple. The last section of chapter 3 focuses on the biological interpretation of 
our analysis. We amend our model by maintaining a biased sex ratio, but re­
moving the non mating penalty and assuming tha t males and females types are 
uniformly distributed in [h — 7 , h +  7 ] and in [I — k, I.+ k] . Our goal is to examine 
how female variation in combination with a biased sex ratio affects the equilib­
rium behaviour. A complete analysis of the model is going to be the subject of 
a joint paper with Steve Alpern.
1.2.3 A ge Preferences M odel
In chapter 4, we focus on the role of age in the mating procedure. We analyse 
the equilibrium strategies in a steady state model where individuals have age
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dependent preferences. We assume tha t the age of an individual represents the 
periods he has been fertile and that there is a maximum age limit for male and 
females. In other words, individuals can be fertile for a given number of periods. 
Individuals seek partners so tha t to maximise the number of periods tha t both 
them and their partners are able to produce offspring.
We analyse the behaviour at equilibrium, given that it depends purely on 
age and on the incoming population sex ratio R.  The incoming population sex 
ratio R  is defined as the ratio of males over females entering in the game in 
every period.
Age dependent preferences is a subject tha t is not extensively studied, proba­
bly due to its complexity. It is often difficult to isolate the effect of age on mating 
behaviour, since age is connected to multiple factors. Steve Alpern (2008) built 
a model on age preferences, assuming a sex ratio r =  1, but he has not analysed 
the equilibria of this model. We generalise Alpern’s model (2008), assuming 
tha t it is possible to have a biased population sex ratio r and we investigate the 
equilibrium strategies for different incoming population sex ratios R.
Under age preferences, it is expected tha t younger individuals have a greater 
incentive than older to find a young partner, since they have more years left to 
be mated or to search for a potential partner in the game. Hence, at equilibrium, 
a type is always at least as choosy as any higher type (of an older age). Types 
in the last two years of their life are always unchoosy, accepting any partner, 
while types in the first year of their life are accepted by all players.
We focus on the cases th a t females live for two and three years and males live 
for at least as many years as females. We investigate the equilibrium behaviour 
when the incoming population sex ratio R  is male or female biased. In the 
cases we examine, it is shown that when the incoming population of males is 
the same as the incoming population of females in each period, the equilibrium 
is trivial and all players are mated in the first period of their life, unless they 
are not paired with a partner. Nevertheless, when R  is biased, more interesting 
equilibrium type distributions appear. In all the models we examine, there is a 
unique equilibrium for any R] the exception is the case where males live for 4 
periods and females live for 3 periods, where there is no equilibrium for some 
male biased R.  In the model where males live for 4 periods and females live for 3 
periods, it is interesting to note there is a pair of equilibria where the population 
sex ratios r are the same.
In the last part of chapter 4, we examine the population productivity; it is 
proved tha t it is the maximum when the incoming population sex ratio R  is 
1 : 1, while it tends to decrease as the incoming population sex ratio becomes 
biased. Moreover, we analyse the average age at marriage of males and females. 
It is shown that it is the minimum when the incoming population sex ratio R
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is 1 : 1, while it increases as the incoming population sex ratio becomes biased.
After the reader becomes familiar with our analysis on homotypic, common 
and age dependent preferences, we consider th a t it is easier to make connections 
with other models, related to ours. In chapter 5 we briefly present the area 
of mate selection, focusing on game theoretical analysis. It is im portant to 
note tha t most models are based on very different assumptions tha t ours and 
comparisons are difficult to be made. Finally in chapter 6 , we offer a summary 
of our results and comment on possible extensions of our models.
1 .3  Su m m ary
In all the models we examine, we are particularly concerned about the role of 
preferences and outside constraints (such as the sex ratio) on the equilibrium 
behaviour. Our goal is to contribute to the exploration of the area of dynamic 
mate choice and to assist the analysis of real life problems. We are especially 
interested in the implications of our results for operational research problems 
and in biology. As part of our effort to offer a complete description of the 
mating process and its products, in all the cases we examine, we investigate the 
stability and effectiveness of the equilibria as well as the mating pattern  of the 
couples created. We hope our results help to lead to a better understanding of 
mate choice and encourage the advance of research into how mating decisions 
are formed.
The dissertation is organised as follows. In the next chapter, we present 
our results on homotypic preferences and on combination preferences, before 
illustrating our analysis on an asymmetric game with common preferences in 
chapter 3. Next, in chapter 4, we present a steady state model, where players 
have age preferences. We examine the role of age and of asymmetry in the 
incoming population sex ratio on the formation of equilibrium strategies and 
distribution. In chapter 5, we offer a discussion on related approaches in the 
literature. This chapter can be considered as a presentation of the general area 
of mating games or as an examination of the connections of other models with 
ours. Finally, in the last chapter, a summary of our conclusions and comments 
is given, and proposals for further research are made.
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2 H om otypic Preferences
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we focus on games with homotypic preferences and we present 
some additional results on a game with mixed preferences (a combination of 
homotypic and common preferences). The majority of the results concerning 
homotypic preferences were first presented in LSE-CDAM-2006-20 research re­
port "Multiple equilibria in a Dynamic Mating Game with Discrete Types and 
Similarity Preferences". The report appears in the website of the LSE Mathe­
matics departm ent1.
Under homotypic or else similarity preferences, individuals prefer partners 
similar to themselves. Homotypic preferences are the least examined in liter­
ature, even though they appear frequently in real life (Alpern and Reyniers 
(1999), Belgstrom and Real (2000)). Their analysis has particular interest since 
it has multiple applications in the social, economic and natural worlds.
In biology and in ecology there is evidence th a t a variety of animal species, 
especially monogamous, illustrate homotypic preferences (Cooke and Davies 
(1983), Amundsen (2000), Arnqvist et al (1996), Barlow and Rogers (1978)), 
searching for partners having the same traits, such as colour and age, as them­
selves or their parents. In psychology, there are also findings suggesting that 
humans tend to define their criteria of beauty according to their own traits (Yela 
and Sangrador (2002)) and they often prefer partners who have common char­
acteristics to themselves (Russel and Bartrip (1989), Alvarez and Jaffe (2004)). 
Furthermore, in economy and in social sciences, similarity preferences appear in 
different contexts. People search for competitors in sports and arts who have 
the same abilities as themselves; flatmates need to have the same expectations 
for the flat they share; partners who work together in a firm often need to have 
the same goals.
Alpern and Reyniers (1999) were the first to  built a game theoretic model 
on homotypic preferences; we base our analysis on the dynamic decentralised 
non atomic mating games r n and r n(m) initially presented by them. In the 
Alpern and Reyniers (A&R) game, two populations X  (males) and Y  (females) 
are randomly paired over n  successive periods. Players have one dimensional 
types which are uniformly distributed over a continuous or a discrete interval 
(in r n or in Tn(m)  respectively), which includes the origin 0 and is symmetric 
around it; hence for every positive type, there exist an equivalent negative type. 
Symmetric positive and negative types are taken to have symmetric preferences 
and behaviour. No new players can enter the game in any period, hence the 
population density of each type changes each time new couples are formed.
1 http://www.cdam.lse.ac.uk/Reports/Files/cdam-2006-20.pdf
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In each period after pairing takes place, each party of a matched pair (i, j )  
can either accept or reject the other. If both accept, then they form a mated 
couple and leave the game, with both paying a cost of \i — j\. Otherwise, they 
both proceed unmated into the next period. At the end of the game, all players 
prefer to be mated than to remain unmated. Even though every pairing has the 
same cost \i — j\  for both the matched male i and female j ,  it is not always true 
tha t when a female (male) accepts a male (female), the male (female) will also 
accept the female (male). The mating decisions of a player in a period depends 
on his/her expected cost in the following periods. The expected cost differs for 
each type, since the type distribution changes in every period. As a result, it is 
possible tha t a type i is choosier in a period than an other type j  and not willing 
to accept the latter, even though j  is willing to be mated with i. In general, 
central types are choosier, since they have more chances to meet someone close 
to their own type.
In Alpern and Reyniers (1999) and in the relevant literature, it seems to be 
implicitly assumed th a t there exists a unique equilibrium, since in the examples 
examined only one equilibrium is presented. Hence the search for multiple equi­
libria comes as a natural question. The basic contribution of this chapter is to 
prove the existence of multiple equilibria in some discrete type games. Specifi­
cally, it is found tha t when there are m  =  3 or m  =  5 positive types (hence 7 
or 11 types in total respectively), there exist 3 equilibrium strategies in the two 
period game. The existence of multiple equilibria, seems to be a fairly robust 
result; computer search, which was not exhaustive, shows that the existence of 
multiple equilibria is possible also when the number of periods is larger. For 
instance, it was found tha t at least two equilibria exist in the four period model 
when there are m  — 8 positive types (hence 17 types in total).
In the discrete type game, the total number of strategies is always finite. 
Nevertheless, as the number of types becomes higher, it is too costly to check all 
possible strategies to pick out the equilibria. We present a method for reducing 
the number of strategies needed to be checked in order to find the equilibrium 
profiles in the discrete type game IT^m). Furthermore, we provide an overview 
of the equilibrium strategies used in T2, expanding the analysis of the continuous 
type T2 game of Alpern and Reyniers.
Unlike the original Alpern and Reyniers paper, we examine as well the equi­
librium behaviour without assuming tha t females and males and negative and 
positive types behave in a symmetric way in the two period discrete type game. 
However, even when negative and positive types and males and females have 
the opportunity to use variant strategies, we observe only symmetric equilib­
ria. Hence only equilibria symmetric over the origin 0 and symmetric for males 
and females exist even when the symmetry assumption is not embedded in the
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model.
In the next chapter we will analyse the equilibrium behaviour when play­
ers have common preferences. Before that, it is interesting to explore how the 
equilibrium behaviour is affected when players have a combination of common 
and homotypic preferences. The final section of this chapter is devoted to the 
analysis of the equilibrium behaviour when individuals have a cost when choos­
ing mates who are not close to them, but simultaneously search for partners of 
a high type. This model could describe the case, when a tennis player needs 
a competitor close to his ability, but at the same time he is interested in a 
competitor of a higher ability in order to have the opportunity to exercise and 
improve his skills. Another example could be a setting where a buyer of a car 
needs a car that has a price covered by his budget but on the same time he is 
fascinated by an expensive car of a higher quality. Similar preferences may be 
displayed by humans who seek partners close to their type, but at they same 
time they believe they are better off with partners who have the best possible 
fitness.
We analyse a discrete type game, played over two or three periods. Our 
goal is to examine how the equilibrium strategies "evolves" and also how the 
couple pattern and the acceptance range of each type change, as preferences 
vary. It seems tha t at equilibrium players are the most choosy when they have 
homotypic preferences and the least choosy when they have mixed preferences, 
giving the same weight to maximise the type of their partner and to minimise 
the cost of a mating. The number of couples formed before the last period is 
the highest when there is a combination of common and homotypic preferences, 
but the importance of homotypic preferences is significantly higher.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the first section we illustrate the 
symmetric continuous type game Tn of Alpern and Reyniers and describe the 
equilibrium strategy for all types in IV  Next, we focus on the corresponding 
discrete type game Tn (m), where we assume having m  positive types, m  nega­
tive types and a type 0. We describe a method for finding all the equilibrium 
strategies in ^ (m ) ,  and then we present our numerical results for the two period 
game when there are m  =  1 to m  =  9 positive types, analysing the equilibrium 
strategies, their effectiveness (in reducing mean intra-couple type difference) and 
their stability. Finally, we discuss the existence of multiple equilibria in games 
of n periods (for n  > 2), and give an example of the existence of multiple equi­
libria in the 4 period game T ^ra). In the last section we explore the relationship 
between similarity and common preferences and seek to  see how the equilibrium 
changes as the importance of the latter increases.
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2.2 D escription o f th e  N on A tom ic M ating Alpern and Reyniers 
Continuous T ype M utual Choice Game Tn
In the r n mutual choice game, two identical populations of individuals, of 
known one dimensional types, are uniformly distributed in an interval [—1, 1]. 
Individuals have similarity preferences as described before (preferring potential 
partners having types close to their own) and the distance between the indi­
viduals’ types \x — y\ is a measure of the cost of a mating of an individual of 
type x  with an individual of type y. We assume tha t there exist a continuum of 
players.
In every period, individuals are randomly paired and they form a couple if 
they both accept each other; otherwise they move on to the next period, where 
a random matching takes place again. The process continues until period n, 
where all matchings are mutually accepted and form mated couples.
A strategy is defined as an acceptance rule indicating the maximum distance 
Sk(x) acceptable in period A; to a type x  individual. That is, a type x male will 
accept a type y female in period k if
S k ( x ) > \ x - y \  (1)
Both sexes are assumed to use the same strategies in this symmetric contin­
uous type model. Hence a type x  male is going to use the same strategy Sk(x) 
as a type x  female in every period k.
When the population is uniformly distributed between [—1,1], types x  and 
—x  are also assumed to share the same strategy.
S k ( x )  =  Sk ( - x )  (2)
It follows from (1) tha t in period k , given tha t type x  uses strategy sk(x) 
and type y uses strategy Sk(y), a mating occurs if and only if
\ x - y \  < m m { s k(x) , sk(y)} (3)
The expected cost for an individual of type x  to enter period k  unmated is 
denoted by Ck{x)', this depends on the strategy s, so Ck(x) =  Ck{s,x).
At equilibrium, no player can decrease his expected cost by using other than 
the equilibrium strategy s, given that the rest of the population is using strategy 
s. Hence at equilibrium
Sfe(x) =  Cfc+i(s, x ), for 1 <  k < n — 1 and — 1 < x < 1 (4)
If F  is the normalised cumulative probability function of types y in the last
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period, the expected cost for a type x  entering in the last period is
Cn(x) = J  \ x - y \ d F ( y )
Before presenting the rn(m) game and illustrating our results, it is important 
to mention two theorems of Alpern and Reyniers, which are im portant for our 
analysis. In these theorems it is assumed tha t F  can take any form, hence the 
theorems can be applied also in the case tha t F  is a discrete function as in
r„(m).
T heorem  2.1 (o f A lpern and R eyniers (1999)) I f  F  denotes the final pe­
riod cumulative probability distribution, then the final period cost function Cn is 
a symmetric convex function, minimised at 0 , with the following properties:
c„(-l) = C„(l) = 1 (5)
Cn{ - 1) =  -1 ,  C'n{ 1) =  1 and C ' (0) =  0 (6)
C'n(x) = 2 F { x ) - l
T heorem  2.2 (o f A lpern and R eyniers (1999)) In a two period model, at
equilibrium, if  xq < x \ < X2 , and x$ accepts X2 , then x \ also accepts X2 .
Since Cn is increasing in |x| by Theorem 2.1, the choosier individuals tend 
to be nearer to the centre. As we move away from the centre, types become less 
choosy, with the extreme types accepting every type between themselves and 
the middle types. Combining Theorem 2.1 with Theorem 2.2, we can show tha t 
in the two period model, central types tend to  do better than extreme types, as 
they have more chances to be accepted in the first period. This fact is verified 
in the analysis of the discrete two period game in section 2.7.
2.3 Extended Alpern and Reyniers Two Period M odel
Alpern and Reyniers focus on the two period mutual choice matching game, 
where the populations are uniformly distributed in an interval [—1,1]. In the 
two period model, a mating occurs in the first period if and only if there is mutual 
acceptance between the paired individuals; thus an individual x  is mated in the 
first period if and only if he is paired with an individual y in the set A x described 
below.
A x = {y : \ x - y \  <  min(s(x),s(?/))} (7)
For simplicity reasons, since a strategy is defined only in the first period and 
a expected cost function is defined only in the second period, s(x) — si(x)  will
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denote the strategy of a type x  in the first period and C(x ) =  C2 (x) will denote 
the cost that a type x  expects to get for entering in the last period unmated.
Let p(x)  be the probability tha t an individual of type x  is mated in the first 
period; then
p(x) = p (Ax) =  p({y : \x — y\ < m in(s(x), s(y))}) (8)
where p  is the normalised Lebesgue measure on [—1,1]. The pre-normalised 
population density at the beginning of period 2 is (1 —p(x)) and given p(—x) = 
p{x) the total population Q is
Q = J  (1 - p ( x ) ) d p ( x )  = J  (1 - p ( x ) ) d x
Therefore the normalised population density function at the beginning of period 
2 is
f 'M  -  (»)
In order to define the equilibrium acceptance strategies, A x and p{x) have 
to be evaluated.
Let
xu  =  min{x : x  accepts l}= m in{x  : x  +  s(x) =  1} (10)
(xu is the unique solution ) 
and
x l =  max{x : —x accepts x}= max{x : —x  +  s(—x) =  x} (11)
=  max{x : —x  +  s(x) =  x}
(x£ is the unique solution)
We define
h  =  [0,xL], h  =  [x l jXu\ and 73 =  [xu, 1]
and
R(x)  =  R s(x) = x  +  s(x)
L(x)  =  L s(x) = x — s(x)
where i?(x) and L(x)  are the rightmost and leftmost types tha t x  accepts 
under strategy s. Hence R ~ 1(x) is the individual th a t is furthest to the left of
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individual x  and accepts x.
Since everything is symmetric around 0, it is sufficient to analyse the be­
haviour of the non negative types; negative types are assumed to behave like 
positive types.
We know tha t for x  e [0, x l ], a type x  — s(x) always accepts x  (as proved in 
Lemma A . l  in Appendix A.  1)
Hence for i  e [0,1] we have that
[L(x), i?(x)] =  [x — s(x), x  +  s(x)] f o r x E l i  
A x = < [R~l(x) ,R(x)],  fo r  x  E h
[iT T (x),l], fo r  x  E h
and
p(x) = <
s(x), fo r  x  E I\ 
»+,(x)-fi-l(*)) f m x e h
2 ’ fo r  x  E h
Types in h  are universal acceptors; if a type x  accepts a type y in h ,  then 
y always accepts x  as well. Therefore in order to determine the equilibrium 
behaviour, it is only needed to define the equilibrium strategy in I\  and h -  
At equilibrium,
s(:c) =  C(x)  according to (4) 
=» s"(x) = 2F'(x)
^ S"{x ) = ^ j { l - P ( x ))
Therefore,
(i) for x E I \  (Alpern and Reyniers(1999)),
(12)
*"(*) =  q (! -  *(*)) (13)
where s is symmetric around 0 and s(x) =  s(—x), m = o.
It is im portant to note th a t Q is underdetermined and it depends on the 
equilibrium acceptance strategy s.
Hence,
s(x, C) = 1 — a cos ^ \ j ^ x^
=  ! - ( ! -  s(0)) cos •
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(ii) for x e h ,
1 - x  +  s(a:) — R 1 1(a:) 
2
(15)
where R  x(x) belongs in Jior in /_  i, since
(i) (x +  s(x)) is an increasing function
(ii) — x l  +  s ( — x l )  = x l  and 
(Hi) we assume tha t x j j  <  x l  +  2 x l
Hence the acceptance strategy of i2-1 (ar) is already known from (14). 
Moreover, s ( x l )  and s i ( x l )  are known from (14).
(iii) for x e h ,
(z) x  +  s(x) is an increasing function,
(ii) - x L +  s ( - x L) =  x L,
(iii) we assume that x j j  <  x l  +  2 x l ,
(iv) xl +  s (x l ) =  3xl  and 
(z;) x v  +  s(xv ) = 1
Hence its acceptance strategy is already known from (14) or from (15). Fur­
thermore it is known tha t s (l)  =  1 and s '( l)  =  1 from (5), since at equilibrium
The solution of the previous differential equations can be quite complicated. 
Alpern and Reyniers tried to approximate a possible equilibrium of the game 
by using a discrete approximation of the continuous model. They assumed we 
have 2m + 1  continuous types. In order to keep the symmetry of the continuous 
model, each type i is taken to belong in the set 7m, where
I m =  {—m, —m  +  1, —m  +  2 , . . . ,  —2 , —1 , 0 , 1, 2 , . . . ,  m  — 2 , m  — 1 , m}
where R  1(x) belongs either to / _ \ or to h  or to  h ,  since
(16)
.(1 ) =  C (l).
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Hence a type i corresponds to a type ^  in the continuous model. They found the 
equilibrium strategy for m  = 40 and they used it to calculate an approximated 
value for s(0) and Q (s(0) =  0.447 and Q = 0.51). Using these results, they 
showed that the equilibrium strategy in the interval I\  of the continuous type 
game is a good approximation of the equilibrium strategy of all types in the 
discrete case, therefore a fairly good approximation for the equilibrium strategy 
in all the intervals of the continuous type game.
If we take s(x) =  1 — 0.447 cos(y^j4^a:), we have xl = 0.295 and xu  = 0.384, 




Figure 2.1: Plots of 1 — 0.447cos( y j 1 — x  and
2x.
2.4 Discrete Type two-period M odel T2(m)
In the discrete type game rn(m), as in the continuous game Tn, cohorts of males 
and females are randomly paired for n periods. Nevertheless, as we saw in the 
previous sections, there are 2m +  1 types belonging in the set
Im = {—m, —m + 1, —m +  2 , . . . ,  —2, — 1,0,1, 2 , . . . ,  m  — 2, m  — 1, m}
The types are uniformly distributed so that at the beginning of the game the 
fraction of the population being of type i is 2m+i • requirement of mutual 
acceptance is maintained and the definition of a strategy s remains unchanged 
as in the continuous type model; Sk{i) denotes the maximum distance that any 
type can have from i in order to be accepted by the latter in period k. It is 
important to note though that in the discrete type model, a strategy Sk(i) is
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always an integer.
In the two period game ^ ( r a )  since a strategy is defined only in the first 
period and a expected cost function is defined only in the second period, s(i) =  
si(i) denotes the strategy of a type i in the first period and Cd(i) = Cd2{i) 
denotes the cost th a t a type i expects to get for entering in the last period 
unmated, as the C  in the continuous type two period game.
At equilibrium, the strategy of a type i in ^ ( m )  is equal to the floor function 
of the expected cost for i in the last period. Hence
s(i) =  | Cd{i, a)} and Cd(i, s) — 1 < s(z) <  Q (z, s) (17)
where Cd(i, s) is the cost th a t i expects to get if it enters in the second period 
unmated, when s strategy is used.
As a result, even though two types may not have the same expected cost 
for entering unmated in the last period, they can have the same strategy. For 
instance, if Cd(i, s) =  2.1 and Cd{j, s ) =  2.9, then s(i) = s(j) = 2.
It is necessary to note th a t Alpern and Reyniers consider that males and 
females use the same strategies and that positive and negative types behave in 
the same way as well; we maintain this assumption in the next two sections. 
Nonetheless, we also examined how the strategies change if we removed this 
assumption, allowing the players to act independently, and calculated the equi­
libria in the discrete type game for m  up to 5; our results remained the same as 
the one found in section 2.7. The exhaustive research showed no difference in 
the equilibria; only symmetric equilibria were found.
2.5 Properties o f Equilibrium  Strategies in T2 (ra)
Alpern and Reyniers found an equilibrium strategy in ^ ( r a )  by seeking fixed 
points of a best response function on the strategy space. Starting with any stra t­
egy s, they used the iterative method in order to find a new strategy s, whose 
value function has the same floor for all types as s. This iterative procedure in 
general may miss some equilibria - especially the ones corresponding to repelling 
fixed points. To ensure tha t we find all the equilibria, we must adopt a more 
thorough method; hence for m  positive types, in order to be certain we find all 
the equilibria, it is sufficient to check all possible strategies, examining
which ones satisfy the equilibrium condition (17). However, as the number m  of 
types increases, this method becomes extremely time consuming and the need 
to rule out some of the strategies becomes apparent. Theorem 2.1 can be used 
to reduce the number of eligible equilibrium strategies.
Before enumerating the properties tha t an equilibrium strategy has according 
to Theorem 2.1, it is im portant to  stress th a t even if the expected cost function
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Cd is strictly convex, it does not follow th a t its floor approximation strategy s 
is also strictly convex. This is due to the fact that a strategy s(z) of a type i 
is always an integer, but the corresponding cost Cd(i) does not have to be an 
integer and it can be larger than s(z); s(i) <  Cd{i) < s(i) +  1. For example, a 
cost function Cd =  (1.99,2.1,2.4,2.9) is strictly convex, while its corresponding 
strategy s =  (1 ,2 ,2 ,2) is not. However, we will show, tha t s must be "almost 
convex", in senses that we make precise in Theorem 2.3.
L em m a 2.1 I f  s(i) — s(j) > 2, then Cd(i) — Cd(j) > 1.
P ro o f . By (17), Cd(i) > s(i) and Cd(j) < s(j)  + 1 .
Hence Cd{i) -  Cd(j) > s(i) -  s(j)  — 1 >  1. ■
L em m a 2.2 I f  Cd(i) — Cd{j) > 1, then s(i) — s(j) > 1.
P ro o f. By (17), Cd(i) < s(i) + 1  and Cd(j) > s(j).
Hence s(z) -  s(j)  > Cd(i) -  1 -  Cd(j) > 0.
Since s(i) and s(j)  are both integers, it follows tha t s(i) — s ( j ) >  1. ■ 
Given Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we will determine the properties of the floor 
function of a convex function.
T h e o re m  2.3 Let s = \Cd\ be an equilibrium strategy o / r 2(m ); with corre­
sponding cost function Cd. Then s is of the form s — (s (0), s (1), s (2 ),..., s (m )) , 
where s(i), for i > 0 ,  denotes the strategy that a type i uses at equilibrium. Then,
(i) s(m) = m
The extreme types m  and —m  are universal acceptors, accepting all non 
negative and all non positive types respectively.
(ii) For all i, s(« +  1) >  s(i)- 
A strategy s has to be a non decreasing list.
(iii) For all i > m  — 2, i f  s(i +  1) — s(i) >  2 then 
s(i  +  2) — s(i +  1) >  s(i +  1) — s(i) — 1.
(iv) For all i > m  — 4, i f  s(i +  2) >  s(z) +  2 then s(i -f 4) >  s(i +  2).
P ro o f , (i) This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.1, since we have 
s(m)  =  [v(m)\ =  m  according to (5). Same way, for —m.
(ii) From (5) and (17), s is the non decreasing floor function of a non 
decreasing function Cd, hence non decreasing.
(iii) Suppose th a t s is an equilibrium strategy, violating this condition. Then 
for some I > 2, we have s(i) =  a, s(i +  1) =  a + 1 and s(i +  2) =  a +  21 — 2. For
strategy s to be an equilibrium strategy then from Theorem 1, it has to be true
tha t
Cd(i +  1) -  Cd(i) < Cd(i +  2) -  Cd(i +  1)
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By (17), we have
Cd{i) e[a ,a + 1)
Cd{i +  1) c [a +  Z, a +  Z -f-1)
Cd(i +  2) e [a +  21 -  2, a +  21 -  1)
Consequently
Z -  1 < Cd{i +  1) -  Cd(z) < Z + 1  
and
Z -  3 < Cd(z +  2) -  Cd(z +  1) < Z -  1
Hence Cd(i + 1 ) — Cd(i) > Cd(i +  2) — Cd(i + 1 ), which contradicts our initial 
claim.
(iv) By Theorem 2.1, Cd(i+4)—Cd(z+2) >  Cd{i+2)— Cd{i). But by Lemma 
2.1, ifs(z+2) >  s(z)+2 then Cd{i+2)—Cd(i) > 1. Hence Cd(z+4)—Cd(i+2) > 1.
It follows by Lemma 2.2 tha t s(z +  4) — s(i +  2) >  1 and therefore we have 
s(i +  4) > s(i +  2). ■
Having determined the properties of the equilibrium strategies, it is then 
easy to identify the potential equilibrium strategies and check which ones satisfy 
the equilibrium condition (17). In order to do so, given a potential equilibrium 
strategy s, we first have to find the set of potential types j  with which every type 
z can be mated. Then, given the initial type distribution, we can calculate the 
probability of each type z remaining unmated and moving to the last period. 
This probability helps us next to determine the new type distribution in the 
last period and consequently the expected cost Cd(i) for each type z entering 
the second period unmated; if s(z) =  [Cd(i)\ for every type z, then s is proved to 
be an equilibrium strategy. The algorithm for identifying equilibrium strategies 
is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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Identify Potential Equilibrium Strategy s.
Find the set o f potential types j with which every type i can be 
mated.
Calculate the probability that each type i remains unmated and 
moves to the last period.
Calculate the new type distribution in the last period.
Calculate the expected cost C(i) for each type i entering the last 
period unmated.
If s(i) = C(i) for every i, s is an equilibrium strategy.
Figure 2.2: Algorithm for identifying equilibrium strategies
2.6 A nalysis of th e Tw o Period M utual Choice D iscrete Type  
G am e ^(ra) w ith  m =  0 to  m =  9 Positive Types
We applied the algorithm described in Figure 2.2 to identify all the equilibrium 
strategies in r 2(ra) for m  =  1 to m  — 9 positive types. Next, we calculated 
the probability to be mated in the first period if the equilibrium strategies are 
used, and the expected cost for any type i in each period and in total; finally 
we computed the intra-couple correlation and the inter-couple stability (marital 
stability) in each case.
The most important result of our analysis is the existence of 3 equilibrium 
strategies when there are m  — 3 and m  =  5 positive types, since multiple 
equilibria had not been noted in r 2(m) till now. Nevertheless, the equilibrium 
analysis in the models where there is a unique equilibrium is also interesting since 
it helps us to get a better insight into the game itself. Connections between the 
strategy, the probability of being mated and the mating cost are made in the 
following sections. Furthermore the role of the number of types is studied. We
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find tha t the correlation is not affected by the number of types in the game, 
while the inter-couple (marital) stability seems to be inversely correlated with 
the number of types.
2.6.1 Equilibrium  Strategies
In all the examined games there exists an odd number of equilibria, ranging 
from 1 to 3, a fact that is in accordance with general theory. In the majority of 
the games (for m  = 1 ,2 ,4 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ) there exists a unique equilibrium strategy. 
Nevertheless, when there are m  — 3 and m  =  5 positive types, there exist 3 
equilibrium strategies. The equilibrium strategies for all the games are listed in 
Figure 2.6. A strategy denotes the maximum distance tha t each type i accepts 
in the first period. For example, when m  = 4, at equilibrium we have s( 1) =  2, 
hence type 1 accepts types 7, such tha t — 1 <  i <  3 and type —1 accepts types 
j  such that —3 < j  <  1.
We also examined the expected costs connected with each strategy. Figure 
2.4 illustrates the expected cost Cd(i) that each type i will pay if he enters in 
the last period unmated when the equilibrium strategy is used, for all examined 
m. The floor functions of Cd are the equilibrium strategies. However, it is 
interesting to examine the costs Cd, since they may give some extra information 
in the case where there are multiple equilibria. The plotted expected costs Cd 
are divided by 777,, so that =  1; by normalising Cd, it is easier to make
comparisons when m  varies.
By looking at Figure 2.3 and at Figure 2.4, it becomes obvious th a t in every 
game the middle type (type 0) is the choosiest type. As we move from the
middle type (type 0) to the extreme types (m  and —m), types become less
choosy. The extreme types (m and —m)  are the least choosy, being universal 
acceptors. Moreover, it is evident tha t as the number m  of types increases, the 
graphs of the strategies seem to approach each other, a fact tha t suggests tha t 
for very large m  we may have a unique equilibrium. This assumption needs to 
be checked and it is based mostly on intuition.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the 3 equilibrium strategies when m  =  3 and
when 777 =  5 respectively, named s i, s2 and s3 in Figure 2.3. The equilibrium 
strategies in each case differ only on the strategies used by the middle types 
(close to 0), while the strategies used by the more extreme types (closer to m  
and — m)  are the same. Nevertheless, even when the strategies are the same for 
some types j ,  where j  7  ^ m, —m  (Figure 2.3) the expected cost for entering in 
the last period unmated differs (Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6).
It is important to note tha t we checked whether there are any changes in the 
equilibria if we remove the assumptions of sex and around the 0 type symmetry 
in the equilibrium strategies. We calculated the equilibria in the games where
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m  takes values between 1 and 5 by using exhaustive research and we did not 
find any additional equilibria. Players behave symmetrically even if they have 
the opportunity not to do so.










Figure 2.3: Equilibrium strategies in the first period of the 2 period
discrete type game.
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Figure 2.5: Normalised expected cost for entering in 
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Figure 2.6: Normalised equilibrium expected costs for 
entering in the second period unmated for m  = 5.
2.6.2 P ro b ab ility  o f G e ttin g  M a ted  in  th e  F irs t P e rio d
We explored how the probability of getting mated in the first period changes, 
depending on the type and on the number of positive types m. In that way, we 
can estimate which types we expect to find a partner more quickly. Figure 2.7 
illustrates the probability for each type, in each game, to be mated in the first 
period. The probability is described as a percentage. A more accurate figure of 
the probability is given in Appendix A.2. It is obvious that the types closer to 
the middle (type 0) have higher probability of being mated in the first period 
(higher than 0.5 in most cases except for m  — 5 and m  = 3), while the more 
extreme types (close to m  and — m)  have lower chances to find a mate in the 
initial period (lower than 0.5 in every case, except when m  — 1). Additionally, 
it is apparent that in the cases where there are multiple equilibria, when the 
middle types are less choosy it is more probable they are mated in the first 
period, while whether the extreme types have a smaller chance of being mated, 
depends not only on the behaviour of the middle types (type 0), but also on the 
behaviour of the types between the extreme (m and —m) and the middle (type 
0).
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typeO typel type2 type3 type4 type5 type6 type7 type8 type9
m=1 100 67
0
m=2 60 60 40
s1 43 43 43 29
m=3 s2 43 71 43 43
s3 71 71 57 43
m=4 56 56 56 44 33
s1 45 45 55 45 36 36
m=5 s2 45 64 64 45 45 36
S3 64 64 64 55 45 36
m=6 54 54 54 54 46 39 31
m=7 60 60 60 60 53 47 40 47
m=8 53 53 53 59 53 47 41 35 35
m=9 58 58 58 58 58 53 47 42 37 32
Figure 2.7: Probability (as percentage) of getting mated in the first period
at equilibrium.
2 .6 .3  Total E xpected  Cost
Depending on the strategy used, individuals of each type i have an expected 
to tal cost TC{i)  =  T C ( i , s) for entering the game, tha t is the expected distance 
\i — j \  from their eventual mate j .  The to tal expected cost TC{i ) for a type 
i , depends on the probability pi(i)  of i being mated in the first period, the 
expected cost d\{i) of i when mated in first period and the expected cost d2(i) 
of i when mated in the second period. Hence
TC(i)  = p i( i)d i( i)  +  (1 - p i ( i ) ) d 2(i)
It is expected th a t types having a greater probability of being mated in the 
first period will have a bigger cost in the first period, but probably a smaller 
to tal cost. This is confirmed by examining the middle types cost as illustrated 
in Figure 2.8. In Figure 2.8, we have normalised the cost, by multiplying it 
with 100, in order to make it easier to make comparisons. A more accurate 
figure of the cost is given in Appendix A.2. For each game (hence for each
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m), the first row in the table in Figure 2.8 illustrates the normalised average 
cost 100pi(i)di(i) tha t each type i receives when m ated in the first period. The 
second row of the table illustrates the normalised average cost 100(1— Pi{i))d,2 (i) 
th a t each type i receives when mated in the second period. The third row 
illustrates the normalised average total cost lOOTC(z) tha t a type i expects to 
receive when he enters the game. Since the probability of getting m ated in the 
first period is higher for types around 0 , they have the lowest cost of mating 
in total, but a large cost in the first period. The to tal mating cost tends to 
increase as we move from the middle types (type 0 ) to the extreme types (m 
and — m), which is probably explained by the fact th a t the mating probability 
in the first period tends to decrease as we move away from type 0. Furthermore, 
the difference between the costs in the two periods increases as we move from 
the middle types (type 0 ), to the extreme types (m  and —m)  and as we add 
more types in the game.
In the case of multiple equilibria, Figure 2.8 shows which strategy is preferred 
by each type, since it illustrates which strategy has the smallest expected total 
cost for each type. Thus, for m  =  3, it becomes obvious that s i  =  (1,1,2,3) 
is better for middle types |z| <  1, s2 =  (1, 2 , 2 ,3) is better for types \j\ =  2 
and both s2 =  (1 ,2 ,2 ,3) and s3 =  (2 ,2 ,2 ,3) are equally good for extreme 
types \z\ =  3. For m  =  5, s i  =  (2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,5 ) is preferred by |z'| <  2, s2 =  
(2 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,5 ) is preferred by \jf\ =  4 and s i  =  (3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,5 ) is favoured by 
\z\ =  3, while the extreme types \z'\ =  5 are indifferent between all equilibrium
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strategies.
typeO typei type2 type3 type4 type5 type6 type7 type8 type9 average
1rst period 67 33 44
m=1 2nd period 0 33 22
total 67 67 67
1rst period 40 40 20 32
m=2 2nd period 53 60 120 83
total 93 100 140 115
1rst period 29 29 29 14 25
s1 2nd period 103 111 133 214 146
total 131 139 162 229 170
1rst period 29 86 29 43 49
m=3 s2 2nd period 105 57 133 171 118
total 133 143 162 214 167
1rst period 86 86 57 43 65
S3 2nd period 57 60 103 171 104
total 143 146 160 214 169
1rst period 67 67 67 44 33 55 54
m=4 2nd period 108 112 125 183 267 318 165
total 175 179 192 227 300 373 219
1rst period 55 55 82 55 36 55 56
s1 2nd period 156 160 146 197 268 318 212
total 210 215 228 252 304 373 268
1rst period 55 109 109 55 64 55 76
m=5 s2 2nd period 162 112 120 200 231 318 193
total 216 221 229 255 295 373 269
1rst period 109 109 109 82 64 55 86
s3 2nd period 112 114 122 169 232 318 184
total 221 223 231 251 296 373 270
1 rst period 92 92 92 92 69 54 46 76
m=6 2nd period 162 165 174 190 247 320 415 245
total 254 257 267 282 316 374 462 321
1 rst period 133 133 133 133 107 87 73 67 107
m=7 2nd period 166 168 175 186 234 295 371 467 264
total 299 301 308 319 341 382 444 533 370
1 rst period 118 118 118 147 118 94 77 65 88 104
m=8 2nd period 215 217 225 208 254 310 379 462 518 315
total 333 335 342 355 372 404 455 527 606 419
1rst period 158 158 158 158 158 132 111 95 84 79 127
m=9 2nd period 220 222 227 236 249 299 359 429 514 616 343
total 378 380 385 394 407 431 469 524 599 695 471
Figure 2.8: Total expected cost at equilibrium.
2.6 .4  Intra-C ouple C orrelation
The intra-couple correlation measures how alike mated couples are and it can 
be used as an indicator of the pleasure the players derive at the equilibrium. In
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order to  find the intra-couple correlation coefficient r, we have to find first the 
fraction of couples (i, j )  in periods 1 and 2 .
In the first period, the fraction of individuals of type i is 2m+i anc  ^
fraction of individuals of type j  is 2m1+1. Hence 2m1+1 of the individuals of type 
i are paired with an individual of type j .  The fraction of couples ( i , j )  created 
in the first period is therefore 2m+i 2m+~i '
Given that strategy s is used in the first period, we define as q(i , s) the 
probability that an individual of type i remains unmated in the first period and 
enters in the second period. Hence in the second period, there are 2rn+i^(^  s) 
individuals of type i and gm+i C^?*’g) individuals of type j .  Every individual 
accepts anyone he is paired with in the last period. So the probability of a type 
i being mated with a type j  is kJ ^ ,s] . Thus, the proportion of couples
L )t= -ra# 's)
( i, j )  in the second period when strategy s is used is
s)
2m +  1 
We define the function
and j  are not mated in the first period_  J o ,  if i 
\  1, if i' r ' and j  are mated in the first period
{ 0 , if \i -  j\  > s(i) or \i -  j \  > s(j)
1 , if \ i - j \ <  s(i) and \i -  j\  < s ( j )
The total fraction N ( s :i , j )  of couples (i , j ) in the first and second period 
when strategy s is used is
N(s ,  z, j )  =  a(s, i , j )  ( - —-— + - —-—-q ( i , s )— r — ------ (18)
Knowing the fraction of couples ( i, j )  in every period, it is easy then to 
calculate the correlation coefficient r.
The intra-couple correlation r seems to be quite small in all the games 
analysed, taking values between 0.306 and 0.36, probably due to  the fact that 
all types are willing to accept a range of types including theirs. There are no 
significant differences between the different games or in the same game between 
different equilibria. We would expect that correlation r would probably be
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higher if the number of periods n becomes larger.
m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9
s1 0.36 0.306 0.337 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.336
s2 0.357 0.347
S3 0.357 0.347
Figure 2.9: Intra-couple correlation coefficient f  at 
equilibrium.
2.6.5 Instab ility  o f C reated C ouples
It is important to know how stable are the couples created given a specific 
strategy used. We need to know how willing the players would be to change 
partners after the end of the game. Instability can also be used as a measure of 
the pleasure tha t players get from the game. Assuming as before that in every 
couple ( i , j )  created, i represents a male and j  a female, we choose two couples 
(z, j )  and (k , I) at random, where i and k are males and j  and I are females. We 
define instability as the probability tha t either i prefers I better than j  and I 
prefers i better than k , or th a t j  prefers k better than i and k prefers j  better 
than I.
We define a function w such as
if i prefers I than j  and I prefers i than k
< or 
if j  prefers k than i and k prefers j  than I
otherwise
if \i — j \  > \i — l\ and |Z — k\ > |z — l\
< or 
k if |i -  j\  > |j -  k\ and \k -  l\ > \k -  j\
otherwise
Given tha t initially we have fixed cohorts of males and females, the prob­







i —m  j = m  k = m  l = m
instability(s) = E E  E E w(s, (i, j ) , (k, l))N(s,  i , j )N (s ,  fc, I)
i = —m  j = —m  k ——m  l — —m
It becomes apparent from Figure 2.10, that as we add more types to the 
game, the couples created become more unstable. Hence in a separate game 
where types were permitted to divorce, we would expect tha t the probability 
of taking a divorce would increase as the number of types becomes larger. Fo­
cusing on the games with multiple equilibria, we can observe that there are 
no im portant differences between the different strategies. In any case, when 
m  = 3, si =  (1 ,1,2 ,3) seems to be the most stable strategy and s3 =  (2,2 ,2 ,3) 
the most unstable and when m  =  5, si =  (2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,5 ) seems to be the most 
stable strategy and s3 =  (3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,5 ) the most unstable. As expected, the 
choosier on average the players are, the more stable are their matings; this is 
also observed in the common preferences model.
m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 m=8 m=9
s1 0.181 0.206 0.245 0.257 0.275 0.293 0.296 0.307
s2 0.223 0.267
s3 0.238 0.272
Figure 2.10: Instability index at equilibrium.
2 .7  M u lt ip le  E q u ilib r ia  in  an  n -P er io d  G a m e r n(m), w h e re  n  > 2
In the two period discrete games analysed, we were able to find all the equilib­
rium strategies and comment on their efficiency. Nonetheless, as we add more 
periods in the game, it becomes complicated to find all the existing equilibrium 
strategies, since even the method described before and used in the two period 
games becomes time-consuming. The 3 period game and the 4 period game, 
where there exist m  — 8 positive types (and 8 symmetric negative types and a 0 
type) were analysed by using computer search methods, and in the case of the 
4 periods, there were found at least two equilibrium strategies, namely
»! =  ((2 ,2 ,2 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,4 ), (3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,4 ,5 ,5 ), (4 ,4 ,4 ,5 ,5 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8)) and 
=  ((2 ,2 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ), (3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,3 ,4 ,4 ,5 ,5 ), (4 ,4 ,5 ,5 ,5 ,6 , 6 ,7 ,8)).
This fact illustrates tha t the equilibrium in the discrete game is not unique 
even in some discrete type games of more than 2 periods. Thus, it becomes
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apparent tha t it is possible tha t there exist multiple equilibria in games of any 
number of periods n, even though this is not investigated thoroughly at this 
point and further research needs to be done.
2 .8  M ix e d  P r e fe r e n c e s  - C o m b in a tio n  o f  S im ila r ity  an d  C om ­
m o n  P re fe r e n c e s
In our analysis so far, we assumed tha t players have homotypic preferences. 
However, in real life it is not always true tha t preferences are purely homotypic or 
purely maximising. In many cases, individuals have a combination of homotypic 
and maximising preferences. They want to find partners similar to them, in order 
to minimise the cost of mating but simultaneously they search for a partner that 
is of a high type, since they value greatly the utility they get from his type. When 
the interests tha t individuals have are conflicting, they make their choice based 
on the importance they assign to their needs.
In our model, we define the utility of a mating (z, j )  for type i as a weighted 
average between its cost and the utility j  gives to i. Hence when a type z is 
mated with a type j ,  the utility uij of i and the utility uji of j  are
+  ( i _ ^  w h e r e w e [ 0 1 ]  (19)
U j i  =  — u  \J  —  l \  +  ( 1  — U J ) l
As individuals become less interested in mating with a high type, but value 
the mating with a type close to their own greatly, the weight u  becomes larger, 
while as the need to find a high type partner becomes stronger u  becomes 
smaller. When uj =  1, players have homotypic preferences and when u  =  0, 
players have common preferences.
We assume tha t males and females have the same preferences, weighting in 
the same way the cost of mating (weight cj) and the value of a mating (weight 
(1 — a;)). This permits us to maintain the sex symmetry displayed in the pure 
homotypic preferences model.
Apart from the player’s preferences, the rest of the characteristics of the game 
remain mostly the same as in the previous sections. Players have one dimen­
sional types which are uniformly distributed over an interval and are randomly 
paired over n  periods. We focus on the discrete type decentralised non atomic 
two and three period game, where types belong in an interval {0 , 1,..., m —1, m}.  
The assumption of symmetric behaviour of types around the origin 0 has no 
longer any meaning therefore it is removed. However, the game remains a mu­
tual choice game, where no new players are perm itted to enter after the begin­
ning of the game and in the last period all players accept any available partner, 
exactly as in the games described in the previous sections.
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A strategy sk(i) indicates the minimum utility tha t i accepts in period k. 
Hence at equilibrium, mating ( i , j )  takes place in period k when the utility Uij 
and Uji tha t it offers to % and j  respectively is higher than the utility they would 
expect to receive if they entered in the next period unmated.
Ui j  ^  9-iid Uj i  ^
Therefore a type i accepts a type j  when
- u \ i - j \  +  ( l -  Lj ) j  >  Sk(i) &
- uj I i  ~  j  I >  h ( i )  “  (1 “  u ) j  <£>
\ i - j \ < - h ( i ) + { 1 - u ) ju
Skip)  -  (1  -  w ) j  ^  ^  - s k(i)  +  (1 -  uj)j  _  \  Z — 7   vv
UJ UJ
~ h { i )  +  (1 -  u j ) j  +  u i >  u j  >  s k { i )  -  (1 ~  uj ) j  +  wi <*=> 
—s k { i )  +  uji  >  { 2 u  — 1 ) j  and j  >  s k ( i )  +  u i
Thus
it ^ 1  ^  +  • -e - §k(i) +  ^  ^  ^  .  / . v  , .If u  >  - ,  then i  accepts j  if — —-——-—  >  J >  s k { i )  +  u j i  
2 2cu — 1
If u  < then i accepts j  if j  >  max{sk(i) + ui,  —^  — . j.
2 2cu — 1
1 i i
If to =  -  then i accepts j  if sk(i) < — and j  > sk(i) +  -
Hence a mating between i and j takes place when
If J <  i, j
Sk{i) < - u j { i -  j )  +  (1 -  u ) j  
Sk{j) < - u j ( i -  j )  +  (1 -  u)i
Sk(i) < u j ( i - j )  + (1 - u ) j  
Sk(j) < u j { i - j )  + ( l - u ) i
\ sk{ i ) < j - u i  
[ sk(j) < j u  + ( - 2 u  + l)i
sk(i) < u i -  2uj  +  j  
Sk(j) < ~juJ +  i
Given tha t the expected utility for an individual of type i to enter period k 
unmated is denoted by Vk( s , i ), at equilibrium
Sfc(0 =  Vk+i(s, i) for 1 <  k < n  — 1 (20)
It is expected tha t as u j  decreases, the to tal utility tha t players receive de­
creases as well. We expect tha t for all u,  the highest types have the smallest
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expected utility for entering in the last period unmated, a fact confirmed by the 
numerical results presented in the next sections.
We examine how the equilibrium behaviour changes as u j increases from 0 
to 1 with steps of 0.1 when there are 10 discrete types, uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 9. We did not assume tha t there is sex or type symmetry at 
equilibrium, nevertheless we found tha t the equilibrium strategies of males and 
females are symmetric. We present our results for the two and three period 
games.
2.8.1 Two Period G am e
The analysis of the two period game offers us the opportunity to examine the 
differences in the behaviour of different types as their preferences change. We 
note tha t the majority of types are the choosiest when they have homotypic 
preferences and are the least choosy when they regard as equally im portant 
finding a high type mate and a mate close to them. We note tha t we measure 
the choosiness of a type according to the number of types he is willing to accept. 
In general, extreme types (close to 0 and 9) are always choosier than the middle 
types, accepting higher types when uj < 0.5, and types closer to their own 
otherwise. The effect of the weight uj on the acceptance range of different types 
varies and it is shown tha t the acceptance range of low and middle types is 
influenced by a; in a greater extent than that of the high types. As a result 
the pattern and the number of couples created before the last period varies 
significantly for different u j . In most games, especially for uj < 0.5, the majority 
of couples formed in the first period are created between high and middle types. 
However, as uj increases low types participate as well in the mating process in the 
first period. The number of couples created in the first period is the minimum 
when uj — 0 and the maximum when uj =  0.9.
Figures 2.11 show the equilibrium strategies found via iteration for each uj 
and Figure 2.12 illustrates the range of types tha t each type is willing to accept 
at equilibrium. In Appendix A .3 we plot the equilibrium strategies in Figure 
A.3. It is worth reminding to the reader tha t a strategy th a t a type i uses in a 
period denotes the minimum utility tha t type i is willing to accept from a pairing 
in th a t period; the strategy of i is equal with the utility th a t type i expects to 
receive if he enters in the next period unmated. It is expected for types to have 
different expected utilities in the last period, but the same acceptance range. 
Since males and females use the same strategy and have the same behaviour 
at equilibrium, Figures 2.11 and 2.12 illustrate both male and female strategies 
and range of acceptance. In Figure 2.12, we do not list all the types th a t a 
type accepts, since there is never discontinuity at the range of acceptance of 
any type. If a type i accepts a type j  and a type z, it always accepts all types
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between j  and 2 . Thus, in order to  define the range of acceptance of any type 
z, we just need to know the highest and the lowest type accepted by i. When 
type i accepts all types between j  and 9 (including j  and 9), only the lowest 
possible type j  tha t a type z accepts is given in non bold writing. When type z 
accepts all types between 0 and z (including 0 and z), only the highest possible 
type z tha t a type z accepts is given in bold writing and in red colour. When i 
accepts any types between j  and z (including j  and z), where j  > 0 and z < 9 , 
both the lowest and the highest types j...z  tha t z accepts are given.
Given Figure 2.12, it is easy to construct Figure 2.13. The latter presents the 
pattern of couples expected to be formed in the first period when the equilibrium 
strategies are used. For each particular u>, we construct a 10 x 10 table. In each 
table, rows and columns range from 0 to 9. Each row i represents a male type 
z and each column j  a female type j .  A cell tha t belongs in row z and column 
j  is blue when types z and j  accept each other and form a couple when they 
meet in period 1 or it is white otherwise.
type 0 type 1 type 2 type 3 type 4 type 5 type 6 type 7 type 8 type 9
w=0 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375
u)=0.1 2.7 2.769 2.806 2.812 2.788 2.75 2.7 2.638 2.563 2.475
00=0.2 2.026 2.16 2.23 2.233 2.184 2.115 2.02 1.898 1.751 1.577
oo=0.3 1.342 1.541 1.637 1.632 1.556 1.449 1.312 1.134 0.915 0.656
oo=0.4 0.676 0.938 1.062 1.062 0.966 0.828 0.648 0.414 0.124 - 0.22
oo=0.5 0 0.339 0.518 0.536 0.429 0.268 0.054 -0.232 -0.589 - 1.018
oo=0.6 -0.696 -0.304 -0.119 -0.119 -0.235 -0.419 -0.673 -0.996 -1.412 - 1.919
oo=0.7 -1.53 -1.046 -0.75 - 0.642 -0.696 -0.858 -1.1 -1.45 -1.908 - 2.473
oo=0.8 -2.365 -1.812 -1.473 - 1.319 -1.35 -1.504 -1.75 -2.119 -2.612 - 3.258
oo=0.9 -3.446 -2.788 -2.338 -2.062 - 1.958 -2.027 -2.235 -2.581 -3.1 - 3.792
00=1 - 4.5 -3.75 -3.215 -2.857 - 2.679 - 2.679 -2.857 -3.214 -3.75 - 4.5
Figure 2.11: Equilibrium strategies for m  =  9. At equilibrium, a strategy of a 
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Figure 2.12: Acceptance range at equilibrium.
It becomes apparent from Figures 2.11 and 2.12 that when players have 
common preferences (u =  0), the equilibrium strategy is a cutoff point, common 
for all types; all types are willing to accept any type at least as high as 4. 
Furthermore, for oj =  0, the expected utility C2 {s,i) that a type i expects to 
get when entering in the second period is much higher that the utility i expects 
to receive in any other game examined. As a result, compared with all games 
where u  < 0.5, most types are choosier when u  = 0. However, for u> > 0.5, most 
types tend to be even choosier than for u> = 0.
If we look at Figure 2.11, we observe that for a given type i, the expected 
utility C2 ( s , i ) for entering in the second period unmated decreases as u  in­
creases. However the decrease of expected utility does not imply necessarily a 
decrease of types’ choosiness. If we look at Figure 2.12, we note that most types 
become less choosy as u> increases from 0 to 0.5, while the opposite is true as 
u  increases from 0.5 to 1. Furthermore, while for u  < 0.5 all types are willing 
to accept all types higher that 4, for to > 0.5 they often reject high types. For 
uj > 0.5, low types (types 0,1,2) never prefer types higher than 5, low middle 
types (types 3,4) never accept extreme types 0 and 9, high middle types (types 
5,6) do not always accept type 9 (evident as u  approaches 1) and high types 
(types 7, 8 and 9) accept all high and middle high types but not lower types 
(they even reject type 4 as u  approaches 1). Looking at Figure 2.12, we observe 
that on average players are the choosiest when they have homotypic preferences 
(a; =  1) and are the least choosy when uj  — 0.5 and therefore they value the 
same the cost and the return of a mating.
Focusing on each particular game, we see that the extreme types (close to
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0 and 9) are most of the times choosier than the middle types. Exceptions are 
u  =  0, u j  =  0.1 and u j  =  0.5. When u  =  0 and u j  =  0.1 all types are equally 
choosy, while when u j  =  0.5 type 0 is a universal acceptor and choosiness of 
types increases as we move from type 0 to type 9. For u  < 0.5, extreme (0 and 
9) and high types are the choosiest, while middle types are the least choosy. 
(It has to be noted that for u  < 0.5 the choosiness and the strategy of type 0 
are irrelevant for the rest of the players, since he is rejected by all types and he 
always enters in the last period unmated.) For 0.5 < u j  < 0.8, the importance 
of the cost of a mating increases. As a result, low types are the choosiest and 
as we move to higher types closer to type 9 the range of acceptance increases. 
For u j  > 0.8 the range of acceptance does not have great differences between the 
types, since most types are willing to accept as many as 5 types of the opposite 
sex.
For a given u j ,  we also examine the changes of the expected utility of type
1 entering in the next period unmated as we move from i =  0 to i =  9. We 
observe th a t in all games, the strategy of type i =  0 is quite high, it increases 
as we move to higher types, until it reaches its maximum for type i =  2, 3 or 4 
depending on the value of u j ,  and then it starts decreasing again as i increases, 
until it reaches its minimum for type 2 =  9. When players have homotypic 
preferences ( u j  = 1), it is worth mentioning tha t the strategies of types are 
symmetric around middles types 4 and 5; s(4 — £) =  s(5 — £) for any integer £. 
Hence we see tha t the symmetry observed in the previous sections around the 
middle type 0, remains in this game around the middle types 4 and 5.
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Figure 2.13: Couple formation at equilibrium, n — 2.
Figure 2.13 gives an image of the couples that are formed in the first period 
in each game. If we take the diagonal passing from cells it is clear that 
the pattern of couples formed is always symmetric around it, as a consequence 
of the symmetric behaviour of females and male types. The number of couples 
formed in the first period is the minimum when u  = 0 and maximum when 
u  = 0.9. As u) increases, the number of couples created increases, reaches its 
maximum and then it decreases slightly for a; =  1. Hence, under homotypic 
preferences (a; =  1) more couples than under common preferences {u =  0) are
formed in the first period. If we choose a male i and a female j  at random in 
the first period, there exist a 0.36 probability they accept each other when they 
have common preferences and a 0.44 probability to m utually accept to form a 
couple when they have homotypic preferences. Looking at all games, the higher 
probability tha t a random male of type i and a random female of type j  accept 
each other is 0.5 (for uj  =  0.9).
With the exception of uj =  1, couples are concentrated in the right bottom  
corner of each table, hence in the majority of couples only middle and high types 
are involved. When uj  is close to 0 couples are created only between types which 
are of a middle or of a higher type. Nevertheless, as u  increases lower types start 
to participate in the formation of couples as well. For uj  < 0.5, lower middle 
types form couples with types next to them and for uj  >  0.5 even low types 
participate in the couples created, forming couples with types close to them. As 
we move towards uj =  1, especially after uj = 0.7, high and middle types tend 
to form couples only with types very close to them. As a result, the number of 
blue squares in the bottom right of the Figure 2.13 decreases as uj approaches 
1. At uj =  1, all types participate in the formation of couples in the first period, 
but each type only mates with types which are close to him (maximum distance 
between mates is 4).
It becomes clear tha t when populations have a combination of homotypic 
and common preferences, but the significance of homotypic preferences is much 
higher, it is more probable for a type to be mated in the first period. On the 
other hand, as populations become more focused on searching for a high type 
mate, the probability tha t a type is mated in the first period is significantly 
lower. Under homotypic preferences a significantly higher number of couples is 
formed in the first period than under common preferences. High types under 
any mixture of preferences have a high chance to find a partner in the first 
period. However, the probability for high types not to enter the second period 
is higher when common preferences are stronger. The opposite is true for low 
types; when players have common preferences, lower types have no chances to 
be mated in the first period. Middle types have the highest probability to find 
a mate when common and homotypic preferences are equally strong.
2.8.2 Three Period G am e
In the three period game, the equilibrium behaviour presents great similarities 
with the equilibrium behaviour in the two period game. Any differences are 
the product of the additional opportunity tha t players have to find a partner 
of their choice in the second period. As in the two period game, players are on 
average the choosiest when they have homotypic preferences and are the least 
choosy when they value the same the cost of a mating and the value of their
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partner. Players are choosier in the first period or they are equally choosy in 
both periods. The range of acceptance of each particular type includes different 
types as u j  changes. High types are the choosiest and low types are the least 
choosy when u j  <  0.5, but when uj > 0.5, all types become choosier, not accepting 
more than 5 types in any case. This affects the number of couples created before 
the last period. More couples are formed in the first two periods when players 
tend to weight more the cost of mating. The number of couples created in the 
first two periods is the highest for uj  — 0.7 and the lowest for uj =  0.
Figure 2.14 illustrates the equilibrium strategies found via iteration; for each 
u j , the first line (written in black) describes the equilibrium strategy of each type 
in the first period and the second line (written in blue) describes the equilibrium 
strategy of each type in the second period. In Appendix A .3 we plot the equi­
librium strategies in Figure A A. Figure 2.15 presents the range of acceptance 
of each type at equilibrium. For each u j , the first line (written in black and red) 
refers to the range of acceptance of each type in period 1 and the second line 
(written in blue and green) in period 2. The range of acceptance of all types 
remains continuous in the three period game (as in the two period game), hence 
it is illustrated in Figure 2.15 in the same way as in Figure 2.12 of the previous 
section. Only the lower limit is given when types accept type 9, only the higher 
limit is given (in bold writing and in red for the first period or in green for the 
second period) when player accept type 0 , or both limits are given when neither 
0 or 9 are accepted. In Figure 2.16 we draw the couples expected to be formed in 
the first and second period. We construct Figure 2.16 in the say way as Figure 
2.13 in the 2 period game. The only difference is tha t the couples formed in 
the first period are described in red colour and any additional couples created 
in the second period are represented in green colour. All combinations of types 
forming couples in the first period, also form couples in the second period.
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type 0 type 1 type 2 type 3 type 4 type 5 type 6 type 7 type 8 type 9
oII3 2 £6 7 2 £6 7 2 £ 6 7 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 33 3 4 33 3 4 333 4 333 4 3 3 3
2 £ 6 7 2 £ 6 7 2 £6 7 2 £ 6 7 2 £ 6 7 2 £6 7 2 £ 6 7 2 £ 6 7 2 £6 7 2 £ 6 7
oli3 2 233 2 292 2 20 8 3 £ 6 7 3 £ 8 3 3 £ 6 7 3 £3 3 3 583 3 5 1 7 3 .433
2 0.33 2 292 2 20 8 2 28 3 2 2 4 2 2.0833 2 0 1 7 1 3 4 2 1 3 5 8 1.767
(0=0 2 1 £ 1.716 1.747 2 3 9 3 0 1 4 2 382 2 32 3 2 328 2 £ 9 8 2 53 3
1 £ 1.716 1.747 1 £ 9 5 1 £ 0 7 1.491 1 3 6 1 1 2 1 4 1 0 4 9 0 3 6 7
noii3 1 j071 1 2 3 7 1 2 8 7 2 3 2 9 2 3 7 1 2 3 2 7 2 24 1 2 20 1 1 3 0 7 1 £ 6 1
1 £ 7 1 1 2 3 7 1 2 7 1 1 3 9 3 1 0 7 4 0 3 0 4 0.713 0.495 0 24 9 -0 2 3 5
oii3 0 53 8 0.747 0 30 8 1 £ 3 3 1 £ 7 1 1 £ 2 1 1 5 1 1 3 3 9 1 0 9 1 0 .767
0 53 8 0.747 0.767 0 £ 6 1 0 50 4 0 2 9 1 0 0 4 5 -0 234 -0 55 2 -0 3 1 2
(0=0 5 0 0 33 0 5 6 9 0 £ 9 7 1 2 5 6 1 2 1 7 1 0 0 3 0.796 0.499 0 2 0 8
0 0 3 0 4 0.414 0 3 5 8 0 2 0 9 -0 02 -0 2 8 8 -0 £06 -0 3 7 4 -1.407
oii
_3_ -0 534 -0 26 6 0 £8 9 0 2 9 8 0.407 0 3 8 0 2 5 6 0.036 -0 3 0 3 -0.763
-0 £22 -0 2 5 9 -0 2 3 4 -0 2 1 3 -0 3 9 8 -0 £6 2 -0 3 7 7 -1 3 4 4 -1.776 -2 29 2
(0=0 .7 -1 0 8 -0 £8 8 -0.419 -0 2 8 -0 2 1 6 -0 2 6 8 -0 2 5 6 -0.44 -0.772 -1 2 7 1
-1.417 -1 £>02 -0 5 -0.765 -0 3 9 3 -1 0 9 3 -1 3 7 7 -1.728 -2 28 9 -2 .758
(0=0 3 -1.768 -1 2 4 3 -0 33 5 -0 31 4 -0 3 0 4 -0 3 3 6 -0 3 1 7 -1 0 9 8 -1.493 -2 0 3 3
-2 26 3 -1.758 -1 A 6 9 -1 3 6 9 -1.447 -1 £5 2 -1 3 4 7 -2 314 -2.799 -3 .428
(0=0 3 -2.479 -1 £5 2 -1 5 5 3 -1.423 -1 3 9 2 -1.425 -1 5 0 8 -1 £ 5 6 -2 00 2 -2 £ 5 6
-3 3 7 7 -2.761 -2 352 -2 2 1 5 -2.061 -2 2 4 9 -2 38 3 -2.741 -3 2 2 1 -3 3 7 8
U)=l -3 3 3 9 -2 £2 8 -2 277 -2 2 6 1 -2 08 4 -2 084 -2 2 6 1 -2 277 -2 £28 -3 3 3 9
-4 5 -3 .793 -3 303 -2 3 6 8 -2.797 -2.797 -2 3 6 8 -3 3 03 -3 .793 -4 5
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Figure 2.15: Acceptance range at equilibrium when n = 3.
From the definition of the equilibrium, as it is given in equation (20), it is 
expected that the strategy of a type in period 2 will never be higher that his 
strategy in period 1. Hence, from Figure 2.14, we note that the strategy in 
period 1 is higher than in period 2 , apart from the equilibrium strategy of type 
0 and of low types close to 0 for u  < 0.5. For u  < 0.5 the types close to 0 use 
the same strategy in both periods. The explanation of the latter lies on the fact 
that types around 0 are never accepted in the first two periods and therefore 
expect that they will enter the last period unmated.
If we look at each column of the table in Figure 2.14, it is clear that the utility 
that a type i expects to receive in the second period decreases as u  increases; 
the same is true for the utility a type i expects to receive in the last period. For 
any u  > 0 , comparing the strategy that types have in each period, it has the 
same pattern as in the two period game; it increases as types become higher,
54
until it reaches its maximum and then it starts decreasing again. Furthermore, 
for any uj, the type having the maximum strategy in period 1 is the same or 
higher than the type having the maximum strategy in period 2. The minimum 
strategy in period 1 is always used by type 1 when uj > 0.5 and by type 9 
otherwise, while the minimum strategy in period 2 is always used by type 9. 
W hen players have homotypic preferences the strategies of types are symmetric 
around middle types 4 and 5 in both periods, as in the two period game.
When players have common preferences (uj =  0) only the strategy of the 
high type players is relevant at equilibrium, since the low types will never be 
accepted before the last period. As we will show in the next chapter, under 
common preferences the strategy in the two period game is a cutoff point, the 
same for all players. In the three period game, all players use the same strategy 
in the second period, while in the first period high and low types have different 
strategies. The high types are choosier, since they expect to be accepted in the 
second period. The low types, who remain unmated till the last period, are less 
choosy; they have the same strategy in both the first and the second period. 
In Figure 2.15 it is noted tha t players of type 0,1 and 2 do not accept anyone 
below 3 in both the first and the second period, while all higher types do not 
accept anyone below 5 in the first period. The strategy of types 0, 1 and 2 does 
not affect the couples created, since these types are rejected by all types in the 
first and second period. All strategies where types 0, 1 and 2 accept any type 
higher than i , where i  > 3, in the first period, are strategies tha t would result in 
the same pattern of couples. However, only the strategy where types 0, 1 and 
2 accept any type higher than 3 in the first period is an equilibrium, according 
to  the equilibrium definition given in Chapter 1.
The strategies of all types are at least as high in the first period as in the 
second period; no type is choosier in the second period. Comparing the choosi­
ness of types for given a;, for any uj < 0.2 and for uj =  0.5 types are choosier 
the higher they are. For uj =  0.3 and uj =  0.4 types very close to 0 tend to be 
choosier than the low middle types next to them, while the rest of the types 
become choosier the closer they are to 9. (However, for uj =  0.3 the strategy of 
types very close to 0 is irrelevant for the rest of the players, since these types 
always enter the last period unmated.) For all uj < 0.5, the range of all types 
includes type 9 but not type 0. This is not always true for uj > 0.5. For uj > 0.5, 
the acceptance range tends to be smaller on average than for uj < 0.5 and it does 
not always include high types. No type i  accept a type j  such tha t \i — j \  > 5 .
For a given uj and a given type i ,  the range of acceptance of i  in the first 
period includes the same or at most 2 types less th a t his range of acceptance 
in the second period. The range of acceptance in the second period is very 
similar for all types when uj < 0.5. However, as the cost of mating becomes
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more important, significant differences arise between the acceptance ranges of 
different types.











I 0 1 1 I 2 1 3 | 4 | 5 16 1 7 | 8 | 91 0 1 1  2 1 3  4 I 5 1 6 17 1 T T T ]  I 0 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 | $ | 7 | T ] T
0 0 “\ 0
ti)= 1
Figure 2.16: Couple formation at equilibrium, n — 3.
As uj increases, the changes in the range of acceptance result in changes in 
the pattern of mated couples. Figure 2.16 gives an image of the couples created
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before the last period in each game. The same types form couples in both 
periods under homotypic preferences (uj =  1); hence in this case, the probability 
of finding a partner is higher in the first period than in the second period. The 
number of couples created in the first period is minimum when uj = 0 (common 
preferences) and maximum when uj =  0.8. For uj =  1 (homotypic preferences) 
more couples than for uj =  0 (common preferences) are formed in the first 
period. However, their number is lower than the maximum. As uj increases, 
the number of couples created in the first period increases, since lower types 
start participating in the mating process, but after it reaches its maximum (for 
uj = 0 .8 ), it decreases again.
The number of new types which are added in the mating process in period 2 
is not increasing as uj increases. As a result, for uj close to 1, the probability that 
a random type has to find a partner is not always higher in the second period 
than in the first period. The opposite is true for uj close to 0. On average, a 
player entering the game, has the highest probability of getting mated in the 
first two periods when uj = 0.7. The probability of a player entering unmated in 
the last period is the highest when uj =  0 , it then decreases as uj increases and 
after it reaches its minimum (for uj =  0.7) it starts increasing again up to uj =  1 
when it slightly decreases again.
Examining each type separately, high types have higher chances to be mated 
in the first two periods for uj close to 0.5 and lower chances for uj close to 0 and 
to 1, while low types have higher chances to be mated before period 3 for uj 
close to 1. Middle types have little differences in the probability to be mated 
before the last period as uj varies.
2.9 Conclusions
We extended the solution given by Alpern and Reyniers (1999) for the two 
period continuous type game and defined the necessary equilibrium conditions 
for all types in [—1,1]. Furthermore, we developed an algorithm, which allowed 
to us to reduce the number of calculations needed in order to find all possible 
equilibria in a discrete type game. W ith the help of this algorithm, we derived 
the equilibrium profiles for the discrete type two period game where the number 
77i of positive types is between 1 and 9. We found multiple equilibria when 
m  = 3 and m  = 5 in the two period game r 2(777). Non exhaustive search showed 
that multiple equilibria may also appear when the game is played for longer 
than 2 periods. This finding may have several implications. In some real life 
situations, players may not want or may not be able to distinguish between 
continuous types. For example, if a type represents age, colour or size, animals 
and humans tend to divide types into groups, where the members of each group 
are considered to belong in the same category or in other words in the same
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discrete type. In tha t way, even though types may be continuous, they may be 
discretised. For instance, often humans are categorised according to their height 
to be tall, of medium height or short, although humans who are considered tall 
may not all have the same height.
In the two period discrete type games which we studied, we focused on 
the "effectiveness" of the equilibria into reducing the mean intra-couple type 
difference and their stability. The type correlation in the couples formed at 
equilibrium is in general quite low and it does not present im portant differences 
between models. However, this is not a surprising result in a game played for 
a small number of periods. When the number of types is very small, although 
the probability of two individuals forming a couple in the first period is very 
high, players are relatively less choosy than in games with a larger number of 
types m; therefore it is more probable that players find a partner of a type not 
so close to themselves. On the other hand, when the number of types increases, 
players become relatively choosier, so they are mated with types closer to their 
own type in the first round, whilst the probability of entering unmated in the 
second round and being obliged to accept any type increases significantly. In 
contrast with correlation, the marital stability of the equilibria is quite high and 
it is significantly higher in all models than the stability under random mating 
(which is 0.5).
In the two period discrete type models, we also studied the welfare (payoff) 
of different types. In the case of multiple equilibria, we found tha t different 
types are better off in different equilibria. Given tha t types have an incentive 
to support the appearance of a particular equilibrium, it would be interesting 
to observe which equilibrium would appear in real life and which factors would 
affect its appearance.
We also analysed and compared the two and three period models under 
homotypic or common (or a combination of both) types of preferences. This 
analysis, allowed us to gain a better insight into how different preferences affect 
the equilibrium strategies and therefore the correlation and the stability of the 
couples created. Kalick and Hamilton (1986) showed in their simulation model 
(their work is described in chapter 5) that both similarity and maximising pref­
erences lead to assortative mating. Looking at the pattern of the couples created 
at equilibrium before the last period(Figures 2.16 and 2.19), it becomes obvious 
tha t in general it is true tha t high types tend to mate with high types and low 
types tend to mate with low types under any combination of preferences; nev­
ertheless, how quickly players find a partner differs greatly and it depends on 
their preferences. High types tend to mate more quickly under common pref­
erences. On the other hand, under homotypic preferences most types have the 
same probabilities to get mated before the last period; only the extremely high
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and extremely low types have slightly lower chances than the rest of the types 
to find a partner before the final period. It is expected tha t when the impact of 
common preferences is higher, there will be a higher density of low types in the 
last period. On the contrary, the population will be more uniform in the last 
period when the effect of homotypic preferences is stronger.
In the three period game, independently of the preferences of the players, 
all types are at least as choosy in the first period as in the second period. 
As a result, there is a wider range of types mutually accepting each other in 
the second period; exception is the game where players have purely homotypic 
preferences. Under homotypic preferences the same pairings lead to matings in 
both periods. In this case, even though extreme types become less choosy in 
the second period, middle types remains as choosy as in the first period. As a 
result, the pattern of couples formed in the first period, does not change in the 
second period.
The decrease of choosiness over time was noted in the common preferences 
model by Alpern and Reyniers (2005). It is an immediate result of the definition 
of the equilibrium. Players accept those type which provide them with a utility 
at least as high as the utility they expect to receive in the next period. Hence 
if players expect to receive a better utility in the future, they will be choosier 




This chapter extends Alpern and Reyniers(2005). It is divided into three sec­
tions. Sections 3.2 and 3.4 focus on work done with Steve Alpern, while section 
3.3 is personal work.
Section 3.2 is a slightly modified version of the LSE-CDAM-2007-32 research 
report "Equilibria of two-sided matching games", presenting joined work with 
Steve Alpern on common preferences; the research report appears in the site 
of the LSE Mathematics departm ent2. A shorter version of this report is ac­
cepted by the European Journal of Operational Research. It is necessary to 
note that section 3.2 may include introductory material that the reader may 
find repetitive.
Section 3.3 compliments the analysis of the efficiency of equilibria done in 
section 3.2.
The final section, briefly presents the results of an equivalent model to the 
one presented in section 3.2 th a t is more applied in biology. A more analytical 
study of these results is going to be the subject of a joint paper with Steve 
Alpern.
3.2 Extended Version of the European Journal of Operational 
Research A rticle
The problem of pairwise matching of individuals from distinct sets (or sexes) 
X  and Y  occurs in many guises: buyers and sellers, employers and employees, 
medical schools and interns, males and females. We shall use the terminology of 
the last case, calling the larger group X  the males. We assume that individuals of 
each group have common preferences over whom they would like to be matched 
with in the other group.
The so-called ‘stable marriage’ problem proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) 
seeks a matching among equal sized finite sets X  and Y  such tha t for any two 
matched pairs (£1, 2/1) and (£2, 2/2) ,  i*1 neither unmatched couple (£1, 2/2) or 
(£2, 2/1) would each member prefer (with an arbitrary preference relation) their 
new partner to the one in the original matching. To analyze such questions 
one must look at complete matchings without considering how they might arise 
in practice. This ‘centralized’ problem has received much study (see Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990)).
More recently, the processes by which complete matchings may arise over 
time have been analyzed as dynamic games played by the individuals in the two
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groups. The utilities of these players are often modeled (and will be so here) as 
‘common preferences’ by all members of one sex over individuals of the other. 
For this reason we can give each individual a ‘type’ (called x  for males, y for 
females) such that when a couple (x ,y ) is formed, the male x  gets utility y , 
and the female y gets utility x. We assume tha t the ‘mating season’ is short 
w ith respect to the time the couple will be together, so tha t we may ignore 
the utility consequences of the time (period) in which the couple is formed -  
there are no search costs in our model. By assuming th a t an individual’s utility 
is the relative rank of their partner within his or her group, we can normalize 
these types to the unit interval [0,1]. A male who is unmated at the end of the 
n(final) period gets a utility —c, where c is a known parameter representing the 
cost of failure to mate. In the ‘mutual choice’, or ‘two-sided’, models we shall 
extend in this section, individuals are randomly paired in each period (that is, 
the smaller group of females is randomly paired with an equally large randomly 
chosen set of males - the remaining males are not paired in tha t period). Then if 
each member of a matched pair chooses to accept the other rather than go into 
the next period unmated, they form a couple and are permanently mated. In 
the final period, players always accept. We call this game Tn (r, c) , where r > 1 
(the ‘sex ratio’) is the initial number of males divided by the initial number of 
females. This game has been analyzed by Alpern and Reyniers (2005) in the 
symmetric case r =  1. Johnstone (1997) considered a similar dynamic game 
model and Kalick and Hamilton (1986) simulated a social psychology version. 
Related games have been studied by Ramsey (2008) and Eriksson, Sjostrand 
and Strimling (2008a).
A strategy for a player in Tn (r, c) is a rule specifying which potential matches 
to accept in each period, by determining the least valuable acceptable mate. 
A strategy profile is called an equilibrium if prospective mates are accepted 
if and only if their type (utility) exceeds the expected utility of the chooser 
of going into the next period unmated - this is essentially a Subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium defined in the same way as in chapter 2. In the symmetric 
case (r =  1) studied by Alpern and Reyniers (2005), only a single equilibrium 
was found. In this generalization to r > 1, we find a region of (r, c) space 
with multiple equilibria. For example, when n = 2 we find three equilibria: a 
choosy equilibrium, where both groups have high acceptance standards; an easy 
equilibrium, where both groups have low but positive acceptance standards; and 
a one-sided (female choice) equilibrium, where males accept anyone. Much of 
this section is devoted to analyzing and comparing these in terms of dynamical 
stability and marital stability (a randomized version of Gale’s stability condition 
based on that of Eriksson and Strimling (2004) and Eriksson and HaggstrOm 
(2008)). For n = 2 (and numerically, for higher n) we find that choosiness at
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equilibrium goes in the same direction for males and females; equilibria with 
choosy males have choosy females). We find tha t the choosy and one-sided 
equilibria are dynamically stable (attracting fixed points of a dynamical system); 
bu t the easy equilibrium is dynamically unstable. The equilibrium where both 
sexes are choosy has the highest m arital stability; the equilibrium where only 
females choose has the lowest. We note tha t the existence of an equilibrium 
follows from a simple application of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem in the 
same way as established for r =  1 by Alpern and Reyniers (2005). As shown 
there, equilibria are fully determined by a pair of non-increasing n  — 1 tuples of 
threshold values (ui,U 2 , . . . ,  un_ 1) and (iq, v-i, . . . ,  vn- i ) ,  where Ui is the lowest 
type female that a top male (x =  1) will accept in period i (similarly for Vi 
for female choice). At equilibrium, a pairing (x ,y )  in period i will mutually 
accept and form a couple if and only if x  > Vi and y >U{. The Vi will always be 
positive. If all the Ui are 0, we call it a ‘one-sided’ (or female choice) equilibrium; 
otherwise we call it a ‘two-sided’ (or mutual choice) equilibrium.
From the point of view of a single player, a sort of ‘secretary problem’ (see 
Ferguson (1989)) is being played out over time, in tha t he is being presented 
with a random succession of secretaries. As in the original secretary problem, 
he may not go back and accept someone he has rejected. However there are 
many differences: The distribution in each period depends on previous choices 
of other players; a secretary may reject him; the objective is expected rank. 
The closest version of the secretary problem is th a t of Eriksson, Sjostrand and 
Strimling (2007).
In contrast to two-sided search models such as the well known one of McNa­
m ara and Collins (1990), our model is not steady-state. Each period is different: 
the sex ratio increases and the distribution of types changes according to the 
strategies employed. The cohorts are initially uniformly distributed but not in 
any future period. At all equilibria, individuals become less choosy over time, as 
suggested in the Pennebaker et al (1979) social science analysis of the country 
and western song “Don’t the girls get prettier at closing time” . A good analysis 
of the effects of changing and uncertain distributions of male quality on female 
choice has been given in by Collins, McNamara and Ramsey (2006).
Two-sided matching models have been used in various aspects of economic 
theory, principally by Burdett and Coles (1997,1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), 
Eeckhout (1999) and Eriksson and Haggstrom (2007). In biology and psychol­
ogy, they have been used to describe and analyze mating behavior in animals 
(Alpern and Reyniers (1999), Alpern, K atrantzi and Reyniers (2005), Bergstrom 
and Real (2000)), and in humans (Kalick and Hamilton (1986)). Connections 
with two-sided spatial matching (‘rendezvous search’) will be discussed in the 
Conclusions section.
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Some notes on terminology. As our model involves two matching processes, 
the random pairing of unmated individuals at the start of each period and the 
permanent coupling of pairs who accept each other, we distinguish these by 
calling the former process matching and the latter mating. Some results are 
obtained numerically, and these will be denoted as Propositions, covering the 
region l < r < 2 . 5 , 0 < c <  2.5.
The section is organized as follows. Section 3.2.2 gives a complete treatm ent 
of the two period problem. We find formulae for the three equilibria: e1 (one­
sided), e2 (easy), e3 (choosy). We determine the regions of (r, c) space where 
they exist (Theorem 3.1). We show that male and female choosiness vary in 
the same way at equilibria (Monotonicity Lemma 3.3). We show tha t only e1 
and e3 are dynamically stable (Proposition 3.1); We show tha t e3 is the most 
maritally stable whereas e1 is the least (Proposition 3.2). In Section 3.2.3 we 
use both analytical and numerical methods to establish that these properties of 
equilibria for n =  2 periods tend to hold for models with n  > 2 periods.
We wish to thank an anonymous referee of Alpern and Reyniers (2005) for 
suggesting tha t an extension of that paper with a nontrivial sex ratio might 
yield new phenomena -  which it has. The addition of the sex ratio has required 
new techniques to deal with multiple equilibria, as Alpern and Reyniers (2005) 
established uniqueness for the trivial (unit) sex ratio case. In addition, they 
dealt only symmetric equilibria, whereas a large part of the story of this chapter 
is about the asymmetries of equilibrium strategies resulting from a skewed sex 
ratio.
3 .2 .1  T h e  Tw o P e r io d  G am e T2 (r, c)
We begin with populations of females and males, with types (quality) uniformly 
distributed on [0,1]. The females have unit density (and unit population), while 
the males have density (and population) r  (the sex ratio) which is at least 1. Let 
u and v be the male and female first period threshold strategies; females accept 
a male x  iff x  > v while males accept female y iff y > u. A matched male-female 
pair with types (#, y) will be mated by mutual acceptance if both x  > u and 
y > v and with random matching the number (understood as a proportion of 
the female population) of such couples will be
k = ( l _  u) ( l _  „ ) . (21)
as shown in the unshaded regions of both the female and male populations 
of Figure 3.1. In the left square, females are located according to their type 
(horizontal y axis) and the type of the male they are matched with (vertical x  
axis). Those in the left rectangle are rejected by their partner and those in the
63
bottom right rectangle reject their partner. The rectangle on the right similarly 
plots all males, with the additional lower rectangle of unmatched males.
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Figure 3.1: Couple formation
The mean value /ix of the r — k males x  that enter the final period unmated 
(those not in upper right unshaded rectangle) is calculated by dividing them 
into those with x < v (of average type v / 2 ) and those with x > v (of average 
type (1 + v ) /2 ) .  The first group of males have population (area) rv, while the 
second have population (1 — v) (r — 1 +  u ) . Hence
^ ( p) = M  m  + 1(1 -  ») (r -  1 + »)] (1 (22)
r — k
The value (expected payoff) of any female who enters the final period unmated 
is simply the mean type of the second period male population, tha t is, nx . So 
in period 1 she should accept a male x  iff x > nx . Hence the female equilibrium 
condition (f.e.c.) is simply
v = (f)(u, v ) . (23)
For v in the range of </>, we can solve uniquely for u, giving the f.e.c. (23) as
—r — 2 v + 2  rv  +  v2 +  1
u = f{ v )  =
—2v +  v2 +  1
(24)
To calculate the corresponding male equilibrium equation (m.e.c.) we first need 
to obtain the mean female type in the final period. By symmetry when r = 1, 
we obtain this by interchanging u and v in (22):
Pv =
u [u /2) +  (1 -  u) (v) (1 -I- u) /2  
1 — (1 — u) (1 — t>)
(25)
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Unlike the simpler case for females, a male entering the final period will not 
obtain an expected payoff of py - he will only get this if he is lucky enough to 
be matched. Otherwise he will have the cost c (utility —c). The probability p  of 
a male being matched in the second period is the inverse sex ratio
P ~ -  (26)
Hence a male entering the final period has an expected payoff, which we will 
call fiy, given by
My = PMy +  ( l - p )  ( - c ) , or (27)
. . . 1 2c +  v -  u2v -  2 cr +  u2 .
M y =  ‘&{u,v) = - ----- — —------------- -—  (28)y 2 r + u + v — uv — 1
The justification for the notation p y is tha t we may add to the final period 
female population a number r — 1 of imaginary females with type —c, and in 
this case fiy would indeed be the mean type of such a population. Hence the 
male equilibrium equation (m.e.c.) is
u =  (ip (u , u))+ , where (a)+ =  max (a, 0), (29)
since a threshold value of 0 is equivalent to  a negative one. Solving the m.e.c.
(29) for v as a function of u , for u in the range of gives
, x _  u 2  +  (2r  ~  2) u +  2c (r -  1)v = g(u) = ------------------------- s----------  (30)
V ( u - l )2
D efin ition : A pair (u, v ) , 0 < w, v < 1, satisfying (23) and (29) is called 
an equilibrium of the game T2 (c, r ) . If u =  0, the equilibrium (u , v ) is called a 
female-choice equilibrium (f.e.c.) (or, one-sided choice equilibrium) and if u > 0 
it is called a mutual-choice equilibrium (m.e.c.) (or two-sided equilibrium). 
Let E\ denote the set of all one-sided equilibria, E<i the two-sided ones, and 
E  = E i U E 2 the set of all equilibria.
Note tha t at any equilibrium we have v > 0, since the mean of the final 
period males is always positive.
3.2.2 Equilibrium  Theorem
In the symmetric case r =  1 studied in Alpern and Reyniers (2005) (where c 
is irrelevant, as all males end up mated), the unique equilibrium was shown to
3 — x/5be the mutual-choice equilibrium u = v =  — -—  «  0.38197. For general r
£
and c the situation is more complicated, though indeed for r sufficiently close
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to 1 (depending on c) there is still a unique equilibrium which is of mutual- 
choice type. More generally, we show in Theorem 3.1 that equilibrium behavior 
partitions (c, r )  space by two curves: r  =  r F  (c), called the ‘F* curve; and 
r — rM (c ), called the ‘M’ curve. Female choice equilibria exist only on or above 
the F curve, while mutual choice equilibria exist only on or below the (higher) 
M curve. These curves are defined as
r  =  r f  (c) =  and (31)
f 27 (1 +  c) -  y/27 ( -5  -  10c +  27c2) 
r  = r M  (c) =  < 32 ’ ° ~  (32)
{  r F ( c ) ,  c  <  1
For c  > 1, we have r m ( c) > r F  (c) with equality only at c =  1 (where they 
are both | ,  and tangent to each other). Figure 3.2 shows how the two curves F  
(r =  r F (c)) and M  ( r  = r \ j  (c)) divide c, r  space into three open regions defined 
by
I  = {(r, c) : r  > r \ j  (c) and c < 1, or r > rF (c) and c > 1} , (33)
I I  = {(r,c) : r < rF (c) }, and (34)
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of theorem 3.1
We use this numbering of the regions because: region I has a one-sided (female- 
choice) equilibrium, region II has a £wo-sided (mutual-choice) equilibrium, and 
region III has three equilibria (one female-choice and two mutual choice). The 
following is our main result for the two period game, and will be proved in the
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next section.
T h e o re m  3.1 (com m on p re fe ren ces) Consider the two period game T2 (r, c ) , 
for r > 1 and c > 0, and let the regions I , I I , and I I I  be defined as in (33-35).
1. I f  (r , c) G  I, tf/ien there is a unique equilibrium and it is a female-choice 
equilibrium
2. I f  (r, c) G  I I ,  then there is a unique equilibrium and it is a mutual-choice 
equilibrium
3. I f  (r, c) G  I I I ,  then there are three equilibria: one o f them is a female- 
choice equilibrium, and the other two are mutual-choice equilibria.
Figure 3.3 illustrates equilibria in regions I , I I ,  I I I ,  given as the intersection 
of the female equilibrium condition (23) drawn in purple (thin) and the male 











Figure 3.3: Male (green) and female (red) equilibrium conditions
The equilibria in the intersections of regions I, I I  and I I I  are illustrated in 
Appendix B. 1.
3 .2 .3  P ro o f  o f  T h eo re m  3.1
In Figure 3.3 we illustrated Theorem 3.1 by exhibiting the equilibria E  symmet­
rically with respect to male and female strategies u and v, as the intersection of 
the male and female equilibrium conditions. However to  prove Theorem 3.1, we 
now take an asymmetric approach in which we determine only the male thresh­
old strategies u which form half of an equilibrium pair (u , v ) . Of course if we 
know u, then v is uniquely determined by the female equilibrium condition (23). 
So for the time being we forget about v and concentrate only on u.
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To establish Theorem 3.1, we show tha t the set E  = Fa (one sided, f.c.e.’s) U 
E 2 (two-sided, mce’s) of equilibria is determined by the intersections of a certain 
cubic polynomial q (u ) with the disjoint union
r =  L\ U L2, (36)
where L \ is the negative y —axis {(0, i/) , —00 <  y < 0} and L 2 is the open in­
terval {(u, 0) : 0 < u <  1}. Intersections with L \ give fee’s and those with L 2  
give mce’s. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4 for the three regions discussed in 
Theorem 3.1: For region I, q intersects only L \\ for region II, q only intersects 
L 2 ; for region III, q intersects L\ and then intersects L 2 twice, once before and 
once after the local maximum of q. Figure 3.4 should be compared with the 
earlier Figure 3.3, noting tha t the earlier one indicated both coordinates (u and 
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Figure 3.4: Intersection of q with L\  U L 2 , regions I,II,III
The following result establishes that the intersections shown in Figure 3.4 are 
indeed equilibria.
L em m a 3.1 (com m on p re fe ren ces) Fix any parameters r > 1 and c > 0.
Then
(u , g (u )) E E  if  and only if  (u , q ( u )) E [. (37)
Furthermore
(u , g ( u )) E Ei i f  and only i f  (u , q (u)) E Li. (38)
P ro o f. Recall tha t v = g(u)  (30) is a form of the male equilibrium equation.
In this analysis u is always in [0,1]. If we combine the two (female and male)
equilibrium conditions in the form of (24) and (30), we can obtain all mutual-
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choice equilibria by seeking solutions u 6  (0 , 1) to the fixed point equation
u = f  (g (u ) ) , or equivalently, solving 
h (u) =  u -  f ( g  (u)) =  0 .
(39)
(40)
We can factor the rational function h (u) in the form
where q — q (u ) is the cubic
(1 +  2c — 2cr — 2 ru)
 (41)
q = rv?—3ru2 +(5r +  4cr — 4r 2 — 4cr2) 4c2r 2—4cr2+8c2r+ 8 c r+ r—4c2—4c—1
For 0 < u < 1, q (u) is 0 if and only if h (u ) is 0, which is equivalent to (38) for
i = 2. The condition /  (g (0)) < 0 is equivalent to (0, g (0)) being a female-choice 
equilibrium, because (0 , p (0)) always satisfies the male equilibrium condition
(30) and ( /  {g (0)), g (0)) satisfies the female equilibrium condition (24). But 
a negative threshold strategy f { g { 0 )) for the males is strategically equivalent 
to u = 0 (as there as no females of negative type y ). Hence (0,^(0)) is an 
equilibrium. But the condition /  (g (0)) < 0 is equivalent to 0 — /  (g (0)) > 0, or 
9(0) < 0. Thus (38) holds for i =  1 as well, and hence the main condition (37) 
also holds. ■
Lemma 3.1 reduces the proof of Theorem 3.1 to the determination of the 
intersections of the cubic curve q (u) with the set [, for different values of the 
parameters r and c. The analysis of the cubic q is given in the following Lemma. 
For Theorem 3.1 we will need information about the location a  of the local 
maximum and its height q (a) .
L em m a 3.2 (ana ly sis  o f cub ic  q) The cubic q (u ) increases from  —oo to i t ’s 
local maximum q (o:) at a , then decreases until its local m inimum at /3, from  
which point it increases to infinity. The numbers a  and (3 (the two solutions of 
the quadratic equation q' (u ) =  0) are given by
a 1 — y/2 /3y/D  < 1, and (3 = 1 +  y/2/3y/~D > 1, where (43)
D  =  2r — 1 +  2c (r — 1) >  1 . (44)
For all parameter values, we have q (1) < 0, but the values of q{fS) and q (a) and
69
a  depend on the parameters r and c in that
sign (q (0)) =  sign (rF (c) -  r ),
i f  r < r M (c), c >  1, then q (a) > 0
(45)
(46)
i f  r > rM (c) , c >  1, then either q (a) < 0  or a  < 0 (47)
4c “I- 5
sign (a) = sign (r$ (c) — r ) , where r3 (c) =  ^ (48)
We can now use our two Lemmas to give a simple proof of Theorem 3.1
which involves breaking up region I  into two regions Ia (with c <  1) and
(with c > 1), as shown below in Figure 3.5.
1.2 "
1 . 1 "
1.05 ' '
2.5 30 0.5 1.51
Figure 3.5: Partition of I  into Ia and
P ro o f  o f T h eo re m  3.1: The portions of the Theorem concerning female 
choice equilibria follow immediately from (38) for i = 1 and (45). That is, there 
is a female-choice equilibrium if q (0) < 0, which is equivalent to r > rp  (c) . So 
we need to consider only mutual-choice equilibria. Recall that u corresponds 
to a mutual-choice equilibrium if 0 < u < 1 and q (it) =  0. We have shown 
in the previous Lemma (3.2) that g( l )  is always negative. We know that q is 
decreasing from a  to /? > 1. We now prove the cases in turn.
l a  If (c, r) e  Iai then r > r p ic ) and r  > rs(c ). It follows from (45) that 
q (0) < 0 and from (48) that a < 0. Consequently q is decreasing between 
0 and 1, and can have no root in that open interval. Hence there is no 
mutual-choice equilibrium.
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l b  If (c ,r ) G /fc, r  > (c) and hence also r > rp  (c ) . The latter condition
ensures by (45) tha t q (0) is negative. Since r > vm  (c) we have by (47) 
tha t q(a)  < Oor a  <  0. If a  <  0, then as in the previous part, q is 
decreasing between 0 and 1. If a  > 0, q will increase until a,  but q (a;) <  0, 
so q has no root less than a.  Prom a  to 1 it is decreasing and the result 
follows.
2 If (c, r) £ 77, we have r < rp(c)  and so by (45) we have q (0) > 0. Since
9(1) <  0 for all parameters, the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees 
at least one root of q between 0 and 1, hence at least one mutual choice 
equilibrium. If q had two roots between 0 and 1, then it would have a 
local minimum between them. But q (u ) has only one local minimum, at 
(3 > 1. Hence in this case there is exactly one mutual-choice equilibrium.
3 If (c, r ) £ I I I , then r > rp  (c ) , r < tm  (c ) , and hence r < r$ (c ) . So by (45)
we have q (0) < 0, by (46) we have q (a) > 0 and by (48) we have a  > 0. 
Hence by the Intermediate Value Theorem, q has a root between 0 and a  
and another root between a  and 1. We have already explained above why 
q cannot have more than two roots between 0 and 1. Hence there are two 
mutual-choice equilibria.
3 .2 .4  A nalysis o f Equilibria
In Theorem 3.1 (common preferences) we determined the number and type of 
equilibria, as a discrete function (regions I, II, III) of the parameter values r  
and c. Here we obtain explicit formulae for these equilibria and analyze how 
they depend continuously on the parameters r and c. Our first observation is 
tha t when comparing equilibria, the level of choosiness (acceptance level) goes 
in the same direction for both males and females, the monotonicity Lemma. In 
other words, one of the equilibria is choosier than the other (for both sexes). To 
see this, recall tha t any equilibrium pair (u ,v ) satisfies the female equilibrium 
equation (24) u =  /  (v) , so f  (-?;) =  2vr f  (1 — i>)3 > 0 implies that u is increasing 
in v , giving the following.
Lem m a 3.3 (com m on preferences) (M onotonicity) Given any two equi­
libria (u, v) and (n;, v ' ) , we have ur and
(y! — vl) {y* — v) > 0 (49)
As an application of this Lemma, the three potential equilibria can be or­
dered in terms of choosiness as e* =  (Ui,Vi), i =  1,2,3, where for i < j  we
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have both < Uj and V{ < vj .We name these (where the latter two are mutual
choice equilibria) as:
e1, the female choice equilibrium, which exists on and above the F  curve, 
e2, the easy equilibrium, which exists between the M  and F  curves, and 
e3, the choosy equilibrium, which exists on and below the M  curve.
For the female choice equilibrium e1, we obviously have u\ =  0, and can 
obtain v\ directly from the female equilibrium condition (24) 0 =  /  (v ) , or 0 =  
—r — 2 v +  2rv  +  v 2 +  1, with unique positive solution
v\ = 1 — r  +  y /r 2 — r. (50)
For the mutual choice equilibria e1 = (Ui,Vi) , i =  2,3, we obtain the formula 
for Ui by explicitly solving the cubic equation q (u) =  0 for u = Ui, getting the 
corresponding V{ from the formula x>i =  g {ui) (30).
.  _  ( t  +  27r\ _ / £ +  47i\ ,  .u2 = 2^/7  cos I — - —  1 +  1, u 3 =  2-^/7 cos(— - — ) +  1, where (51)
t =  arccos ^(2 — a\ — ao) /2 y /y ^ j  , 7  =  (3 — a{) /3,
ai =  5 — 4c(r — 1) — 4r, a0=  (—1 +  4c(r — 1) +  4c2 (r — 1)) (1 — r ) f r
To see what the equilibria look like in u, v space, for a 4 x 5 grid of c, r
parameters taken to cover points in all three regions I, II, and III (see Figure
3.6), we draw the equilibria in a similarly arranged array of boxes in Figure 3.7. 
In each box (with r and c fixed), we plot any female choice equilibria with a red
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c = l  3  c = l  3 1  c - 1 3 2  c - 1 3 3
Figure 3.7: Equilibria at the 20 c, r grid 
points
We have drawn the M line in blue and the F line in red. Note that the grid 
points were chosen so that the former goes through the upper left box and 
the latter goes through the lower right box. For that reason we have drawn 
the lines as splitting around these boxes. Observe that in all cases in Figure 
3.7, a line between two equilibria is always upwards sloping, as follows from
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the Monotonicity Lemma. Note that as we go up (increasing r) the column of 
boxes corresponding to c = 1.32, we start with one mutual choice equilibrium 
(which is the choosy one e3), then get all three, and finally get only the female 
choice equilibrium e1. A better way of seeing these transitions is to consider the 
bifurcation diagram drawn in Figure 3.8 with the sex ratio r increasing to the 
right, and the male and female acceptance levels drawn in the vertical axis. The 
lower (black) curves describe the male equilibrium acceptance levels u , while the 
top (red) lines describe the female levels v. In region III, the equilibrium values 
for each sex appear, from top to bottom, in the order e2 1e2 ,e 1.
U / V
0 . 3
0 . 2 5
0 . 1 5
0 . 1
0 . 0 5
1 . 0 6 1 . 0 7 1 . 0 8 1 . 0 9 1.1
Figure 3.8: Bifurcation in r of equilibria for c = 1.32
3.2.5 D ynam ical S tab ility  of E qu ilib ria
The equilibria el are solutions to both the male and female equilibrium condi­
tions (29,23), or equivalently are fixed points of the mapping T  given by
T  (u, v) = (u, v ) , <j> (u, v ) ) . (52)
In this section we determine the dynamical stability of the equilibria e% as fixed 
points of the mapping T. That is, a fixed point is stable if iterations of T  applied 
to nearby points converge back to it. To do this, we must determine the matrix 
norm
 ^ d ^ 3
(53)
\  du dv /
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A fixed point (u , v) will be dynamically stable if for some j , N J (u , u) < 1. Since 
we found the formulae for the equilibria e1 (r, c) in the previous section, we can 
evaluate the Jacobian m atrix at these u , values. We find tha t N 2 (e1 (r, c)) <  1 
where e1 exists (on and above the F curve) and N 2 (e3 (r, c)) < 1 where e3 exists 
(on and below the M curve). Furthermore N 1 (e1 (r, c)) < 1 in the bigger part 
of area I I  and TV1 (e3 (r, c)) < 1 in the bigger part of area I. On the other 
hand both  eigenvalues of the Jacobian of at the easy equilibrium e2
have absolute values larger than 1. Summarizing these numerical results, we 
have the following.
P rop osition  3.1 Let e1,e 2 and e3 be the female, easy and choosy equilibria. 
The equilibria e1 and e3 are dynamically stable and the equilibrium e2 is unstable.
Our numerical results supporting the above proposition and some examples 
on the basins of attraction of each equilibrium type are illustrated in Appendix 
B.2A .
3.2 .6  M arital S tab ility  cr o f Equilibria
Suppose we look at the distribution of couples over the (#, y) square tha t arises at 
the end of the play of our game, or indeed that arises in any way. We ignore the 
unm ated males in this analysis. For the moment, suppose tha t agent preferences 
are arbitrary. We say th a t a pair of couples (#1 , 2/1 ) and (#2 , 2/2 ) is unstable if a 
male from one couple and a female from the other both prefer each other to their 
current partner. In our common preference model, where type equals utility to 
the opposite sex, this means tha t the better (higher type) male and the better 
female belong to distinct couples, or that ( # 2  — # 1 ) (2/2 — 2/i) < 0. If a pair of 
couples is not unstable, we say it is stable. We define the Stability a  of a given 
distribution to be the probability that a randomly and independently chosen 
pair of couples is stable. This definition is similar in spirit to tha t proposed 
by K. Eriksson and P. Strimling in (2004). In our two period game, every 
strategy pair (u , v ) (not only equilibrium pairs) leads to a couple distribution 
tha t is uniform (with some constant density) on each of the four sub-rectangles 
rectangles Rk of the unit square in #, y space determined by the lines # =  v and
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y =  u drawn in Figure 3.9.
1
v




Figure 3.9: Couple distribution on 
the type square.
Let 7Tfc denote the probability that a couple belongs to R Note that 7Ti +  7T2 +  
^3 +  7T4 =  1 and that 7Ti +  n 2 = 1 — it, while 7Ti +  depends on r. Define a 
symmetric 4 x 4  matrix S  so that Sij is the probability that a pair of couples 
is stable, given that the couples belong to Ri and Rj. It is easy to see that two 
couples belonging to R 2 and R 4 form an unstable pair, while a pair belonging 
to R\ and R 3 form a stable pair. Otherwise, the couples belong to the same 
rectangle or two rectangles whose union is a rectangle R, and which are each 
preserved under a symmetry transformation 9 of R. Observe that 9 transposes 
pairs of such couples in such a way that if one is stable then the other is unstable. 
Hence for all these cases, S(j = 1/2. For example, Figure 3.10 illustrates how 




Figure 3.10: s3,4 =  1/2
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So if the distribution over the rectangles is 7r =  tt(u, v) = (7r i ,7T2, 7T3, 7r4) , the 
stability a is given by
a = G  (u, v) =  nSft  =  i (1 — 27T27T4 +  27Ti7T3). (55)
Li
Note that at any female choice equilibrium we have u = 0, hence 7ri =  7T4 =  0, so 
by (55) we have a = 1/2. More generally, we calculated a at the three equilibria 
in III, observing that
P ro p o sitio n  3.2 For any r and c, in region III, the choosy equilibrium e3 is 
the most stable one and the female choice equilibrium e1 is the most unstable 
one. That is,
0.5 =  <j(e1(r, c)) <  <j(e2(r, c)) < a(e3 (r,c)).
Furthermore, <r(e2(r, c)) < 0.54 and cr(e3(r, c)) < 0.59.
The distribution 7r is shown in Appendix B.3 and the numerical results 
supporting proposition 3.2 are illustrated in Appendix BA.
Figure 3.11 plots the marital stability a  of the three equilibria as a function 
of r, for fixed c =  1.32. The red line is a  (e1), the black line a (e2) and the 
green line a (e3) .
o
0 . 5 8
0 . 56
0 . 5 4
0 .5 2
1 . 02  1 . 0 4  1 . 0 6
Figure 3.11: Marital Stability o of the el .
1 . 08 i . i
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3.2 .7  n -P erio d  M odel, n > 2
In the previous section, we were able to obtain a complete analytical description 
of the equilibria for the two period model, with explicit formulae. Due to the 
complexities involved, this will no longer be possible for models with n  > 2 
periods. However, we are still able to obtain some analytical solutions for the 
continuous (uniform distribution) model and fairly complete numerical solutions 
for models where both sexes come in m  discrete types. We have extensive results 
for n  =  3 and very partial results for n = 4.
Recall that in the two period game all (say) females who enter the last 
period unmated do equally well, they get the mean male of the final period. 
Consequently at equilibrium all female types have the same threshold strategy 
in the first period (namely this male mean). This observation remains true in 
the penultimate period (last strategic period) in the n-period game -  but not 
in earlier periods. Consider the three period game, and an equilibrium in which 
the males are choosy in period 2 , accepting females equal or above some type 
a. Hence in period 1, females of low types [0, a) do worse if they enter period 2 
unmated than those females of high types [a, 1]. So the low female types accept 
males of types above some vl and the high types accept those above vjj, with 
vh > v l . However since the low female types will not be accepted by males 
in period 2 , they also will not be accepted in period 1 (where males are more 
choosy). So vl is not relevant to any im portant equilibrium property and can 
be ignored in the analysis. This fact, the irrelevance of low type strategies, was 
already observed in Alpern and Reyniers (2005). So the only relevant numbers 
are the equilibrium strategies in each period of the top male (x  =  1) and female 
(y = 1) types. Once the equilibrium strategies of the high types are determined, 
those of the lower types can if desired by calculated as well, but they don’t affect 
which couples form at equilibrium. It is worth noting in this multi period context 
that the threshold strategies for top types are decreasing in time (period). This 
is an observation obtained earlier in Alpern and Reyniers (2005).
3.2.8 F em ale-C hoice  E q u ilib riu m  for n  =  3
This section presents our only analytical result for n  > 2, the determination 
of the unique female choice equilibrium for n =  3. We assume th a t any male 
accepts any female in any period. For females, we denote by v 1 and v 2, v2 <  v1, 
the lowest male type tha t a top female (y =  1) will accept in periods 1 and
2. Let pi =  1/r^ be the inverse sex ratio, the ratio of females to males at the 
beginning of period i. This is the probability th a t a male entering period i will 
be matched in tha t period. Let qi =  1 — pi be the complementary probability of
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not being matched in period i, so tha t
Qi = 1 -  1 A, Q2 =  1 -  vi/ (vi +  r -  1) .
There are three type-classes of male: High, of type in H  = [iq, 1], with initial 
probability Pjj =  1 — id and mean fiH = ( l +  id ) /2; Medium, with types in
M  =  [v2, id] with initial probability Pm = v 1 — v2 and mean fiM = (v1 +  v2) /2;
Low, with types in L =  [0, id] with initial probability P l  =  v 2 and mean 
fiL =  v 2 /2. The probabilities tha t males of these types reach the final period 
unmated are given by
P l  =  1, Pm  =  Q2 , P h  =  <M2-
The expected payoff e3 to a female entering the final period is simply the mean 
type of the final period male distribution, and hence given by
_ Pl Pl ^ l +  Pm Pm ^ m  +  Ph Ph ^ h  /cgx
Pl Pl +  Pm  Pm  +  Ph Ph
Thus
_  r2 — v\ — 2r +  v 2r +  v \v 2r +  1 
63 2uir — 4r — 2v\ +  2v\v^v +  2 r2 +  2
The expected utility e<i for a female entering period 2 unmated is calculated 
as follows: If she meets a Low male, she goes into final period and gets if she 
meets a Middle male she accepts and gets on average (y 1 +  v2) /2; if she meets 
a High male, she accepts and gets on average ( l  +  id) /2. Hence her expected 
payoff is given by
y2r ^ ( (  1 2\ / \ ( y l + v 2\  (1 -  v1) (r -  1) / I  + i ;2\e2 =  _ e3 +  ((t,1 -  , 2) r /« ) ----------------- j +  i --j , (58)
where k — r — ( l — id) is the male population in period 2. Hence the female
equilibrium condition is given by the two equations,
v 2 =  e3 and id =  e2 (59)
The solution id (r) and v 2 (r) to the female equilibrium equations is drawn (using 
Mathematica) in the following figure. Of course, these will be equilibria only 
if c is sufficiently large so th a t males will always accept, tha t is, if the male 
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r
Figure 3.12: Female equilibrium strategies in the one sided choice
3 period game.
To determine when v 1, v2 forms an equilibrium with males always accepting 
(u1 =  u2 = 0) we must find when a male of type 1 will accept a female of type 0 
in period 1. Clearly he will do this only if his expected payoff w2 , if he goes into 
period 2 unmated, is not positive. A type 1 male will be accepted if matched, 
and will on average be matched with a type  ^ female. If he is not matched in 
either period, he gets — c. Thus
w2 = W 2  (r , c) =  (p2) i  +  (q2 P3 ) 2 +  (92 95) ( -c )  • (60)
Solving the equation 0 =  w2 (r, c) for r as a function of c gives the line (which 
we again call the F  line) above which we have one female choice equilibrium 
and below which we have none. This line is drawn as F  = F 3  (again using 
Mathematica) in Figure 3.13, alongside the F  and M  lines of the two period 
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Figure 3.13: The F  line for n = 3.
3.2.9 D iscre te  T y p e  M odel for n = 3
Although it was possible in the previous section to obtain the female choice 
equilibrium for n — 3 and the uniform distribution by analytical means, the 
mutual choice equilibria cannot be obtained in this way. For this reason we now 
turn to the game r niTn (r, c) in which both sexes are initially distributed with 
equal amounts of types 0,1, 2 ,. . . ,  m —1. To align our results with the continuous 
model where types belong to the interval [0 , 1], the cost to a male of not mating 
will be given as c m.  For n  =  3 and small m  we can obtain all the equilibria 
by a modified exhaustive search technique illustrated in Appendix B.  5. Figure 
3.14 charts, for m  = 8, the qualitative aspects of this search, for r and c in the 
grid. Here, F represents just a female choice equilibrium, M just a male choice 
equilibrium, and B the presence of both types. The ‘F ’ line is drawn in red, the 
‘M’ line in blue, and the portion M =F is drawn in black. One can easily detect 
the same qualitative partitioning of c, r space into the regions I, II, and III of 
the table in Figure 3.14. Note that, compared with the two period problem, 
region III (B’s) is smaller and the ‘M’ line is lower.
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c = 0 .6
0II0 C = 1 c = l  2 C = 1 .4
r = 1 .8 F F F F F
» = 1 .7 F F F F F
33=1.6 M F F F F
3 5 = 1 5 M B 1 F F F
33=1.4 M B B F F
33=1 3 M M M F F
33=1.2 M M M M M
33=1.1 M M M M M
33=1 M M M M M
Figure 3.14:. Regions J, I I , I I I  for n — 3,
m  =  8
To obtain a more quantitative analysis of the equilibria, as functions of r and 
c, we describe in Figure 3.16 the equilibria corresponding to a grid of r and c 
values. This is analogous to Figure 3.7 for n = 2, except that for n — 2 an 
equilibrium could be represented by a single point (u, v ) , whereas for n  =  3 we 
represent each equilibrium by a line segment between the lower male equilibrium 
values (ui, U2) and the higher female values (iq, v2). The grid lines correspond to 
u, v € {0,1,2,3,4} . Female choice equilibria, which have lower point (ixi, 1x2) =  
(0 , 0), are drawn in red and mutual choice equilibria are drawn in black.
In order to make it easier for the reader to interpret Figure 3.16, we will 
focus on an example. We examine the case where c =  1.4 and r = 0.6; we 
have one mutual choice equilibrium where (^1,^ 2) =  (1,0) and (^1,^2) =  (4,2). 
The equilibrium is represented by two dots. The coordinates of the lower dot 
indicate the male strategy (ui, U2) in periods 1 and 2 and the coordinates of the 
higher dot indicate the female strategy (tq, 1*2) in periods 1 and 2. Figure 3.15 
illustrates the equilibrium strategies for c = 1.4 and r = 0.6.
Period 2
0 1 2 3 4
Period 1
Figure 3.15: Equilibrium for discrete uniform 
distribution, m  = 8 , when r = 0.6 and c =  1.4.
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Note in Figure 3.16 that most of the mutual choice equilibria start at the 
bottom (U2 = 0), so in these the males are only choosy in the first period. In 
fact, only in the two boxes corresponding to r = 1.1 and c =  .6 and .8 is there 






Figure 3.16: Equilibria for discrete uniform 
distribution, m  = 8 .
The red line between the boxes is the F  line and the blue line is the M  line.
We also analysed a discrete 8 type model played over 3 periods, where types 
are not uniformly distributed in the first period. We assumed a truncated normal 
distribution of the population, so that middle types are more common than 
extreme types. Our results are presented in Appendix B . 6 . We found that 
there are multiple equilibria even when the distribution is not uniform and that 











c=0 £ c=0 B c=l c = l  2
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3.2.10 E qu ilib ria  for n =  4
When there are n = 4 periods, it is extremely time consuming to do an exhaus­
tive search for all equilibria, even for small numbers of types. So we adopt the 
iterative methods employed by Alpern and Reyniers (1999) in which an analog 
of the T  mapping of (52) is iterated to find attracting fixed points. Of course in 
this case T  acts on the 6-dimensional space,
T  ( ( u \ u W )  » ( ^ V 2^ 3)) =  ((^ 2, W3,W4) , (e,e3,e4) ) ,
where Wj (resp. ej) is the expected payoff for a male (resp. female) entering 
period j  unmated, given the strategies ul ,v l. For each pair of r and c, we start 
the iteration at a number of different points, and note the fixed points (all orbits 
of T  appear to converge). In the cases where only one type of equilibrium is 
observed (female or mutual choice), we indicate this by an F or M; if both appear 
we write down a B. Of course any F or M might become a B if we added the 
right additional starting point.
c = 0 .6 C = 0 .7 o II o bo c = 0 .9 C =1
r = 2 M F F F F
13=1.9 M F M F F
13=1.8 M B B F F
13=1.7 M M M F F
13=1.6 M M M M F
13=15 M M M M M
13=1 .4 M M M M M
13=13 M M M M M
1 3 = 1 2 M M M M M
13=13 M M M M M
13=1 M M M M M
Figure 3.17: Equilibria for n = 4, m  = 8
The pattern is similar for the case n — 3 shown in Figure 3.14, except for 
the M between an F and a B at the top of column c = .08. Possibly the M is 
really a B.
3.2.11 Conclusions
This section generalized the earlier matching model of Alpern and Reyniers 
(2005) by considering unequal sized groups to be matched. Calling the larger 
group ‘males’, and letting r > 1 denote the ‘sex ratio’ of males to females, we 
observed that a fraction £ of the males will end the game unmated. We set 
the utility of this eventuality to an unmated male as a cost (negative utility)
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c > 0. We then analyzed the equilibria of the resulting n-period game Tn (r, c ) . 
We analytically determined the equilibria in terms of the parameters r  and 
c for n =  2. We found two regions with unique equilibria (one-sided and two- 
sided) and a more interesting region with three simultaneous equilibria: a choosy 
equilibrium (both groups with high acceptance standards), an easy equilibrium 
(both groups have low standards) and a one-side equilibrium (males accept 
anyone). It is an interesting question as to which equilibrium one would expect 
to find in practice. If the process is one that is repeated each season (hiring 
season, mating season), one might expect that the equilibrium is determined in 
an evolutionary manner, in which case we would expect either the choosy or 
one-sided equilibria, which are dynamically stable (and the choosy one has a 
larger basin of attraction). If equilibria are chosen by society to be stable with 
respect to deviations after the couple formation (e.g. divorce), then we would 
also expect to see the choosy equilibrium, because it has the highest m arital 
stability index a. Our preliminary investigations (to be carried further in a 
subsequent article) indicate tha t different quality individuals (bands of types) 
fare unequally in the three equilibria, and so we might expect that the power 
of these groups (expressed through their numbers or otherwise) might be a 
determinant of the equilibrium tha t occurs.
The section takes the two parameters of the game, r and c, as given. Step­
ping back a level to the design problem, it can be seen tha t the organizer of 
the matching process may have some control over these values. The organizer 
of the process will usually have some direct control over r, typically by limiting 
the entries to the process of the larger group (called males), and so making it 
closer to 1. This is in fact often done by ‘capping’ in ‘singles’ events, and in­
directly done by setting application dates or entry fees (e.g. ladies free nights) 
in other matching processes. In captive breeding populations (in zoos or else­
where), the sex ratio is chosen to optimize population growth, for a given set of 
resources. In order to optimize the choice of r, it is of course necessary to know 
the result (or results, if multiple equilibria) of the game with a given value of 
r. Our model shows that in some cases shifting r a small amount will convert 
an ambiguous situation with multiple equilibria into a more predictable unique 
situation. Control over the c (non mating) cost parameter is more problemati­
cal. At the governmental level, it is reflected in tax benefits to married couples 
and in tourism by the use of ‘singles supplements’. Some local councils give a 
tax break to single occupancy apartments.
In this section we have taken the usual route of not explicitly modeling the 
process th a t pairs unmated individuals at the start of each period. Presumably, 
in order to be matched, the pairs must come into spatial contiguity by some 
process. A good candidate for this process, assuming individuals want to be
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matched, is what is known in the literature as rendezvous search, which tem­
porally optimizes the search for a partner. Originally posed by the first author 
in 1976, this problem has been extensively studied (mostly, but not exclusively, 
for two searchers). See, for example, Alpern and Gal (2003), Alpern (2002),Gal
(1999), and Howard (1999). W ith more work in this area for multiple searchers, 
we might have to modify our assumption of random pairing in each period. For 
example in the housing market some real estate agents may cater mostly for 
expensive houses and rich buyers (a rendezvous focal point), giving some de­
gree of assortative matching even before choice is taken into account. Similarly, 
in the biological setting, Cronin (1991) has suggested tha t assortative pairing 
may arise due to non-random arrival times at the breeding ground, another 
non-choice factor.
3 .3  W elfare
We study the average payoff (welfare) tha t females and males expect to receive 
at each equilibrium in the area I I I  of (r, c) space (presented in Figure 3.2). 
This welfare analysis complements the analysis of the equilibria in the area I I I  
of (r, c) space. Welfare analysis in combination with dynamical and marital 
stability analysis offers a complete study of the "efficiency" of the equilibria of 
the two period continuous type game. Its conclusions can be proven to be useful 
to explain or predict the equilibrium behaviour under different circumstances.
The study of the social and individual welfare allows us to examine any con­
flicts of interest between male and female populations and between the members 
of the same sex. Hence welfare analysis can be useful to understand how the 
equilibrium behaviour is formed under different conditions.
Welfare analysis may also be relevant to equilibrium selection. If a particular 
group has a dominant role, it may have the power to direct the rest of the 
population to follow an equilibrium tha t is more profitable for it. There are 
cases where male or female behaviour can be controlled or influenced by a specific 
group, or by a leader of a particular type. For instance, biological experiments 
show that in fish, younger females often copy the behaviour of older females 
(Gibson and Hoglund (1992), Dugatkin and Godin (1993)).
We note that in this section, we use the same notation as in section 3.2. 
Hence we name e1 the female choice equilibrium, e2 the easy equilibrium and 
e3 the choosy equilibrium and we assume tha t at an equilibrium e*, the male 
equilibrium strategy is the U{ and the female equilibrium strategy is the V{.
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3.3.1 Social Welfare
Given (r, c), the mean male welfare remains the same at all equilibria, as we will 
prove next. However, this is not true for mean female welfare which is affected 
by the strategies used. We prove tha t females are better off at the female choice 
equilibrium and worst off at the choosy equilibrium.
3.3.1.1. Definition of Mean Male and Female Welfare
The mean male welfare is independent of the strategies used by both males 
and females. Given (r, c), only ^ males are mated after the end of the game 
and males remain unmated, having a cost c. Hence the mean male welfare 
W m {^1) depends only on the sex ratio r  and on the expected cost c and it is 
the following
W M(ei) =  \ \  +  (61)r I  r
Hence from (61) follows Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3 .2  (male social welfare) For given (r, c) in region I I I ,  the av­
erage male payoff W  is not affected by the strategies used by males or
females.
The mean female welfare coincides with the average male type which is 
mated in the game; hence it is affected by the strategies used at equilibrium. At 
an equilibrium e*(r, c) =  (Ui,Vi) only k{ =  (1 — Uj)( 1 — vf) (as defined in (21)) 
females are expected to be mated in the first period, receiving a utility higher 
than Vi, and the rest of the females are mated in the second period, receiving 
an average utility of V{. Thus, the mean female welfare W f {g1) is the following
W F {e*) =  +
= 1 ^ 1 ( 1 - t , y + Vi (62)
Obviously, at the female choice equilibrium e1, males are non choosy (u\ =  0) 
and the average female payoff is of the form
W F(e') =  (63)
3.3.1.2. Theorem 3.3 on Female Social Welfare
Theorem 3 .3  (female social welfare) For given (r, c) in region I I I ,  the av­
erage female payoff W f ( g 1) is the highest at the female choice equilibrium e1 
and the lowest at the choosy equilibrium e3.
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In order to prove Theorem 3.3, we will use the following Lemma.
L em m a 3.4 Given (r, c) let (u , v ) and (u ', v') be equilibria where u , ur ^  0. I f  
v < vf then the mean female welfare WF (el) is higher at the (u,v).
P ro o f. We rewrite ^ ( e 1), replacing u with the equivalent function
, ,  , ~ r  -  2Vi +  2rvi +  v? +  1
/ M  = ------- - 2, i +  t,f +  i-------
(from (24)) for i = 2,3. Hence we have
W F(el) =  W F(ui,Vi) =  W F(f(vi),Vi)
=  1 ^ 5 )  ( ! - » , ) *  +  ««
_  . —r  -  2vi +  2rvj +  v? + 1  
-2v i  +  v? +  1
(1 -  ^ )  +  ^
=  ~ -  (r -  1) ^  (64)
Hence W F(el) decreases in Vi. ■
W ith the help of Lemma 3.4, we can now prove Theorem 3.3.
P ro o f  o f th e o re m  3.3 (fem ale social w elfare). We are first going to prove 
tha t females are better off at the female choice equilibrium e1 than  a t the easy 
equilibrium e2.
From (50), we know that v\ =  1 — r +  y/—r + r 2 at the female choice equi­
librium. Hence from (63), and (64) the difference between the mean female 
welfare at the female choice equilibrium e1 and at the easy equilibrium e2 is the 
following
1 +  v\
1 +  (1 -  r + y / - r  + r 2 ) 2 r
=  ----------------j -------------------- 2 2
=  y/r  (r — 1) — r y jr  (r — 1) — 2r  +  r 2 +  1 +  (r — 1) V2 
=  (r - 1 ) (v2 -  ( l  — r + y/r  (r -  1) ^
=  (r — 1) (v2 — vi) >  0
The fact that females are better off a t the easy equilibrium than at the 
choosy equilibrium, is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. ■ 
The following figure shows the mean female welfare WF(el) a t equilibrium 
el when r  =  1.05 and c =  2.
Fem aJechoioe fe1) Easy fe?) Choosy fe3)
Figure 3.18: Average female payoff Wi?(e*) at 
equilibrium el when r = 1.05, and c =  2.
3.3.2 In d iv id u a l W elfare
In the previous section, we analysed the effect of the equilibrium strategies on 
the mean male and female welfare. In this section, we study the impact of 
the equilibrium strategies on the expected payoff of specific groups of female 
and male types. As not all types are accepted in the first period, the welfare of 
different types of males and females differs greatly as strategies change. Types of 
the same sex can have conflicting individual interests and it is probable that the 
social and individual interests cannot be satisfied simultaneously. According to 
Theorem 3.2, the sum of the expected payoffs of all males is constant and equal 
to ^ — (r — l)c. Hence when some types of males are better off at a particular 
equilibrium, inevitably other male types are worst off. Total female welfare 
does not remain constant, but it varies as the strategies change. Nevertheless, it 
becomes clear from our analysis that different types of females can have different 
payoffs in each equilibrium and as a result different preferences for different 
equilibria to appear.
3.3.2.1. Definition of Expected Payoff of Male Type x  and Female Type y at a 
Mutual Choice Equilibrium el — (ui,Vi)
At an equilibrium, types accepted in the first period expect to enjoy a higher 
expected utility than the rest of the types. At a mutual choice equilibrium 
e* =  (Ui,Vi), a male of a type higher than Vi expects to get if he is mated in 
the first period (probability (1 — uf) £) and Ui if he enters in the second period 
unmated (probability 1 — ( 1 — Ui) A). However, a male of a type lower than Vi
89
expects to get a utility of Ui in the game, since he can only be mated in the 
second period.
Hence at a mutual choice equilibrium e%, the expected utility W m {%, e*) that 
a male of type x  expects to have when he enters the game is the following
ur f i \ - \  Ui for x < Vi
M ’ \  (! -  Ui) f  +  ( i  -  U “  Ui) f )  ui for x >Vi
Similarly, at a mutual equilibrium e1 =  (ui, Vi) a female of a type higher than 
Ui expects to receive if she is m ated in the first period (probability(1 — i^)) 
and Vi if she enters the second period unmated (probability Vi). A female of a 
type lower than Ui expects to receive Vi.
Hence, the expected utility W f (v , el) tha t a female of type y expects to have 
when she enters the game is the following
Wf {  i) =  f *  (66)
\  (1 -  V i )  +  vf  for y > U i
3.3.2.2. Definition of Expected Payoff of Male Type x  and Female Type y at a 
Female Choice Equilibrium e1 =  (0, i>i)
At a female choice equilibrium not all males expect to have the same payoff. 
Males of a type higher than v\ have a higher expected utility, since they have a 
chance of £ to be mated in the first period. The rest of the types never expect 
to find a partner in the first period. In the second period, players of all types 
have the same chance of finding a partner. (The probability of being mated in 
the second period is the ratio of unmated females over unmated males, hence it 
is ^ e t ) -  The average payoff th a t a male expects to receive if he enters unmated 
in the second period is p,y , as it is given in equation (27).
Hence the payoff Wa/(x, e1) th a t a male of type x  expects to receive when 
he enters the game is
e1) = i  t y  ■’ '  1 11 +  1=12
I  2  r  * r  nw * , * )  =  < ? i ir t vi-pLy for x > v\
vi
r — 1 + v i  
2  r  '
i  -  ( i  -  H + s r ) c for 1 ^  wi
It is im portant to note th a t at a female choice equilibrium, a male who 
remains unmated after the first period expects th a t he is going to receive a 
maximum payoff of 0 in the second period. Hence males of a type lower than
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v\ expect to receive a non positive payoff, while the rest of the males expect to 
receive a payoff tha t is not higher than
WM{ x ^ ) < {  ^  ™ X Z Vl (68)
0 for x  < v\
\ \  for x  > vi
At a female choice equilibrium e1, females of all types have the same expected 
payoff when they enter the game; since no male rejects them, they all have the 
same probability to be mated in the first or the second period. The expected 
payoff W p (y ,e 1) th a t any female type y expects to receive is the same as the 
average male type ^ ( e 1) in the couples created. Hence for all y e [0,1], we 
have
W F(y ,e 1 ) = W F(e1) (69)
3.3.2.3. Categories of Male and Female Types
For any given (r, c), from Lemma 3.3 it is known tha t in area I I I , the 
strategy Ui of males and the strategy v% of females are the lowest at the female 
choice equilibrium e1(r, c) and the highest at the choosy equilibrium e3(r, c).
u 3 >  u 2 >  u i  and V 3 > V 2 >  v \
Given (r, c), we divide male types in the following four categories
L L m = [0 , i>i]
Lm — [V\,V2 )
M m — \v2 , n )
Hm = N , i]
We call L L m the male types rejected in the first period at all equilibria, L m 
the male types rejected in the first period at the easy and the choosy equilibrium 
but accepted at the female choice equilibrium, M m the male types rejected in the 
first period at the choosy equilibrium but accepted at the easy and the female 
choice equilibrium and Hm the male types accepted always, at all equilibria.
In the same way, given (r, c), we divide female types in three categories
Lf  = [0, u2]
Mf  = [K2, U3)
Hf  = N ,  1]
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We call L f  the female types rejected in the first period at all mutual choice 
equilibria but accepted at the female choice equilibrium, M f  the female types 
rejected at the choosy equilibrium but accepted at the easy equilibrium (and 
obviously at the female choice equilibrium) and H f  the female types accepted 
at all equilibria.
3.3.2.4. Theorems on Individual Welfare
We prove tha t each one of the categories of male and female types defined 
above has a list of preferences over the equilibria in area I I I  according to the 
expected payoff of the types it includes. The following theorems summarise our 
results.
T h eo re m  3.4 ( in d iv id u a l m ale w elfare) For given (r, c) in region I I I  in 
the two period game,
(i) Male types in LLm get the maximum expected payoff at the choosy equilib­
rium e2 and the minimum expected payoff at the female choice equilibrium 
e1.
(ii) Male types in Lm get the maximum expected payoff at the female choice 
equilibrium e1 and the minimum expected payoff at the easy equilibrium 
e2.
(Hi) Male types in Mm get the maximum expected payoff at the easy equilibrium 
e2 and the minimum expected payoff at the choosy equilibrium e3.
(iv) Male types in Hm get the maximum expected payoff at the choosy equilib­
rium e3 and the minimum expected payoff at the female choice equilibrium 
e1.
P roo f. We are going to prove first parts (i) and (iv) and then parts (ii) and 
(hi).
(i) It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.3.
(iv) Let x  e Hm. We are going to prove first tha t his expected payoff is higher
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at e3 than at e2. Prom (65) we have
3 \  TTT (  2 \  ^ 3  +  I  / 1  . N I  , / i  / i  _. \  1-  W M(x, e ) =  — - —  (1 -  i*3) -  +  ( 1 -  (1 -  1*3) -  ) i*3
1t3 +  1 \  ( l - i * 3)
2 u3 j  ~ ^3
1*2 +  1 \  (1 — 1*2)
-  U 2 ---------------------------------------- 1*22 V  r  
( i - t i 3) 2 , .. ( 1 - U 2 ) 2
=  — 2 T ~  + “ 3 - - ^ T ~ " “ 2
=  n3 -  1*2 +  — (2 -  1*3 -  1*2) ( - 1 * 3  +  U2 )2r
=  (1*3 -  1*2) ^1 ~  (2 -  1*3 -  1*2)^  > 0
Looking at the final inequality in more detail, it becomes apparent tha t 
since 0.5 >  1*3 >  1*2 >  0 and 2r  > 2, the difference W m (x,  e3) — Wm(x, e2) 
is non negative.
Having proved tha t a male x  in Hm is better off at e3 tha t at e2, in order 
to complete the proof of (iv) it is enough to prove tha t the expected payoff 
W m (x 5e l) tha t a male x  gets at female choice equilibrium e1 is at most equal 
to the expected payoff W m (x , e2) he gets at the easy equilibrium e2.
From (68), at female choice equilibrium, the expected payoff that a male 
expects to receive is always less than Hence it is enough to prove that
W M (l +  K , e2) - - l >  0 
r  I
We show this as follows
W M (l +  K , e 2 ) - i i  =  ^ ± i ( l - „ 2 ) I + ( l - ( l - U 2 ) I ) M 2 - i i  
2 r 2 r \  r J 2r
( l - t ! 2) 2 , 1 1
---------------2r  2 r
_  1 — 2 i *2 + 1*2 +  2 r i* 2  — 1 
2 r
=  77-1*2 ( - 2  +  1*2 +  2 r )  >  0 .
2 r
In order to prove (ii) and (iii) we need the following lemma.
L em m a 3.5 For given (r, c) in region I I I  in the two periods game, a male type 
x which is rejected in the first period at equilibrium e% and is accepted in the first
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period at equilibrium e3, is always better off at equilibrium e3.
P ro o f . From (65), (67) and Lemma 3.3, for given (r, c) in region I I I  in the 2 
periods game, the highest male type 1 has the lowest expected payoff Wm{  15 el) 
a t the female choice equilibrium, while the lowest male type 0 has the highest 
expected payoff Wm{0 ,el) at the choosy equilibrium. A type x  rejected in the 
first period at equilibrium el , but accepted in the first period at equilibrium e3 
can never expect to get more than W(0, e3) at el and less than V F(l,e1) at e3. 
Hence it is sufficient to prove that the expected payoff W{  1, e1) of type 1 at the 
female choice equilibrium is higher than the expected payoff W (0 , e3) of type 0 
at the choosy equilibrium.
From (65), (67) and (27) we have
^ ( l . e ^ - ^ O . e 3) =  +   ^ L — \ c - U3
2 \ r  r r — l + v i )  r \  r — l  + v \ J
=  r ~ l ( \  Vl V
2 \ r  r r — k \ )  r \  r  —1 +  u iy  
( \ - k 3 f r - l  + k3\  \
- { 7 ^ r 3 ^ ^ - { - ^ k r ) c)
( 1 1  l - k 3 ( , ( ( r - l  + k3\  r - l \
=  +  c j
+ f lr .-_1l-_ j i+ r - 1 ”1 c) > 0
\ 2  r r — k \ r r — l  + v \ J  
The explanation of the last inequality follows.
We know that pp(u 3 ,v 3) < ^ and < r > hence the first parenthe-
( \ ________________________ ^__- J |\ \  — is positive. Furtherm ore  —  < I1^ ,  thus the
/  r k3
second parenthesis ( ( - — —4 —— | c — J is positive as well. The last paren-
\ \  r - k 3 J  )
thesis is positive since all terms are positive. ■
C ontinuation o f proof o f theorem  3.4 (individual m ale w elfare).
We can now prove parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 3.4.
(ii) and (iii) They are immediate consequences of Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.3 and part (i) 
of Theorem 3.4 (individual male welfare).
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The following figure (3.19) shows the payoff W m {x , e*(1.05,2)) that a male 
of type x  expects to get at equilibrium el , when r = 1.05, and c =  2.
W H
C h o o s y  fe3) 
E a s y  fe2)
fem  a J e  c h o r e  fe1)
Figure 3.19: Expected payoff 
Wm (x , el) of male type x  at 
equilibrium el when r  =  1.05 and 
c =  2 .
T h eo rem  3.5 (ind iv idual fem ale w elfare) For given (r , c) in region I I I  in 
the two periods game,
(i) Female types in L f get the maximum expected payoff at the female choice 
equilibrium e1 and the minimum expected payoff at the easy equilibrium 
e2.
(ii) Female types in Mf get the maximum expected payoff at the easy equilib­
rium e2 and the minimum expected payoff at the choosy equilibrium e3.
(iii) Female types in Hf get the maximum expected payoff at the choosy choice 
equilibrium e3 and the minimum expected payoff at the female choice equi­
librium e1.
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P ro o f. We are going to prove parts (i) and (iii) and then part (ii).
(i) Let y e L f.  From (66) and Lemma 3.3, it follows tha t for all y in L f  it is 
true that
WF{y,e3) > W F (y ,e2)
Hence we need to prove th a t the expected payoff WF (y^e1) of a type y 
in L f  at the female choice equilibrium is higher than her expected payoff 
WF (y, e3) at the choosy equilibrium. From (66 )and (69) we have
W F(y ,e l ) =  i i s  > i  >  V 3  =  WF(y,e3)
2 *
(iii) Let y eHf .  In order to prove th a t a type y  in H / gets her maximum payoff 
at the choosy equilibrium e3, we are going to prove first that the expected 
payoff WF (y,el) of y is higher at e3 than at e2. From (66) we have
W F{y, e3) -  W F(y , e2) =  (1 -  vz) - 3 ^ ~ 1 +  v l  -  ^(1 -  v2) V2^  1 +  v ^ j
^3 +  1 _  vl +  1 
2 2
Having proved tha t UF (y,e3) >  UM{y,e2)-> in order to complete the proof, 
it is enough to prove tha t the payoff W F (y,e l) th a t a female of type y can get 
at the female choice equilibrium is less th a t the expected payoff she can get at 
the easy equilibrium. Hence in the same way as before and given (66) and (69) 
we have
WF{y,e2 ) - W F(y ,e l ) =
Therefore WF (y, e2) > WF (y ,e1).
(ii) Similar to («) and (iii).
■
The following figure (3.20) shows the payoff W F (y ,e l( 1.05,2)) tha t a female 
of type y expects to get at equilibrium e®, when r  =  1.05 and c = 2.
W F (y ,e 2 ) - W F(el )
v 2 +  1 ^ l + l  
~ 2  2 ~
\ (4 - 4 ) > q
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Choo^ - fe3)
Ea^ fe?)
fem  a le c h o io e  fe1)
I0 .2  0.4 0 .6  0 .8  1y
Figure 3.20: Expected payoff W f {v , e*) 
of female type y at equilibrium ex when 
r = 1.05 and c =  2.
3.4 Biological Im plications of th e  Model
In this section, we briefly examine the implications of the model presented in 
section 3.2 in biology. We present a variation of the two period game that is 
more applied in biology and mate selection. The extended analysis of this model 
will be the subject of a joint paper with Steve Alpern. Here we summarise our 
main results, without providing any proofs. We try to give an answer to the 
question "when do we have female choice and when do we have mutual choice".
This section is added in this chapter for general information and in order to 
provide an insight on applications of our model.
3.4.1 D escrip tio n  o f th e  M odel
The same basic model as in section 3.2 is used but there are some important dif­
ferences in the assumptions made concerning the types and their utility. Types 
represent fertility or fitness and the type space is no longer normalised in [0 , 1].
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Instead, males are considered to be uniformly distributed in [h — 7 , h +  7 ] and 
females are uniformly distributed in [I — k , I +  k], where 7  and « are the maxi­
mum distances a type may have from the average male type h and the average 
female type Z correspondingly.
Players still have maximising preferences as in section 3.2. However, we 
assume th a t their objective is to maximise the number o(x, y) of offspring pro­
duced. The utility of a mating (x,y), expressed as the number of offspring 
o(x ,y ) =  Z x y  produced, is taken to be proportional to both male type x  and 
female type y. It is necessary to note than in section 3.2, when the lowest pos­
sible female type was mated with the lowest possible male type, the utility for 
both partners was zero, while in the current model, the outcome of the mating 
is a positive number of offspring.
Players use the type of their partners as an indicator of the number of off­
spring o(x , y) they expect to have. Their effort to achieve the maximum number 
of offspring is expressed by seeking a partner of a high type.
Population is considered to be male biased (sex ratio r > 1), as in the original 
model. Consequently, not all males find a partner; however there is no cost c 
payable by the males remaining unmated. Males tha t do not manage to get 
mated until the end of the game do not have offspring and have a utility of 0 .
It is easy to show th a t male variation 7  and average type h do not influence 
female or male strategies at equilibrium, since all females are mated at the end 
of the game. On the other hand, female variation k has an im portant role at 
the formation of the equilibrium behaviour. The utility of mated and unmated 
males at equilibrium can be significant, especially when the mean female type Z 
is high and female variation k is low.
3.4.2 B asic  R esults
We analysed the discrete type and the continuous type two period models. In 
the former model, we assumed we have three equiprobable male and female 
types.
In both  models, we found that for given r and Z, choosiness in both sexes 
increases as female variation k increases. For k very large, males tend to be 
choosy, even for r very large. When the value of female variation « approx­
imates the mean female type Z, the utility males receive from a mating with 
different females varies greatly. In this case, the utility tha t low type females 
offer does not differ greatly from 0. On the other hand, high type females offer 
to males a significantly higher utility. As a result, males are willing to reject 
low type females and risk to remain unmated, in order to give to themselves 
more opportunities to find a partner of a higher type. For female variation k 
low though, especially as Z and r increase, males are not willing to take any
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risk and thus accept all females. When k is low, the difference of the minimum 
utility I — k males can get by being mated and the utility of not being mated (0 ) 
becomes important, especially as I increases. If in addition to that, r  is large 
and consequently the probability of finding a partner is low, males have one 
more reason not to want to be choosy.
For given I and female choice is the norm when male population is sig­
nificantly larger than the female, while mutual choice appears otherwise. This 
comes into accordance with the general theory that predicts that mutual choice 
appears when female variation is high and operational sex ratio is close to 1 
(Trivers (1972), Kokko and Johnstone (2002), Real (1990), Kvarnemmo and 
Simmons (1999)).
In the discrete 3 type model, we found a unique equilibrium, while in the 
continuous type game we showed that it is possible the existence of multiple 
equilibria.
Given Z, in the discrete type model there is a line F  dividing the (r, k) space 
in two regions. On and above F  there is a unique female choice equilibrium, 
while below it there is a unique mutual choice equilibrium.
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Figure 3.21: Plot of the F  line for I = 1 (discrete type
model).
However, for given Z in the continuous type model, the F  line separating the 
areas of female and mutual choice is divided into two brunches for k < | .  We 
call M  the higher branch for « < | .  It is proved, as in section 3.2, that for 
« < | ,  between the F  and the M  line, there are three equilibria, two mutual 
choice and one female choice equilibrium.
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Figure 3.22: Equilibrium areas for / =  1 (continuous type model).
The analysis of the area between the F  and the M  lines is similar to the 
analysis of the area I I I  in 3.2; it is easy to normalise the current model and 
show it is equivalent to the model presented in 3.2.
4 Age Dependent Preferences
4 .1  In tr o d u c tio n
The connection between age and mating preferences is studied extensively by 
the biological, evolutionary, psychological and sociological literature, but the 
empirical and theoretical results often contradict each other (Brooks and Kemp 
(2001)). Drawing general results on the connections between age, fitness, fertility 
and preferences and trying to isolate each factor and analyse its relation with 
the others have proved to be difficult, leading to inconsistent results (Brooks 
and Kemp (2001)). Our research is focused on building an analytical framework 
which examines how age dependent preferences affect the equilibrium behaviour.
This chapter focuses on the relation between age and choice. Our analysis 
is different from the existing evolutionary models, examining the relation of age 
and time preferences (Sozou and Seymour (2003), Rogers (1994)). We do not 
use an evolutionary model and we examine how the age of an individual and 
the availability of potential partners affect the selectivity of the individual over 
the age of his partner, not over the time he is willing to  wait in order to find a 
partner.
In contrast to the previous chapters, we examine a mutual choice steady 
state model where the types of players are determined by their age. We assume 
that a player of age (type) 1 is in the first year of his fertile life. Players seek 
partners such that they maximise the years tha t both they and their spouses 
are fertile. For instance, assuming tha t males are fertile for 6 years and females 
are fertile for 4 years, the best partner for a male of age 2 is a female of age 1, 
since they can both be fertile for 4 years. If a male of age 2 is mated with a 
female of age 3, they can produce offspring for only 2 years.
4.1.1 R elated  L iterature on A ge Preferences
In biology, most studies focus on female preferences and behaviour. It is often 
assumed tha t longevity is connected with gene quality, and therefore it is ex­
pected tha t females prefer to mate with old rather than  young males (Anderson 
(1994), Trivers (1973), Manning (1985), Kokko (1998), Poesel et al (2006)). This 
assumption has been criticised by Hansen and Price (1995) who assert th a t older 
individuals are not always genetically better partners. Hansen and Price (1995) 
base their criticism on four basic facts: firstly th a t fitness and age are in most 
cases negatively correlated (Trivers (1973) and Manning (1985)); secondly that 
males in a younger age have usually higher breeding value for fertility; thirdly 
that young individuals may be better adapted to their environment as a result 
of their parents having been most recently exposed to the selection process; and
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finally tha t the breeding value for fitness is reduced as a result of "deleterious 
germ-line mutations occurring over the lifetime of a male" (Brooks and Kemp 
(2001)). Their arguments are supported by empirical findings, showing a nega­
tive relation between the offspring viability or reproductive quality and the age 
of its father (Price and Hansen (1998), Alatalo et al (1986), Beck and Powell
(2000)). Furthermore, it is observed th a t in some species parental investment in 
the form of quality of ejaculates reduces with successive matings and therefore 
with age (Brooks and Kemp (2001), Manning (1985)). So, it is possible tha t 
females do not prefer old males. Evidence towards this direction is given by the 
empirical research of Jones et al (2000) and by the theoretical model of Beck 
and Powell (2000) who demonstrate tha t female mate choice based on male age 
is most likely to evolve in a population where females have a preference for 
younger and intermediate age males. "If females choose mates based on genetic 
quality alone, females should prefer younger rather than older males" (Beck and 
Powell (2000)).
On the other hand, it is proved th a t in many species such as insects and 
lizards, not only male but also female reproductive success and viability of off­
spring decline with age (Uetz and Norton (2007), Hercus and Hoffman, (2000), 
Pervez et al (2004), LeComte et al (2005)), a fact tha t should give an incentive 
to males to choose younger females as well.
In humans, it is generally accepted tha t during the mating process men 
prefer younger women and women prefer older men (Helle et al (2008), Kenrick 
and Keefe (1992), Kenrick, Keefe et al (1995)). Nevertheless, the preferences 
of women seem to change during the recent years. Einon (1997) notes tha t 
marriage statistics in UK reveal tha t women of breeding age choose young men. 
This result is supported by a study of the Office for National Statistics in UK 
tha t was published in the Daily Telegraph (2003), noting th a t the proportion 
of men marrying older women than themselves amongst men marrying for the 
first time has almost doubled (it is now 26%) in the last 25 years, while among 
women marrying for the first time, the proportion of women marrying younger 
men than themselves has risen from 13% per cent to 20%. This phenomenon is 
connected with the need of women to find mates of a high fitness. As Doosje et 
al (1999) argue, humans as well as other mammals aim to increase the viability 
of their offspring and, consequently, base their mate choices on indications of 
reproductive investment.
4.1 .2  Sum m ary o f  Our R esu lts
Trying to examine the influence of age preferences in the mating behaviour, we 
built an age preference model based on an idea of Alpern and Reyniers (1999). 
Nevertheless, we do not assume homotypic preferences as Alpern and Reyniers
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(1999), but as they propose, we explore the equilibrium behaviour under max­
imising preferences. In our model, two populations (males and females) meet 
randomly over successive periods. Players are taken to have different types, 
denoting their age, and the utility from a mating depends on the age of both 
partners. The utility of a mating is the number of years th a t both partners can 
produce offspring. Hence, the younger both partners are in a couple, the higher 
the utility both partners receive is. Our goal is to examine how the age of an 
individual and the age and availability of its potential partners affect its mating 
behaviour.
In contrast to the models presented so far, we use a steady state model, in 
which the distribution of the population remains fixed in time. Given tha t the 
age (type) of players increases over time, we consider an age limit over which 
players are not able to participate in the game anymore. Hence, in every period, 
players leave the game either because they have found a m ate or because they 
are too old to participate any longer. In the mean time, a fixed number of new 
players enters the game, replacing those who left (with or without a partner). It 
is important to distinguish between the population sex ratio r and the incoming 
population sex ratio R. The population sex ratio r is the ratio of males to 
females in the population, while the incoming population sex ratio R, is the 
ratio of males of age 1 to females of age 1.
We analyse particular cases where male and female maximum age limits 
differ. We assume tha t males can never be fertile for a smaller number of 
periods than females. We examine how the equilibrium strategies change when 
the number of young males entering a period is not equal to the number of 
young females entering the game (R ^  1). In the cases we examine, when the 
incoming population sex ratio R  is 1 : 1, the equilibria are trivial; we will show 
tha t all males of age 1 are mated with females of age 1. Nevertheless, when the 
incoming population sex ratio R  is not taken to be 1 : 1, the equilibria appearing 
are more interesting.
In the models examined, we do not find multiple equilibria for any given 
incoming population sex ratio R. However, the equilibrium in particular games 
often changes as R  varies. The game where females are fertile for r  =  3 periods 
and males are fertile for A =  4 periods is of particular interest. In this game, 
there is no equilibrium for some values of R , while when the population is male 
biased (r > 1), there are two possible equilibria where the population sex ratio 
r is the same. In all the games studied, young males and females are at least 
as choosy as the old ones at equilibrium, a fact tha t accords with findings in 
biology (Gray (1999), Kodric - Brown and Nicoletto (2001)).
We measure the "satisfaction" of couples created according to the population 
productivity. We assume tha t both male and female populations are better off
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when the population productivity is high. It is shown tha t in all cases the 
population productivity is the maximum when the population sex ratio r is 
1:1 . When r is 1 : 1, the average age at marriage of both males and females is 
minimum.
We assume that on average a couple produces J  offspring per period that 
both partners are fertile and given some special assumptions, we find when 
the number of entrants in each period is equal with the number of offspring 
produced.
The chapter is organised as follows: in the next section, the game is described 
in detail, before some general observations on the equilibrium behaviour are 
stated. Next, our results for the case where females are fertile for r  =  2 periods 
and males are fertile for A >  2 periods and the case where females are fertile 
for r  =  3 periods and males are fertile for A >  3 are presented. After the 
presentation of the equilibria, we focus on the population productivity and the 
average age at marriage as indicators of the couples satisfaction. Finally we 
conclude with some general remarks.
4 .2  D e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  G a m e
We consider a steady state non atomic mating game, based an idea of Steve 
Alpern and Diane Reyniers (1999). Two populations, males and females, are 
randomly matched over successive periods. Males are fertile for A periods and 
females for r  periods, where A >  r .  There exists a continuum of players, who 
have one dimensional types denoting the number of periods they have already 
been fertile (including the period they are). Hence the type of an individual 
reveals in which period of his fertile life he is. W ithout loss of generality, we 
can assume that players are fertile from year 1. Hence in our analysis, we can 
assume that types simply denote the age of players.
A constant number of players (females and males) of age (type) 1 enters the 
game in the beginning of every period, before a random matching takes place; 
each party of a matched pair (i , j ) can either accept or reject the other. If both 
accept, then they form a mated couple and leave the game, with both having 
a utility of u^j =  min[A +  1 — i , r  +  1 — j]; Uij can be thought as the number 
of periods a couple (i , j ) is expected to be both fertile, or as an indicator of the 
number or the viability of offspring a couple can have. When there is no mutual 
consent, both i and j  proceed unmated into the next period where their type 
increases by 1, becoming z + 1 and j  + 1  for i and j  respectively. In each period, 
there are a* males of age i and bj females of age j .  We call R  =  the sex 
ratio of the incoming population and r the population sex ratio, where R, r > 0. 
In our analysis, we consider tha t the normalised male population is r  and the 
normalised female population is 1.
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A male strategy s m  denotes the minimum utility that each male of age z 
is willing to accept. The female strategy sp is defined similarly. This strategy 
formulation facilitates the analysis and it is equivalent to a specification of the 
highest type (oldest partner) that one should accept. If the strategy of player 
of age z is s(z), z accepts any player at least as young as A — s(i) +  1.
Let Ui be the utility tha t a male of age z expects to receive in the game and 
Vj the utility that a female of age j  expects to receive in the game. The utility 
Ui th a t a male of age i expects to receive is a weighted average of a the utility 
he expects to receive if he is mated in age z (probability Y Z  and
the utility he expects to receive if he enters in age z +  1 unmated (probability 
^  1( l  — +  The utility Vj that a female of age j  expects to receive 
in the game is defined similarly.
Thus when r > 1
3=1 \ j =i
vj = r  ' ri—1 i=l
and when r <  1
3=T / 3=T
Ui — ^  ] kjjbjUj j +  I ^  ^(1 ki,j)bj J U{+1 (71)
3=1 \ j= 1
Vi
where
i=A /  i=X \
=  ^  ] ki,jQ/i'U/i,j I 1 T ^  ^(1 ki^C Li I Vjf+1
i=1 V i=l /
h j  =  (  1 1J  \  0 c
if both z, j  accept each other 
otherwise
(72)
It is interesting to note that when r > 1, £ males and all females participate 
in the matching in each period, (r — 1 males remain unpaired.) In the same 
way, when r < 1 all males and only r females participate in the matching is each 
period. (1 — r females remain unpaired.) As a result, when r > 1 the probability 
th a t a male of age z meets a female of age j  is ^bj while when r < 1 it is bj. 
Similarly, when r > 1 , the probability that a female of age j  meets a male of 
age z is while when r < 1 it is a;.
We assume tha t a male of age A and a female of age r  leaving the game 
w ithout finding a partner receive a utility less than 1.
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The equilibrium notion used is the same as the one used in the Alpern 
and Reyniers (1999, 2005) and in all the previous non steady state models we 
presented. At equilibrium every player accepts those types providing him with 
utility as least as a high as his expected utility in the next period.
Hence at equilibrium the male strategy sm  is
= [|V2l,|V»l,...1[U*l,l]
since each male of age i is willing to accept any female of age j  providing 
him with a utility of at least £/*+i-
In the same way, the female equilibrium strategy is
=  [rv a l, rv a l \V r] ,l]
For instance if a male of age z, expects to receive a utility of 2.3 if he enters 
unmated in the next period, then his strategy is [2.3] =  3 and he should accept 
any female of age r  — 2 or younger.
Since it is a steady state model, the total population must remain unchanged 
during time. Hence the number of males of age z should be equal with the
number of males of age z — 1 which remain unmated. (Similarly for females of
age j .) Hence at equilibrium, when r  > 1, it must be true tha t
1 ^   ^k j jb j—) =  Uj-fi (7^)
= bl+1 (74)
and when r  <  1, it must be true that
a,i(l -  ^ k i j b j )  = ai+1 (75)
M 1 =  bl+l (76)
4 .3  G en era l O b serv a tio n s a t E q u ilib r iu m
In order to facilitate the reader, we illustrate the male strategy in a table A x r ,
where each row z represents a male of age i and each column j  a female of age
j .  A cell (z, j )  is filled with an A T  when a male of age i accepts a female of 
age j  and with an R T  otherwise. In a similar table A x r  we can illustrate the 
female strategy. In a female strategy table, a cell (z, j )  is filled with an at when 
a female of age j  accepts a male of age i and with an r t  otherwise.
The following general observations are true at equilibrium, independently of
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r ,  A, R  and r.
(i) Males of age A and females of age r  are universal acceptors. Independently 
of the age of their partner, the utility they receive from a mating is always 
1, hence equal with the minimum utility any mating in the game can 
produce; immediate consequence is tha t they are indifferent between all 
types with which they can be mated.
(ii) Males of age A — 1 and females of age r  — 1 are universal acceptors as well. 
They expect than if they enter unmated in the last period, the maximum 
utility they can get is 1 , and therefore they are willing to accept even the 
oldest players (of age A or r) .
(iii) If A >  r ,  all males of age A — r  + 1  or younger are accepted by all females, 
since they provide to them the maximum possible utility the latter can 
get. If A <  r ,  all males accept all females of an age r  — A +  1 or younger.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 AT 1 at at at at at
2 AT 2 at at at at at
3 AT 3 at at
4 AT 4 at at
5 AT AT AT AT AT 5 at at
6 AT AT AT AT AT 6 at at
male strategy female strategy
Figure 4.1: Application of observations (t), (ii) and (iii) 
in a game where A =  6 and r  =  5.
(iv) Equilibrium strategies are non increasing sequences of numbers. At equi­
librium, no player is choosier than  any younger player of the same sex. If 
a male of age x  is not willing to accept any partner older than y , then any 
male younger than x  never accepts any female older than y as well. The 
same is true for females.
Let a male x  not accept any female older than y at equilibrium. Then, a 
male younger than x, expects th a t if he reaches age x  + 1  unmated, he will 
receive a utility higher than ux+i,y+\ but at most ux+1)2/. Therefore, at 
equilibrium, a male younger than x  is not willing to accept anyone older 
than y , in other words anyone offering him a utility lower than ux+ijV. (Or 
he can be even choosier than that). Accordingly, any female younger than
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?/, knowing that at equilibrium a female type y rejects any male older than 
x , she will accept only those males offering her a utility at least as high as 
^x,y+i(or even higher).
For instance, let’s assume that males are fertile for 4 periods and females 
are fertile for 3 periods and at equilibrium a male of age 2 only accepts 
females of age 1 and 2. Then a male of age 1 knows that if he reaches 
age 3 unmated, the minimum payoff he can receive is higher than what 
a female of age 3 would offer him (hence it is higher than 1) but it is at 
most 2. (If it was higher than 2, a male of age 2 would also reject a female 
of age 2). As a result, at equilibrium, a male of age 1 has to reject any 
female older than 2 (and can be even choosier).
1 2 3
1 AT RTA
2 AT AT r t I
3 AT AT AT
4 AT AT AT
male strategy
Figure 4.2: Application 
of observation (iv ) in a 
game where A =  4, 
t — 3.
In general, in a male strategy table, if a cell ( i , j )  is filled with an R T , all 
cells (z , j ) for z < i, are also filled with an R T ; if a cell (i , j)  is filled with 
an AT, all cells (i, z') for z' < j ,  are also filled with an AT.
In a female strategy table, if a cell (i , j ) is filled with an r t , all cells (i,w) 
for w < j  are also filled with an r t ; if a cell (i , j )  is filled with an at , all 
cells (w ' , j ) for w' < i , are also filled with an at.
(v) A male of age x  is always willing to accept any female at least as old as 
t  +  1 — A + re when either r  > A or A > r  and A — x  < r ; and at least 
female of age 1 when A > t  and A — x  > r .  Accordingly, any female of 
age y is always willing to accept any male at least as old a s A T l  — t  + y 
when either A > r  or r  > A and r  — y <  A; and at least male of age 1 
when r  > A and r  — y >  A.
This is an immediate consequence of the fact that all players should accept
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types which offer them a utility at least as high as the utility they expect to 
receive when they enter the next period unmated. The maximum utility 
that a male of age x  and a female of age y expect to receive if they 
enter unmated the next period depends on the maximum fertile life of the 
opposite sex. When the r  > A, the utility that a male of age x  + 1  expects 
is at most A — x  and the maximum utility that a female of age y +1 expects 
is A if r  — y > X or r  — y otherwise. When A > r  the maximum utility 
that a female of age y +  1 expects is t — y and the maximum utility that 
a male of age x  +  1 expects is r  if A — a: >  r  or A -  x  otherwise.
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 AT 1 at* at at at at
2 AT^ _AT 2 at at at at at
3 AT, AT .A,T 3 aJ at at at at
4 AT, ?\T 4 at at at at
5 AT AT AT AT AT 5 at at at
6 AT AT AT AT AT 6 at at
m ale strategy fern ale strategy
Figure 4.3: Application of observation (v ) in a 
game where A =  6 and r  =  5.
(vi) If the players of age z of the limiting sex (the sex that has the smaller 
population) are non choosy and are accepted by all players of the opposite 
sex, then at equilibrium there are no players of the limiting sex that are 
older than z.
Since a type z is always accepted and non choosy, all pairings in which 
he participates lead to matings. Therefore, no player of age z will remain 
unmated.
(vii) When r = 1, then R = 1 when either none leaves the game unmated 
or when the number of females and males a^+iand bT+\ who leave the 
game without a partner is the same (aA+i — ^r+i 7  ^ 0). In the first case, 
at equilibrium, players of age 1 accept all existing types of the opposite 
sex and therefore no player enters in the second period of his fertile life 
(ai =  b\ == 1). In the second case, at equilibrium, a\ = b\ < 1, young 
players are not universal acceptors and males of age A — 1 and females of 
age r  — 1 are always rejected by some players of the opposite sex.
The second case can never be true when at least one sex is fertile for at
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most 3 periods (say males), since in this case a female of age r  — 1 is always 
accepted at equilibrium.
(viii) When R  — 1 and a\ — b\ =  1, then r  =  1 and as a result nobody enters 
in the second period of his life unmated. Assuming tha t females are the
limiting sex and the female population is 1, then b\ =  1 only when females 
are non choosy. Hence in this case all males who are paired with females 
are mated. Hence from (73)
^  ai = r where a* =  - — -a*_i
(ix) In our model, both males and females are taken to have the same pref­
erences and we regard the utility tha t males and females receive from a 
mating to be the same. Hence, it is obvious th a t a model where r  >  1
females are fertile for A periods.
In the next sections, we provide analytical results for r  € {2,3} and var­
ious A. We provide the equilibria, without showing how we calculate them. 
Therefore, it is not expected that the formulas are obvious to the reader. The 
complete analysis of the equilibria can be found in Appendix C, where the 
algebra involved is presented.
4 .4  r  =  2 : F em ales are F er tile  for 2 P e r io d s
When females are fertile for 2 periods, it is known from observation (i) and 
observation (ii) tha t at equilibrium all females are unchoosy, independently 
from the number A of male types and of the male strategy Knowing the 
female equilibrium strategy s> =  (1,1), we need to find the male equilibrium 
strategy %  and a distribution supporting (s m , s f ) in order to complete the 
description of the equilibrium. The male strategy and therefore the equilibrium 
distribution depend on our assumptions on A and on r.
and males are fertile for A periods and females are fertile for r  periods 
is identical to a model where r <  1, males are fertile for r  periods and
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4.4.1 A =  r =  2
If there are only two male types, it is a trivial case, since both sexes are unchoosy 
at equilibrium and the equilibrium profile is ((1,1), (1,1)).
When r = 1, populations are identical since both sexes are fertile for the 
same number of periods and have the same preferences. We add an asymmetry 
to the model, assuming tha t at equilibrium the population sex ratio r must be 
male biased (it is r =  1 in the symmetric case) and we check how this affects 
the equilibrium distribution.
Independently of r  and R, all matchings in each period end up in matings. 
No female enters age 2 and only the males remaining unpaired in a period 
enter the next period unmated. Hence the distribution of males and females at 
equilibrium ((1,1), (1,1)) is such tha t
Q1 =  5 = 1  “ d “* =  2r -  1
b\ =  1 and 62 =  0
The sex ratio R  of the incoming population is
7" 2---------------------------- ----------------
R  = ai =  ------   <=> r(R) = R +  y /R 2 - R  (77)
2r  — 1
The population sex ratio r is an increasing function of the incoming popula­
tion sex ratio R. It is clear tha t in order to  have a sex ratio tha t is male biased 
(r >  1), we must have R  > 1. If we had a female biased incoming population 
sex ratio R , given th a t males and females have the same features, we would end 
up having a female biased population sex ratio r at equilibrium.
4.4 .2  A > 3, t  =  2, r  < 1 (Fem ales A re Fertile for 2 P eriods and M ales 
Are Fertile for A > 3  Periods; T he P opulation  Sex R atio r Is 
Fem ale B iased .)
All male types and female types in the last two periods of their fertile life are non 
choosy (from observations (i) and (i i)). Therefore our only concern is whether 
males younger than A — 1 accept females of age 2. It is proved (further details 
can be found in Appendix C.2) tha t when r < 1 the unique equilibrium profile 
is ((2 ,2 ,2 ,..., 2 ,1,1), (1,1)). At equilibrium, we have a female biased population 
sex ratio (r < 1) at equilibrium only when R  < 1.
At equilibrium, all males younger than A — 1 are selective. They reject any 
potential partner of age 2 , in their effort to maximise their chances to meet a 
female of age 1 and receive the maximum utility of 2. However, when males 
reach age A — 1, this strategy ceases to have any meaning and they become
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universal acceptors. If males reached age A unmated, the chances of receiving a 
utility greater than 1 would have been 0 given tha t even a female of age 1 would 
offer them the minimum possible utility 1.
Since females are non choosy and males of an age A — 1 or higher are also 
unchoosy, all pairings of females with a male of age A — 1 lead to matings. 
Consequently no male enters age A unmated and so no male leaves the game 
unmated.
The distribution of males and females at equilibrium ((2 ,2 ,2 ,..., 2 ,1,1), (1,1)) 
is such tha t
(—1 +  r)r
ai =
( - 2  +  r) ( l  -  2 ( & ) *  +  ( - 1  +  ( £ ) ' X)  r)  
-  (£ }
j~  1
a% =  a\ I ^— -  ) for i < A and a \  =  0
1 1 — r
bi =  -z and &2 =   -----2 — r 2  — r
All females of age 1 which are paired with a male get mated. As a result 
only (1 — r)b\ of females reach age 2. Males younger than A — 2 are only mated 
if they are paired with a female of age 1; hence only 62 of males of age i <  A — 2 
enter age i +  1.
When A =  3, then the incoming population sex ratio is
„ (2 -r )» r
3 “ 2r
and r is the a root of the polynomial Ap and an increasing function of R , 
where
Ap =  - 3 R  +  (4 +  2R)r -  4r 2 +  r 3 
For r < 1, it is necessary tha t R  < 1.
4 .4 .3  A > 3 , r  =  2, r  > 1  (Fem ales A re  F e rtile  for 2 P e r io d s  a n d  M ales
A re  F e rtile  for A > 3  P e rio d s, T h e  P o p u la tio n  Sex R a tio  r Is 
M ale  B iased .)
In the previous section, we examined the equilibrium behaviour when the pop­
ulation sex ratio r is female biased (r < 1). We can also have equilibria where 
r  >  1; at these equilibria the incoming population sex ratio R  is male biased as 
well (R  > 1).
As noted in the previous section, females of all ages and males of age 2 and 3 
are non choosy, while females of age 1 are accepted by all males. So, it is expected 
tha t at equilibrium there will be no females of age 2 and therefore no female
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will leave the game without finding a partner (observation u)). Furthermore, 
only those males who are not paired with a female can enter the next period 
unmated.
Thus, independently of the strategy pair at equilibrium, the distribution has 
to be of the form
1
d \  =   r
/  1Cb^ Cb
h  =  1
J  for i >  1
Hence
R  = ------   y
and
When A =  3, then the incoming population sex ratio is
I _  ( r - i 1 — 3r  +  3r 2
and _ 1
For r > 1, it is necessary tha t R >  1.
Since the strategy of females and the population distribution at equilibrium 
are known, we need to find the best response of males in order to complete the 
equilibrium description. It is known from observations (iii) and (iv) tha t if a 
male of age x  is selective (accepts only females of age 1), then all males younger 
than x  are equally selective.
In order to check whether a strategy is an equilibrium, we just have to find 
r such tha t the youngest males which are not choosy (accept all females) have 
an expected utility tha t is higher than 1. A male of age x  <  A — 3 expects that 
if he enters in the next period unmated, he will receive a utility of
A strategy profile
( (2 ,2 ,2 ,2 , ,2 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,..., 1,1,1), (1,1))
a number x  of 2’s a number X—x  of l ’s
is an equilibrium if
Ux-\-i 1 and Ux-\-2 ^  1
Hence for A large,
- ((2 ,2 ,............, 2 ,1 ,1), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 1 <  r  < 2.618
- ((2 ,2 ,......... , 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 2.618 < r < 4.08
- ((2 ,2 ,...... , 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 4.08 <  r < 5.53
- ((2 ,2 ,.... , 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 5.53 < r < 6.977
- ((2 ,2 ,..., 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 6.977 <  r  < 8.423 
etc
It becomes clear tha t for given A, as r increases the age of the youngest male 
which is unchoosy decreases.
When A =  3, strategy pair ((2,1,1), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for r  <  2.618 
and strategy pair ((1,1), (1,1,1)) is an equilibrium for r > 2.618.
4.5 A =  3: Females Are Fertile for 3 Periods
When females are fertile for 3 periods, females of age 2 and 3 are not choosy. 
However the strategy of females of age 1 depends on the male behaviour and 
the equilibrium distribution.
4 . 5.1 A =  r  =  3
When A =  r  =  3, not only females but also males of age 2 and 3 are universal 
acceptors (from observations (z) and (zz)). Therefore, we only need to check 
whether females and males of age 1 are choosy. We add an asymmetry to the 
game, by assuming th a t at equilibrium the population sex ratio is male biased 
(r =  1 when the game is symmetric).
For r > 1, females of age 1 always reject males of age 3. For males of age 1 
to have a similar behaviour, population sex ratio at equilibrium must not exceed 
r =  2. Hence if 1 <  r  <  2, the equilibrium strategy profile is ((2,1,1), (2,1,1)). 
When r > 2 though, males have no incentive to be choosy any more (as it is
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shown in Appendix CA) and the strategy profile at equilibrium becomes the 
( (1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1)).
At both equilibria, no female ever reaches age 3 (from observation (v )). So, 
the distribution that supports both equilibrium strategy profiles is the following
1 — 3r +  3r2 
(—1 +  r)r 2 
1 — 3r +  3 r2 
(—1 +  r)2r 
1 — 3r +  3r2 
1 — 3r +  3r2
2 — 5 r + 4 r 2 
( - 1  +  r ) 2 
2 — 5 r  +  4 r2 
0
Only those females of age 1 which are paired with a male of age 3 reach age 
2 and only those males of age x  < 3 which are not paired with a female enter 
age x  +  1. Males of age 3 are mated only when they are paired with a female of 
age 2.
At both equilibria,
i - 3 r + 3 r 2  _  2r2 -  5r 3 +  4r4
1 - 3 r + 3 r 2  _  Qr  _  J g r 3 Qr 4 _j_
2 —5 r + 4  r 2
and r  is a root of the polynomial B p\ r(R)  is an increasing function of R.
B b = - R  + 6 R r  -  15-Rr2 +  2r 3 +  18R r 3 -  5r 4 -  9R r 4 + 4r 5
In order for the male population to be higher than the female population at 
equilibrium (r >  1), the incoming population sex ratio has to be male biased
( R > l ) .
To summarise, the equilibria are
((2,1,1), (2,1,1)) for 1 <  R  < 1.30612 hence for 1 <  r < 2 
((1,1,1), (2,1,1)) for R  > 1.30612 hence for r > 2
Any combination between males and females appears in the couple distribu­
tion at both equilibria, except from matings between females of age 1 and males 
of age 3. Males of age 3 are the most underrepresented in the couple distribution 
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4.5 .2  A =  4, r  =  3 (M ales A re  F e rti le  for 4 P e rio d s , Fem ales A re  
F ertile  for 3 P e rio d s .)
Males and females in the last two periods of their fertile life are universal accep­
tors (from observations (i) and (ii)). Hence we need to check whether males and 
females of age 1 and males of age 2 are choosy. From observation (v) if females 
of age 1 are choosy, they can only reject males of age 4, since the maximum 
expected utility they can get in age 2 is 2. In the same way, if males of age 2 are 
choosy, they can only reject females of age 3; if males of age 1 are choosy they 
may reject females of age 2 and 3 or only females of age 3. From observation 
(iv), it is known tha t if females of age 2 are choosy, then females of age 1 have 
to be equally choosy or even choosier. Hence there are 10 potential equilibrium 
strategy pairs. We show at which equilibria the population sex ratio is male 
biased or female biased.
4.5.2.1 r < 1 : Searching for Equilibria Where The Population Sex Ratio r Is 
Female Biased
When male population is lower than female population at equilibrium, there 
is a unique equilibrium for all r <  1, where females are non choosy while males 
are the choosiest they can be. Hence ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1,1)) is the unique equilib­
rium strategy pair and the equilibrium distribution is of the form







D  =  —9r +  18r2 — 15r3 +  6r4 — r5 +  ((17 — 46r +  50r2 — 24r3 +  5r4) R  
+  (14 -  32r +  25r -  7r3)R2 +  (3 -  6r +  3r 2)R3
-2 a\ — a2 +  a\r  1
2(1 +  a l  — r) 2
r — ai — <22 
0
a\ — a2 
ai




—4a2 — 8a2 — 3a3 +  8 a lr  +  20a2r 
+10a3r  — 12air2 — l l a 2r 2 +  4 a ir3 
(1 +  a l  — r ) 2
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No male enters in the last period of his fertile life, as follows from observation 
(iv). Males of type 1 end up mated only with females of age 1 and females of 
type 3 end up mated only with males of age 3. Only those females of age x < 3 
which are not paired with a male enter age x  +  1 and only those males of age 2 
which are paired with females of age 3 enter age 3. Males of age 3 and females 
of age 1 accept all possible pairings, so they can have partners of different ages.
Let
E  = 4R  +  32R2 +  9RS +  (—54 — 151.R — 92R2 — lS R 3)r
+(189 +  278it! +  107R 2 +  9R 3 )r2 +  (-297  -  273R  -  62R2)r3 
+(270 +  1587? +  17R 2 )r4 +  (-153  -  55R  -  2R 2 )r5 +  (54 +  11 R )r 6  
+ (-1 1  -  R )r 7  +  r 8
Then r  is a root of the polynomial E\ r(R)  is an increasing function and it 
is proved tha t in order to have a female biased population sex ratio (r <  1) at 
equilibrium, it is necessary tha t the incoming population is also female biased
( « <  i) .
In the more general case, where A >  4 but r  =  3, the equilibrium strat­
egy profile is ((3,3, ....3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) according to observations (iv) and (v ). 
Since females are non choosy, males of age A — 3 or younger are not willing to 
compromise and accept any female of an age older than 1. Nevertheless, when 
males reach age A — 3 they adapt their behaviour and become less choosy, under 
the threat of entering in the last period of their life without a partner.
4.5.2.2 r > 1 : Searching for Equilibria Where The Population Sex Ratio r Is
Male Biased
When female population is lower than the male at equilibrium, different 
equilibria may appear depending on the sex ratio r  or on the incoming popula­
tion sex ratio R . As r increases males tend to become less choosy, while females 
become choosier.
W hen females are unchoosy at equilibrium, all females get mated in the first 
period of their fertile life, hence no female ever reaches ages 2 and 3. Therefore, 
when the female strategy is (1,1,1), the population distribution is the following
7*4 (<7Q\
ai _1  _|_ 4r  _  gr 2 _|_ 4r 3
Ui—l +  a{—\r  .ai = -------------------- for 1 < % < 4
r
b\ =  1 and 62 =  =  0
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Only those males of age x < A which are not paired with a female enter age 
x  +  1.
Given the distribution (78), we have
r 4
—1 +  4r — 6r2 +  4 r3
and
„  r -— - r  1 ~  32R -  9 6 R 2 +  64 F 3
r{R) — R —v  R  R  —S R S R  . . -----
2 y  8 V - R  +  &
Hence r < 1 when R  < 1.
On the other hand, when females of age 1 are choosy at equilibrium, for any 
r > 1 females of both age 1 and age 2 are accepted by all males. Therefore from 
observation (m) it follows tha t at equilibrium there are females of age 1 and 
age 2 but no females ever reach age 3. When the equilibrium female strategy is
(2,1,1), the distribution is the following
ai —1 +  4 r — 6 r 2 +  4 r3
—ai~ i +  a j_ ir  1 . .ai =   for 1 < i < 4
r
—1 +  4r — 6r2 +  4r3
1 —2 +  7r — 9r2 +  5r3
6 2  =  1 — b\ and 6 3  =  0
As before, only those males of age x  < A which are not paired with a female 
enter age x  + 1 . Furthermore, only those females of age 1 which are paired with 
males of age A enter age 2 unmated.
Given the distribution (79), we have
R  _  (5r7 ”  9r6 +  7r5 “  2r4)
(4r3 — 6r2 +  4 r — l ) 2
Solving the previous equation in terms or r, we have 
F  = —R + 8 R r —28Rr2+ 56Rr3 +  (—2 — 68i7)r4 +  (7+48i?)r5 +  (—9 — 16i?)r6+ 5 r7
and r is a root of the polynomial F ; r is an increasing function of R. r(R)  
takes its minimum value r =  0 when R  = 0 and its maximum value r  = 1 when 
R  = 1.
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The following table summarises the equilibria.
((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) for 1 <  R  <  1.078 hence for 1 < r <  2.078
((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) for 1.131 <  R  < 1.145 hence for 1.969 < r < 2.033
((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) for 1.145 < R <  1.837 hence for 2.033 < r  < 4.5
((1,1,1,1), (2,1,1)) for R  > 1.837 hence for r  >  4.5
Looking at the above table, we note tha t no equilibrium was found for 
1.078 <  R  < 1.131.
If we try  to  find an equilibrium for 1.0781 <  R  < 1.131 where females are not 
choosy, it is known th a t the distribution should be of the form of (78), and males 
best response should be either strategy (2,2,1,1) or strategy (3,2,1,1) depend­
ing on the value of R. Nevertheless when males use either of these strategies, 
females are better off by being choosy, hence by using strategy (2,1,1). Against
(2,1,1), neither (2, 2 ,1 ,1) or (3 ,2 ,1 ,1) are best responses and the equilibrium 
collapses. On the other hand, if we assume that there is an equilibrium where 
females are choosy (they use strategy (2,1,1)) for 1.078 <  R  <  1.131 then the 
population distribution is of the form of (79) and the best response of males 
is to use strategy (3 ,2 ,1 ,1 ). However, against this strategy, females are better 
off by not being choosy anymore and the equilibrium collapses again. As it 
becomes obvious, when 1.078 <  R  < 1.131 it is expected that male and female 
pure strategies will alternate constantly and no pure strategy equilibrium will 
ever been reached.
Although an equilibrium is not always attained for all R  > 0, there is at 
least an equilibrium for any r > 0. It is particularly interesting that to any r in 
[1.969,2.078] correspond two possible equilibria. Hence, there are two different 
incoming population sex ratios R  tha t may lead to a particular f  in [1.969,2.078] 
at equilibrium; for R  £ [1.062,1.078], females are unchoosy at equilibrium while 
for R  £ [1.131,1.156] females are choosy at equilibrium.
In Figure 4.4 are illustrated the male and female population distributions at 
equilibrium when r £ [1.969,2.078]. It is shown tha t for given r, male distribu­
tion is the same independently of the equilibrium. However, this is not true for 
females. For given r, the fraction of females of age 1 is higher at equilibrium 
when females are non choosy. Consequently, for given r, R  has to be lower at 
the equilibrium when females are non choosy, as it is shown in Figure 4.5. At
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equilibrium ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)) there are no type 2 females, hence 
b
< * • ( ( 3 , 2 , 1 , 1 ) , ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) )  =
I &1((2,2,1,1),(2,1,1)) +  &2((2,2,1,1),(2,1,1)) f°r r € [1.969,2.033) 
[ &i((2,i,i,i),(2,i,i)) +  ^2((2,i,i,i),(2,i,i)) f°r r e  [2.033,2.078) 
while
J  a»((2,2,i,i),(2,i,i)) f°r r £ [1.969,2.033) and 1 <  i < 4 













 __ —  _  b, (r)
1 .98 2 .02  2 .0 4  2 .0 6  2.08
r
Figure 4.4: Comparison of the male distribution 
(top picture) and the female distribution (bottom 
picture) at different equilibria when A =  4, r  =  3 
and r 6  [1.969,2.078].
In the following figure we draw the incoming population sex ratio R  as a 
function of the population sex ratio r at ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)), ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1)(2,1,1)) 
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the incoming 
popualtion sex ratio R  at different equilibria 
when A =  4, r  =  3 and r e  [1.969,2.078].
Having analysed the equilibrium behaviour for A =  4 and r  =  3, we can 
focus on the more general case, where A > 4 and A =  3. From the analysis 
of A =  4, it is known that for A > 4, when 1 <  r  <  2.078, the strategy 
pair ((3, 3,..., 3, 2,1,1), (1,1,1)) is always an equilibrium and the equilibrium 
distribution is the following
Nevertheless, when r > 2.078, it is not possible to find the equilibrium 
strategies based on our results of the A =  4 and r  =  3 model and a complete 
analysis of each specific case is needed.
4 .6  A n a ly s is  o f  T h e  S ex  R a t io  r  a n d  o f  T h e  M a le  a n d  F e m a le  
D is t r ib u t io n s  a t  E q u il ib r iu m
In general, in all models examined, r is proved to be increasing with R. In each 
case analysed, r is male (female) biased only when R  is male (female) biased and 
r — 1 only when R  — 1. However, the rate of increase of r varies, depending 
on the particular game. The following figures show the population sex ratio
1
r — 1
ai = b i- i (  ) for 1 < i < Ar
b\ = I
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r (R ) at different equilibria when r  6 {2,3} and A 6 {2,3,4}. The population 
sex ratio r for A =  r  =  2 is described is red, for A =  3, r  =  2 is described 
in green (the dashed lines illustrate change of equilibrium strategies), for A =  
r  =  3 is described in blue (the dashed lines illustrate change of equilibrium 
strategies) and for A =  4 ,r  =  3 is described in purple, black and grey (where 
each colour describes different equilibrium strategies). In Appendix C, there are 
more detailed figures for each particular model.
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Figure 4.7: Population sex ratio r for different A and r . The left figure 
focuses on the behaviour of r when R  < 1 and the right picture focuses 
on the behaviour of r when R  > 1.
Having a close look at the male and female distribution in the different games 
we studied, we see that there are common characteristics between the models, 
although the rate of change of a* and bj may be different depending on the case. 
Analysing ™ in each model, it becomes obvious that the fraction ^  of males of 
age 1 is increasing for R  < 1 and decreasing for R  > 1. The opposite is true 
for 2i, where i > 1. Focusing on the models where R  < 1, we observe that the 
number ai of male i ,where i > 1, can reach its maximum for R  ^  1 (as in the 
model A =  3 ,r  =  2, Figure C.4, illustrated in Appendix (7.2). The number of 
males of age 1 is increasing for all R.
Focusing on the female distribution, b\ is increasing for R  < 1 and decreas­
ing otherwise, while bj, where j  > 1, is decreasing for R  < 1 and increasing 
otherwise. (Exception is the case where b\ =  1, since b\ remains constant for 
R >  1).
At R  — 1, all males and females are of type 1. For R  > 1, as R  increases all 
and correspondingly all bj tend to come closer, but they never become equal; 
it is always true that ^  > £i±i and bj > bj+\. When R  < 1, and bj behave 
similarly as R  decreases and moves closer to 0.
The behaviour of a* and b{ is explained with the help of equations (73) and 
(74). When R — 1, the game is symmetric and all matings are between males 
and females of age 1. Nevertheless, as R  moves away from 1, it is expected 
tha t more players of the sex that has a higher population will remain unmated
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and will move to the next period, especially when the players are choosy. The 
choosier the players are, the more players will end up in the final periods of their 
life unmated.
Further analytical results and figures describing the behaviour of a,i (and ) 
and bj in each model are given in Appendix C.
4 .7  P o p u la tio n  P r o d u c t iv ity
We assume that players seek partners so tha t they maximise the number of 
periods they are mated with a partner who is reproductive. We are interested 
in analysing the population productivity pp. Since we used the terms males and 
females in the analysis of the previous sections, we are going to use the term 
offspring for the output of a mating. In this section, the sex of an offspring is 
not relevant.
It is expected that the productivity of a couple (z, j )  is connected to  the 
number of periods Uij the partners (z, j )  expect to be both fertile. If we assume 
that a couple (z,j) has on average J  offspring every period over which both 
partners are able to reproduce, z and j  are expected to produce Juij offspring 
during their lifetime.
Since we have a steady state model, we find the population productivity pp 
by calculating the total number of offspring produced by the couples created in a 
particular period, over the lifetime of each couple. The population productivity 
also coincides with the total number of offspring expected to be produced in 
a particular period, by all the couples for which both partners are still fertile, 
independently of the period during which they were created.
Hence the total number pp of offspring tha t is produced as a result of the 
mating of the population in any period (hence the population productivity) is
We remind to the reader, that in each period, when r < 1, the number of 
males of age z matched with females of age j  are aibj (respectively when r  >  1 
it is (libj^ ). kij was defined earlier in (72) as a binary variable taking the value 
1 only when both z and j  accept each other.
We expect that the population "satisfaction" or the population welfare is 
maximised when the productivity takes its maximum value. In the models we 
analyse, the pp at equilibrium is maximised when r = 1, so when R  =  1, while 
it tends to decrease as the incoming population sex ratio R  (so the population 
sex ratio r ) becomes male or female biased. When r  =  R  = 1, all matings are 
between males and females of age 1, hence the number of offspring each couple
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produces is maximum.
When J  = 1, the population productivity expresses the average number of 
periods over which are fertile both the male and the female forming a random 
couple in a period.
Figure 4.8 shows how the population productivity varies with R. We assume 
J  =  1. We describe pp in red for A =  r  =  2, in green for A =  3 ,r  =  2 (the 
dashed lines illustrate change of equilibrium strategies), in blue (the dashed 
lines illustrate change of equilibrium strategies) for A =  r  =  3 and in purple, 
black and grey (where each colour describes different equilibrium strategies) for 
A =  4 ,r  =  3.
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Figure 4.8: Population productivity pp for different A and r.
4.7.1 4.7.1 S tab le  p o p u la tio n
We assume that at equilibrium the population remains constant over time. We 
are interested in finding under which conditions at equilibrium, the population 
input is equal with the population output. Hence we want to find for which r, or 
for which R , the number of offspring produced in each period is the same as the 
total number of males and females of age 1, so that the population distribution 
does not change and the population remains "stable".
We assume that the ratio of male offspring over female offspring produced 
in each year is the same as the ratio R  of the incoming population. Of course, 
this assumption may not be true in a real life situation. However, let’s assume
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tha t offspring are sexless and we can choose their sex.
In biology, the productivity of a population depends on various factors, such 
as presence of predators and other species, abundance of food and other envi­
ronmental factors. In this section, we analyse for which R  the productivity pp is 
such tha t the population remains stable, under the absence of any other factor 
tha t can affect it. Hence we search for R  such that
PP(sm ,sf ) M  =  ai(r) +  h ( r )  (92)
In our analysis we assume tha t J  =  1, hence a couple produces 1 offspring 
per period. This analysis could be done for any value of J .
When r  =  2, for Ae{2,3}, the number of offspring born in each period is 
equal with the number of new individuals entering in game in each period only 
in the trivial case when r = 1 and R  — 1 and therefore when the maximum 
number of offspring (1 male and 1 female) is produced in every period.
When A =  r  =  3 and r > 1, the equation (92) is satisfied when r  =  2.43756, 
hence when R  =  1.48389 and the equilibrium strategy is ((1,1,1), (2,1,1)). Un­
der these conditions, the number of offspring produced is 2.106 (61.261% of the 
total population), consisting of 1.258 males (51.611% of the total male popula­
tion) and 0.848 females (84.781% of the total female population). Correspond­
ingly, assuming th a t r  < 1, then the equation(92) is satisfied when r =  0.41, 
hence when R  =  0.674 and the equilibrium strategy is ((2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)). Under 
these conditions, the number of offspring produced is 0.864, consisting of 0.348 
males and 0.516 females.
When A =  3, but the females are productive for longer, so r  =  4 and 
r >  1, the number of offspring produced is the same as the number of males 
and females of type 1 entering in the game in each period when r = 2.131, so 
when R  =  1.734. The equilibrium strategy is ((1 ,1 ,1), (3 ,2 ,1 ,1)). In this case, 
the number of offspring per period is 1.707 (54.532% of the total population), 
consisting of 1.083 males (50.814 % of the total male population) and 0.625 
females (62.455% of the total female population). Comparing this result with 
the case where A =  r  =  3, it becomes obvious th a t the number of offspring 
produced is a higher percentage of the population when A =  3, r  =  4, and the 
difference between the number of males and females produced is higher when 
A =  r  =  3.
When A =  3 and m  =  4 and r < 1, the equation (92) is satisfied in two 
cases. Either when r =  0.597, so R  =  0.974 and the equilibrium strategy pair 
is ((1,1,1), (3 ,2 ,1 ,1)) or when r =  0.264, so R  = 0.615 and the equilibrium 
strategy pair is ((1,1,1), (2,1 ,1 ,1)). W hen males are unchoosy, the number of 
offspring produced is 1.21 (75.77% of the total population), consisting of 0.597
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(100% of the male population) males and 0.613 females (61.308% of the female 
population) while when males are choosy, 0.603 offspring (47.733% of the total 
population) are produced per period, consisting of 0.23 males (87.033% of the 
male population) and 0.374 females (37.36% of the female population). Com­
paring the two cases, it is obvious tha t when males are unchoosy, the number 
of offspring produced is much higher, while the difference between the number 
of young males and females is significantly smaller.
4 .8  A v era g e  M a le  an d  F em ale  A g e  a t M arr iage
In the models we analyse, all males and females are mated at age 1 when R  =  1. 
It is interesting to examine what is the average age at marriage of a male and 
of a female when R  ^  1. We name m m a  and m f a  the mean male and mean 
female ages at marriage. We have
The average age at marriage and the population productivity can be used 
as measures of the satisfaction of players at equilibrium.
In Figures 4.9 and 4.10, we present the average age at marriage of a male
all males are mated at age 1, since r = a\. Similarly when A =  3, r  =  2 and 
R  > 1, all females are mated at age 1, since b\ = 1. In all models examined,
mated is minimum when R  =  1, since as we already noted there are no players 
which are not mated at age 1 when R =  1. However, as the incoming population 
becomes male or female biased, the average age at marriage of both males and 
females increases, but it never exceeds a maximum limit. Figure 4.11 describes 
the maximum age at marriage of a male or of a female at any equilibrium, for R  
large (R  —*• oo) or small (R  —► 0). It is interesting to note tha t for given R  and 
A, male average age at marriage is lower when r  is higher. We also observe tha t 
for given R  and t , female average age at marriage is lower when A is higher.
mma,'
where
and a female respectively as functions of R. Clearly when A =  r  =  2 and R  < 1
the number of periods tha t both males and females have to wait before they get
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Figure 4.9: Average age of males at marriage.
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Figure 4.10: Average age of females at marriage.
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Game Max mma Max mfa
CMIIi-II«< R large/small 1.5 1
A = 3, t = 2, r < 1 R small 1.5 1.25
A = 3, t = 2, r > 1 ((2,1,1),(1.1))
R=1.309 1.691 1
((1,1,1),(1,1)) R large 2 1
COni-ii-< R large/small 1.667 1.333
A = 4, t = 3, r < 1 ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)) R small 1.889 1.444
A = 4, t = 3, r > 1
((3.2.1.1),(1,1,1)) R= 1.078 1.078 1
((2,2,1,1), (2,1,1)) R= 1.145 1.139 1.002
((2,1,111),(2,1,1)) R=1.837 1.531 1.504
((2,1,1,1), (2,1,1)) R large 2.125 1.25
Figure 4.11: Maximum number of periods that a male and a 
female need to wait before they get mated.
4 .9  C o n c lu sio n s
We analysed a model where the utility of a mating depends on the age of both 
partners: the utility tha t a male and a female forming a couple receive is the 
number of periods they are both able to reproduce. Players are interested in 
finding a young partner, but their choosiness depends on their age. Players 
demonstrate a less selective behaviour as they get older; close to the end of 
their fertile life they are always willing to accept any partner they are paired 
with.
The decrease of choosiness of females with age is observed in nature. When 
the breeding season is finite and a mating has to take place in a specific time 
frame, females often present an adaptive mating behaviour (Bateson and Healy 
(2005)). As Uetz and Norton (2007) note, in an annual species where reproduc­
tion has time constraints, older females become less choosy, since if they risk 
waiting for a higher quality mate, they may end up with no m ate at all (Moore 
and Moore (2001)). Furthermore, choosier behaviour of young compared to old 
females has been described in studies of crickets and fish (Gray (1999), Kodric- 
Brown and Nicoletto (2001)), although it is not always clarified if it is connected 
with physiological reasons or with the motivation of the animal.
In our model, choosiness does not depend on age only, but also on the avail­
ability of potential partners. Assuming tha t females are the limiting sex, we 
noted tha t as the incoming population becomes more male biased, females
129
dem onstrate a choosier behaviour while males become less choosy. The op­
posite is true when males are the limiting sex. In the models described in the 
previous chapter, we did not observe an analogous behaviour. On the contrary, 
the choosiness of both sexes moved to the same direction as r varied. However, 
given tha t the model described in this chapter is a steady state model whilst 
the models in chapters 3 were not, any previous results do not contrast with our 
current observations.
We also examined the population productivity and the average age at mar­
riage as functions of the incoming population sex ratio R. In the models exam­
ined, we found tha t when R  =  1 the population productivity is maximum and 
the average age at marriage of both males and females is minimum. As the bias 
of the incoming population sex ratio R  increases, the population productivity 
decreases and the average age at marriage of both males and females increases. 
Furthermore, making some specific assumptions, we examined for which R , the 
to tal input of the population is the same with the total output.
Population productivity and mean age at marriage can be considered as in­
dicators of the "satisfaction" of male and female populations at the equilibrium. 
In this case, players are better off when the number of males equals the number 
of females entering in the game in each period.
In our game we did not allow "remarrying" or divorcing, even though these 
are phenomena tha t may appear in nature. If divorcing and remarrying are 
allowed, without assuming any searching or other costs, all equilibria will be 
trivial; in each period, anyone who has no partner will accept the player with 
whom he is mated and will abandon her when he finds a better partner who is 
willing to accept him. However, if searching costs, cost of divorcing or remarry­
ing are added to our model, new conclusions may be attained.
Another possible extension of the model would be to examine the equilibrium 
when different types have different preferences or when all types prefer older 
partners.
In the analysis of this chapter, we focused mostly on the biological implica­
tions of our model. Nevertheless, our model can also have applications in non 
biological problems and it is not built to be used only in a strict biological or 
psychological context.
Imagine a situation where two teams of children in a camp are asked to form 
couples to participate in a game taking place during the whole year. We assume 
th a t there are two possible programs in the camp and children can either stay A 
or t  weeks. Children are allocated in a team according to the duration of their 
stay in the camp. It is not possible to have all children of both programs to be 
involved in the game, but the game is very popular and every child wants to 
participate. The organisers, trying to deal with this problem, have established
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a rule tha t does not permit to any child without a partner or to any child tha t 
had a partner but the latter left him, to take part in the game. Couples must be 
created between children from different teams. Each child wants to participate 
in the game the longest possible. Hence he wants to  find a partner th a t stays as 
long as he does in the camp (or longer) or, if this is not possible, a partner that 
stays the longest possible in the camp. Our model can predict what strategy 
should a child use in each week of his stay in each program so that to maximise 
the number of weeks participating in the game.
Another application of our model could be a situation where the students in 
two different departments (universities) are asked to find roommates to share 
their rooms in the halls in the beginning of each year. Each room has to be 
occupied by two students from different departments (universities). Students 
may be in different years of their degree. If a student finishes his degree and 
leaves the halls, his roommate has to leave the room as well and does not have 
the right to find a new roommate, due to the popularity of the rooms. Our 
model can describe how students should choose their potential roommates at 
equilibrium.
Further examples can be found in different fields, where our model can be 
used to predict the equilibrium behaviour. Age can prove to be an im portant 
determinant of the utility of a matching and its role needs to be analysed further.
131
5 Literature review
5.1  In tr o d u c tio n
We have taken the unusual approach of placing this review after presenting our 
work. However, in the introduction we have already described to the reader 
the basic models tha t our work is based on. In chapter 1 we offered a detailed 
description of the models of Alpern and Reyniers (1999, 2005), giving the reader 
an insight into the background of our own research. The goal of this chapter 
is to offer a general description of the area of dynamic mutual choice mating 
games.
Firstly, we comment on the importance of the matching problem in different 
sciences, outlining the general area of mate selection. Thereby it becomes easier 
to understand the multiple applications of models we have described in the 
previous chapters and the various applications of our results. Next, we focus on 
the area of game theory and briefly present different approaches to the analysis 
of mating selection and compare them to our models.
We think it is helpful to present the simulation model of Kalick and Hamilton 
(1999, 2005) which motivated Alpern and Reyniers (1999, 2005) to develop their 
game theoretical mating models. Examining the background of Alpern and 
Reyniers’ (1999, 2005) models helps to a better understanding of the ideas on 
which our models were built.
Finally we refer to some game theoretical models in biology, operational 
research and economics which are relevant to our results, allowing the reader to 
make comparisons with our own work. However, it is im portant to note that 
these models present im portant differences from our own. Often they are based 
on very different assumptions and serve different purposes. Therefore, even 
though they are relevant to our research field, it is not easy to make connections 
with our own results.
5 .2  Im p o r ta n c e  o f  M a te  S e le c t io n
The importance and complexity of mate selection process was initially noted by 
biologists. Darwin was the first to talk about sexual selection, but even after 
his revolutionary theories were known, it took biologists several decades before 
they generally accepted tha t animals have preferences and actively select their 
partners. Nowadays the importance of mate selection is widely recognised and 
in the last fifty years mate selection has been a pivotal research field in evolu­
tionary biology. Experimental research either in the field or in the laboratory 
has proved th a t different kinds of animals can indeed be selective when it comes 
to choosing a mate, and they exhibit their selectiveness in many possible ways
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(Kvarnemo and Simmons (1999), Beeching and Hopp (1999), Cunningham an 
Birkhead (1998), Paul (2002)). In addition to experiments and observation, an­
alytical, computational and simulation models have been used, especially lately, 
to explain and predict mating behaviour (Parker (1983), Johnstone et al (1996), 
Johnstone (1997), Kokko and Monaghan (2001), Kokko and Johnstone (2002)). 
The analytical models developed in biology and evolution have become more 
and more sophisticated and often they are based on complicated mathematical 
theories and practices.
Psychology and social sciences accept tha t many findings concerning animals 
have application in humans (Doosje et al (1999), Buunk et al (2002), Kenrick et 
al (1990)). Hence, following the example of biological sciences, in the last two 
decades social sciences have shown an interest in evolution and human courting 
habits. Even though there are some mathematical models describing human 
courtship (Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), Sozou and Seymour (2005)), most 
social scientists use demographic research, experiments and simulations as tools 
(Kalick and Hamilton (1986), Buunk et at (2002), Kenrick and Keefe (1992)), 
given tha t human behaviour is extremely complicated and difficult to model.
In parallel to biological and sociological research, especially after 1980, the 
importance of real life problems involving the couple formation (such as the 
matching of companies and job seekers or the matching of colleges and stu­
dents) has motivated mathematicians and economists to  develop game theo­
retical models of mate choice (Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor 
(1990). Several game theoretical approaches exist to m ate selection. We will 
briefly present the game theoretical approaches used in the analysis of mutual 
choice models.
5.2.1 G am e T h e o re tic a l A p p ro ach es  o f M a te  S election
The matching procedure is in most cases analysed with the help of the Gale- 
Shapley (1962) algorithm. Gale and Shapley first formulated the tw o-sided  
m a tch in g  problem. In their model, two populations need to be matched (men 
and women or universities and applicants). Preferences of all players are known 
and therefore every member of each population can list the members of the 
opposite population in terms of desirability. Gale and Shapley developed a 
d e fe rred  acc ep tan c e  m a tc h in g  p ro c e d u re 3 which produces at least one
3  D u r i n g  a  d e f e r r e d  a c c e p t a n c e  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  t w o  p o p u l a t i o n s  ( s u p ­
p o s e  t h e y  a r e  m a l e s )  m a k e  a n  o f f e r  t o  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p o p u l a t i o n  ( l e t  t h e m  b e  
f e m a l e s )  t h e y  b e s t  p r e f e r .  F e m a l e s  a c c e p t  t h e s e  o f f e r s  o r  r e j e c t  t h e m  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  o w n  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  T h e n ,  t h e  m a l e s  w h o  a r e  r e j e c t e d ,  m a k e  a  n e w  o f f e r  t o  t h e  f e m a l e s  t h e y  p r e f e r  
n e x t  a n d  a g a i n  f e m a l e s  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  t o  a c c e p t  o r  r e j e c t  t h e m .  E a c h  f e m a l e  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  
t o  a c c e p t  t e m p o r a r i l y  a  m a t e  w h o  m a k e s  a n  o f f e r  t o  h e r  t h a t  i s  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  o n e s  s h e  h a s  
e n c o u n t e r e d  s o  f a r ,  a n d  l e a v e  h i m  w h e n  a  b e t t e r  p a r t n e r  m a k e s  h e r  a  n e w  o f f e r .  A t  t h e  e n d  
o f  t h e  p r o c e d u r e ,  a  s t a b l e  m a t c h i n g  i s  p r o d u c e d ,  s o  t h e r e  i s  n o  p l a y e r  w h o  w a n t s  t o  l e a v e  h i s
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s ta b le  m a tch in g  based on the preference lists of the players. Roth and So- 
tomayor (1990) review and comment on the applications of stable matching in 
the classical two-sided matching model (as described by Gale and Shapley) and 
the assignment model4 (Shapley and Shubik (1972)). Apart from its economic 
applications, the two-sided matching approach has also been used in the analy­
sis of human and animal courtship and marriage (Knuth (1976); Becker (1981); 
Bergstrom and Lam (1989); Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), Bergstrom and Real 
(1990)).
The problem of Gale and Shapley and its extensions are not relevant to 
our research. In our models, the mating is considered as a dynamical process 
and the players’ strategies cannot be described as preference lists. The mating 
process is modelled as a sequential game. Furthermore, we assume a non atomic 
distribution of players; there exists a continuum of players and the behaviour 
and the decisions of each player are made independently of the decisions made 
by others at the same stage of the game. Finally, in contrast with the Gale and 
Shapley problem, in our models players are assumed to leave the game when 
they mate and it is not possible to put "on hold" or defer an offer made in any 
period. Players in each period have to decide whether they accept or reject an 
offer, and they have to commit to their decision for the rest of the game.
Another approach tha t is used in economics and mathematics for the analysis 
of mating problems, is based on the s e c re ta ry  or m a rr ia g e  p rob lem . In the 
standard form of the problem, as described by Freeman (1983), a list of n  objects 
(secretaries) is presented in a random order to an observer. The quality of an 
object is not revealed to the latter until he sees it; hence at any time the observer 
can rank only the objects he has seen up to tha t time in term s of desirability. 
Until all n objects have been presented to the observer, he does not know which 
one is the best for him. Each object can be presented to him once only. Each 
time he is presented with an object, he can either accept it or reject it. In the 
first case, the game finishes. In the second case, a new object is offered to him 
and he faces once again the same option. When the last object is presented to 
the observer, he is obliged to accept it. The observer wants to maximize the 
probability that the object he accepts is the most desirable out of the n  objects 
available.
The secretary model can easily be adapted and used to analyse a variety of 
mate choice problems where players do not know the types of their potential 
partners from the beginning and consequently do know their preferences from 
the beginning. In our models, we assume th a t players are aware of the types
p a r t n e r  f o r  s o m e o n e  w h o  p r e f e r s  h i m  m o r e  t h a n  h e r  c u r r e n t  p a r t n e r .
4  T h e  a s s i g n m e n t  p r o b l e m  a l l o w s  b o t h  m a t c h i n g  a n d  w a g e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
t o g e t h e r  s i n c e  t h e  p l a y e r s ’ o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  m a x i m i s e  t h e  p r o f i t  t h e y  r e c e i v e  f r o m  a  m a t c h i n g .
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of their potential partners and therefore know their preferences from the initial 
stage of the game. Furthermore, as Ferguson (1989) notes, in secretary problems 
“the payoff depends on the observations only through their relative ranks and 
not otherwise on their actual values". In our analysis the maximisation of the 
rank of a partner is no longer the objective; players seek to maximise their 
expected utility th a t is a function of the actual values of their partners.
Our models belong in the general class of dynamic game theoretical models.
5 .3  K alick  an d  H a m ilto n ’s (19 8 6 ) S im u la tio n  M o d e l
In biology and sociology it is commonly observed th a t individuals find partners 
who are similar to themselves. This phenomenon of assortative mating has been 
by the focus of multiple biological and sociological studies.
Kalick and Hamilton (1986) tried to find which type of preferences leads to a 
high correlation of physical attractiveness in humans. They examined two types 
of preferences: homotypic preferences, assuming tha t humans prefer partners 
similar to themselves, and common preferences, assuming tha t humans prefer 
partners of a high attractiveness. Their work was the inspiration for research in 
operational research and evolutionary theory and has been extended by game 
theorists and biologists.
They built a computer simulation model in which two very large equal pop­
ulations of males and females of various levels of attractiveness were matched 
randomly over sequential periods. They ran two separate simulations. In the 
first simulation they tested the effect of homotypic preferences by programming 
the individuals to accept partners of similar levels of attractiveness to themselves 
w ith a high probability. In the second simulation they focused on the impact 
of common preferences by programming the individuals to accept individuals 
of a high attractiveness with a high probability. In both cases they assumed 
th a t players become less choosy over time and therefore they programmed the 
probabilities of accepting a potential partner to  increase over time.
They assumed tha t a couple is created only when there is mutual consent 
from both  paired partners, and they did not allow remarrying. Hence, in every 
period in both simulations, when two individuals were paired and they both 
accepted each other, they formed a couple and they no longer participated in 
the rest of the matchings taking place in the next periods.
After all individuals were mated in both simulations, Kalick and Hamilton 
examined the correlation of the levels of attractiveness in the couples created. 
The results were rather unexpected, since both simulations resulted in high 
correlations of attractiveness in the couples.
Alpern and Reyniers (1999, 2005), motivated by these results, built two game 
theoretical models in order to  test and explain Kalick and Hamilton’s results
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and to examine how preferences affect strategies and equilibrium behaviour. 
Kalick and Hamilton did not offer any information on the relation between 
preferences and strategies and how the first form the latter, since they did 
not distinguish between preference, choice and motivation (Kalick an Hamilton 
(1986), Alpern and Reyniers (1999)). Hence, they did not offer any insight 
on how an equilibrium can be reached when players are free to decide on the 
strategies they should use according to their preferences. Alpern and Reyniers 
(1999, 2005) tried to fill this gap.
5 .4  F u r th er  R esea rch  in  G am e T h eo ry
A variety of game theoretical models, trying to present the mating selection as 
a dynamical process has been developed, especially in recent years. In general, 
the models focusing in labour economics and the marriage problem have great 
differences from our models and are based on very different assumptions. As a 
result, in many cases it is difficult to make comparisons between them and our 
work. We would categorise our models as being focused mostly on applications 
in operational research and possibly in biology rather than in economics. This 
will become clearer if we briefly present some models tha t are related to our 
work and comment on their connection with the models we developed.
5.4.1 R e la te d  M odels  Focusing  on  B iological A p p lic a tio n s
A game theoretical model that presents many similarities with Alpern and 
Reyniers (2005) was developed earlier by Jo h n s to n e  (1997). This presents 
com putational results on a discrete type model where the initial distribution 
has the form of a truncated normal. Johnstone (1997) assumes a 1 : 1 sex ratio 
(as Alpern and Reyniers(1999,2005)) and he focuses on the influence of time 
constraints, choice costs and competition for mates. He concludes that high 
quality players become less choosy over time, while the low quality players may 
be the most selective in the middle periods of the mating season when choice is 
costly. He notes tha t a model where the population of males and females are 
unequal should be developed.
Before publishing this work, Jo h n s to n e  e t a l (1996) developed a game 
theoretical model examining the effect of costs of choice on the strategies of males 
and females. They commented on the role of parental care in the choosiness of 
animals and noted tha t when parental care offered by both sexes is similar, the 
differences in quality have a strong impact on mating strategies.
Johnstone’s note on the possible importance of the sex ratio and the earlier 
observation of Johnstone et al on the role of quality variation, in combination 
with further comments in the biology literature, motivated us to adapt our non
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symmetrical model with common preferences in order to  incorporate these two 
factors. Examining the influence of quality variation and a biased sex ratio in 
the development of mating behaviour, we found th a t when variation is small 
and the population is male biased, multiple equilibria exist. On the contrary, 
when the variation is large, a unique equilibrium exists in the two period model.
5 .4 .2  R e la te d  M odels , F ocusing  on O p e ra tio n a l R esea rch  A p p lica ­
tions
The models of E rik sso n  e t al (2007, 2008a) are related to  our work, even 
though they base their research on the two-sided choice secretary problem. 
Eriksson et al (2007) examine a game where preferences are independent (non 
uniform) and each player can rank his potential partners according to his pref­
erences . As in Alpern and Reyniers (2005), cohorts of males and females are 
matched over n  periods. However, in contrast to the Alpern and Reyniers model, 
the objective of players is to maximise the rank of their potential partner. Eriks­
son et al (2008a) also focus on a game where preferences are independent, build­
ing a steady state model where populations of males and females are equal. They 
show tha t asymmetric equilibria may exist when the game is perfectly symmet­
ric and investigate the effect of the option to stay single. They also study how 
the equilibria change if both men and women are given the option of staying 
single, but value this option in a different way. They show tha t if the utility 
of staying single is higher for males than for females, males are better off at 
equilibrium, while when staying single is not very bad for any sex, there is a 
unique equilibrium.
R am se y  (2006) focuses on a non-atomic game where males and females 
have only two types. At random times, players of the opposite sex are paired 
and form couples when they both accept each other. Players have maximising 
preferences (preferring high type partners) and there are costs of searching, 
expressed by discounting of the expected utilities over time. Ramsey derives the 
equilibrium of this game and shows tha t the choosiness of the players does not 
decrease over time.
5 .4 .3  R e la te d  M odels , F ocusing  on  E conom ic A p p lic a tio n s
In parallel with the game theoretical models focusing on biology and operational 
research, some models applied in labour markets are related to ours. The game 
theoretical model developed by M c N a m a ra  a n d  C o llin s  (1990) has similar­
ities with the research produced by Alpern and Reyniers (2005) and Johnstone 
(1997) and with our model focusing on common preferences. McNamara and 
Collins examine the two-sided choice job search problem assuming discounting
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of utilities over time. However, they examine a steady state model and there­
fore their results have great differences from ours. They show there is a unique 
equilibrium in which couples are created between employers and candidates who 
belong to the same level, where levels in this case are defined as intervals.
Steady state models related to our common preferences work were also de­
veloped by B u rd e t t  an  C oles (1997, 1999). The la tter focus on the marriage 
problem and (as McNamara and Collins) they prove th a t men and women form 
couples only if they are in the same "class". Furthermore, they find multiple 
equilibria under some conditions, but their assumptions and analysis are very 
different from ours.
5.5 Final Remarks
The goal of this chapter was to give an overview of the area of mutual choice 
games. We have briefly described approaches and models that have been devel­
oped to  analyse mate selection. The reader, being familiar now with our models, 
should be able to understand the relationship of our models to other work in 
the area. In tha t way, he will understand better what our models offer to the 
analysis of the dynamic mating games, and what are their possible applications.
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6 Conclusions - Further Research
6 .1  In tr o d u c tio n
The area of mate choice is very wide and is a subject of interest to different 
scientific fields, such as biology, social sciences and economics. A variety of 
methods have been used for its analysis. We use a game theoretical approach 
to examine equilibrium mating behaviour and its implications. As shown in the 
previous chapter, various other game theoretical mating models have been de­
veloped. Our models are different from secretary and stable matching problems. 
We have analysed the mate selection process as a sequential game, where males 
and females randomly meet over successive periods and form couples only when 
there is mutual consent.
Our analysis extended and generalised Alpern and Reyniers’ (1999, 2005) 
and Alpern’ (2008) models. However, our work differs from the models on 
which it is based in several ways. Two most important differences between 
our models and the relevant literature are as follows. Firstly, in Alpern and 
Reyniers analysis, and in previous work done on dynamic mating games, a sex 
ratio r  =  1 is assumed. We in contrast examined the effect of a biased sex ratio 
on the equilibrium behaviour (chapters 3 and 4). A sex ratio deviating from 
equality is more likely to be realistic (Johnstone (1997)). Secondly, we found 
multiple equilibria in different games under different preferences (chapters 2 
and 3). In most of the relevant literature, a unique equilibrium is found or is 
assumed. The existence of multiple equilibria is not often observed. A natural 
question is which equilibrium would appear in reality. Possible answers to this 
question can be based on the results of a comparison of the different equilibria 
in terms of stability and of the benefits they offer to different players.
Even when there are not multiple equilibria, the outcome of the analysis 
of the equilibrium stability and the welfare of players at equilibrium is useful. 
The analysis of the basins of attraction of a stable equilibrium, show us how 
we expect the players to react against different strategies and how we expect 
the strategies to change till we reach an equilibrium. This can be useful in 
a real life application, where predictions on the population behaviour need to 
be made. On the other hand, welfare can be thought as an indicator of the 
satisfaction of players. It is possible tha t the change of some parameters can 
lead to another equilibrium where welfare is improved. This can help to explain 
changes appearing in reality. Therefore, we find it necessary to focus especially 
on the analysis of the stability and of the welfare of the equilibria found in all 
cases.
We studied the equilibrium strategies under homotypic, mixed (combination 
of homotypic and common), common and age dependent preferences. The goal
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of our research was to analyse how the equilibrium behaviour is affected by 
different preferences and to examine the influence of other factors such as the 
sex ratio, the variation of types and their number (in case they are discrete) on 
the equilibrium strategies. It would be interesting if our results were compared 
to observed behaviours and real life examples. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a summary of our main findings, comment on them and examine any 
possible extensions of our work.
6 .2  H o m o ty p ic  P re fe r e n c e s
The basis of our analysis is the model of Alpern and Reyniers (1999). We 
provided some limited results on the continuous type game, extending the equi­
librium analysis of the uniform distribution two period model of Alpern and 
Reyniers (1999). It would be interesting to further analyse the n  period contin­
uous type game and compare the mutual choice and the one sided choice models. 
However, it can be difficult to find explicit results, due to  the complexity of the 
analysis.
In chapter 2, we mostly focused on the discrete type game. We developed 
a method for reducing the number of potential equilibrium strategies needed 
to be examined in the two period discrete type game. Using this method, we 
found and studied the equilibria in several discrete type games with different 
numbers of types. We observed tha t choosiness increases as the number of types 
increases and we showed tha t it is possible for multiple equilibria to appear. We 
compared the equilibria we found, analysing the intra-couple correlation, the 
marital stability and the expected payoff tha t each equilibrium offers to different 
types of players. At all equilibria, the type correlation in the couples formed is 
low. However, in a game played for a larger number of periods (n > 2), the intra­
couple correlation is expected to be higher. The marital stability of equilibria 
in all models examined is much higher than the stability in the corresponding 
one sided choice models (marital stability of 0.5), a fact noted in the common 
preferences model as well. In the cases of multiple equilibria, we found that 
different types are better off in different equilibria. It would be interesting to 
observe under which conditions each equilibrium appears in reality and whether 
types are able to recognise which equilibrium is more beneficial for them.
In the discrete type games we studied, two types of symmetry were observed 
at equilibrium: symmetry between males and females and between positive and 
negative types, even when it was not assumed th a t at equilibrium strategies 
are symmetric. Further research could focus on proving the existence or non 
existence of asymmetric equilibria in the continuous and discrete type games.
During our analysis of both the continuous and the discrete type games sex 
ratio is r =  1 and players’ types are uniformly distributed in the first period.
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Relaxing these two assumptions might lead to interesting results.
6 .3  M ix e d  P re feren ces  (C o m b in a tio n  o f  H o m o ty p ic  an d  M a x ­
im is in g  P re feren ces)
One of the basic factors affecting the selection procedure is the preferences 
of players. Usually, players are assumed to seek partners similar to themselves 
(homotypic preferences) or partners who possess a characteristic in a high degree 
(common preferences). Animals and humans exhibit both kinds of preferences 
or a mixture of them, depending on the context. However, it is not always 
possible to  find a specific pattern of mating preferences in all species (Bakker et 
al (1999), Widemo and Saether (1999)).
We examined the equilibrium in a model with mixed preferences. We analysed 
the two and three period discrete type model under a combination of homotypic 
and common preferences. We studied the possible changes in the equilibrium 
behaviour and in the mating pattern as homotypic preferences become less im­
portant than common preferences in the choice of mate. In both the two and 
three period models more couples are expected to be formed before the last 
period when homotypic preferences are stronger. This is because all types have 
the opportunity to find a partner before the last period, whereas under common 
preferences only high types are mated in the first periods of the game. In the 
three period game we compared the mating patterns in the first and second 
period. Under all combinations of preferences, the range of mutual acceptance 
is wider in the second period, with the exception of purely homotypic prefer­
ences. Under homotypic preferences, mating takes place between the same pairs 
of types in both periods.
It would be interesting to check how equilibrium behaviour would be affected 
if players were characterised by more than one index (multidimensional types) 
and had different types of preferences for each index. Furthermore, a biased sex 
ratio could have im portant impact on the equilibrium behaviour.
6 .4  C o m m o n  P re feren ces
We extended the common preferences model of Alpern and Reyniers (2005) by 
assuming a biased sex ratio r and a cost c for remaining unmated after the end of 
the game. It is easy to show that our model is equivalent to a model where there 
is a biased sex ratio and quality variation. We proved the existence of multiple 
equilibria under certain conditions and we managed to give one possible answer 
to the question of "when do we have mutual and when do we have one sided 
choice". Our results are not based only on simulation and numerical analysis, 
in fact we have analytical results for the two and partially for the three period
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model, a fact tha t differentiates our work greatly from other research in the 
field.
The role of sex ratio as the principal factor determining differences in choosi­
ness has been criticised by researchers in biology (Kokko and Monaghan (2001)). 
Nevertheless, examining the simultaneous effect of a biased sex ratio and a non 
mating penalty offers a new insight into the role of sex ratio in the formation 
of the equilibrium strategies and complements the research done so far (Alpern 
and Reyniers (2005), Johnstone (1997)).
Of course, our model is based on simplicity in order to keep it general, so 
some assumptions may not be realistic. Criticisms of the model may be based 
on the assumptions of simultaneous arrival of all players in the beginning of each 
period and of the absence of learning. The last assumption though, could be 
realistic in a short game of 2 to 4 periods.
We assumed tha t types are uniformly distributed in the first period. Further 
research could focus on some other type distributions. We have some limited 
results, using a truncated normal distribution, in the discrete type three pe­
riod model; we found multiple equilibria, where both mutual and female choice 
appear. Our analysis is presented in Appendix B . 6 .
Our main results are is accordance with general theory. For a very large sex 
ratio r, males are not willing to be selective, unless the non mating cost c is 
extremely low. The results for a very high non mating cost cost c are analogous; 
unless the sex ratio is close to 1, males are better off by not being choosy. Our 
analytical results in the two period model and our numerical results in the three 
and four period models showed tha t multiple equilibria are possible. This result 
may be of significant importance and it deserves further examination.
In the n period problem, where n > 2, we noted th a t both female and male 
tend to become less choosy over time, a fact that accords with results of previous 
one sided choice models (Real 1990)). Johnstone (1997) in his mutual choice 
model notes that high type individuals become less choosy as time passes by 
but low type individuals tend to become choosier in intermediate periods. A 
result like this could not possibly be observed in our model. In our analysis 
only the strategies of the highest types m atter. The strategy of the lowest 
types is not important since these types would never be accepted before the last 
period. Hence, even if the lowest types of a sex choose to be more selective 
than high types in an intermediate period, they will be rejected and thus not 
manage to increase their expected utility. Consequently, Johnstone’s results do 
not contradict our own.
In the case where multiple equilibria exist in the two period game, we exam­
ined the dynamical and m arital stability of each equilibrium and the expected 
payoff each equilibrium offers to players. It is obvious tha t marital stability
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decreases as players become less choosy at equilibrium. The choosiness of the 
players is associated to the extent th a t the mating pattern is assortative. When 
a female choice equilibrium appears, males have no say in the mating, so a male 
type has equal chances to be m ated with a high or a low female type. On the 
other hand, when both sexes are selective, high males tend to mate with high 
females with a higher probability.
Females welfare is related to the degree tha t a mating is assortative. When 
males are universal acceptors, low type and high type females have equal chances 
to find a high type partner; consequently the average male type in the couples 
created is higher than at mutual choice equilibria and low type females are 
happier. However, high type females have individual preferences for mutual 
choice equilibria. Mutual choice favours assortative mating. As a result it 
allows high type females to have access to higher type males, without having to 
compete with low type females, at least before the last period. At female choice 
equilibrium, a conflict of social and individual interest of high type females 
appears. This can be beneficial for males, since the majority of male types 
(both high and very low types) prefer mutual choice equilibria to female choice.
We are particularly interested on the biological applications of our model. 
In section 3.4 we briefly presented a modified version of our model, showing the 
effect of sex ratio and female type variation on equilibrium behaviour. Work in 
progress shows th a t further analysis of this modified model should offer results 
th a t can have significant implications for biology.
6 .5  A g e  D e p e n d e n t  P r e fe r e n c e s
Based on an idea of Alpern and Reyniers (1999) and Alpern (2008) we analysed 
the equilibrium strategies in a steady state model where individuals have age 
dependent preferences and they seek partners to maximise the number of pe­
riods tha t both they and their partners can produce offspring. We examined 
the equilibrium strategies as the sex ratio of the incoming population changes. 
Furthermore, we studied the changes in the total population and in the average 
number of years a couple is m ated when the maximum number of periods that 
males and females are able to reproduce varies.
The availability of potential partners for each player depends on the player’s 
type (age) and the sex ratio. Choosiness of players decreases as their type (age) 
increases. This is intuitive, since as players become older, a wider range of 
types offers them the same utility and the risk of remaining unmated increases. 
Examples of the tendency of individuals to become less choosy as they get older 
has been observed in several animals (Uetz and Norton (2007), Gray (1999), 
Kodric-Brown and Nicoletto (2001)). The effect of sex ratio on the choosiness 
of the two sexes is different. It was shown tha t the limiting sex, let it be
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females, becomes choosier as r increases, while the opposite sex (males in this 
case) becomes less choosy. This observation contrasts with our conclusions in 
the previous models, where the choosiness of both sexes moved to the same 
direction as r varied. However, it needs to be noted th a t in the previous models 
all females were mated after the end of the game, whereas in the current model 
it is possible for members of both sexes to leave the game without finding a 
partner.
We used the population productivity as a measure of the population welfare. 
In the models examined, the social welfare is maximised when the number of 
males and females is the same (r = 1). It is interesting to note that Fisher (1930) 
in a more general situation with a non monogamous setting stated tha t Natural 
Selection leads to equality of the number of males and females at maturity. 
Fisher argued tha t "the sex ratio will so adjust itself, under of influence of 
Natural Selection, th a t the total parental expenditure incurred in respect of 
children of each sex, shall be equal". It would be of particular interest to check 
whether social welfare is maximised when r — 1 when both males and female 
are fertile for longer than 3 years.
We assumed that another measure of the "satisfaction" of players at equilib­
rium is the average age of players at marriage. We found that the average age 
at marriage is minimum for both males and females when r — 1, since in tha t 
case all players get mated in the first period tha t they enter the game. However, 
as the population becomes male or female biased, the average age at marriage 
increases for both males and females.
In all the games analysed an equilibrium always exists if we assume tha t 
the total population is constant. When males are fertile for A =  4 periods and 
females are fertile for r  =  3 periods, multiple equilibria exist for some sex ratio 
r. Thus when multiple equilibria exist for a sex ratio r, one can achieve this 
r  by two different incoming population sex ratios R.  However, in the A =  4, 
r  — 3 model, an equilibrium does not always exist for all incoming population 
sex ratios R.  Further research could focus in examining whether an equilibrium 
exist for all r  for larger A and r  and whether multiple equilibria may appear in 
other cases.
A possible extension of our model could incorporate remarrying and divorc­
ing. This could make it more realistic. Remarrying is frequent in nature. Alba­
tross whose mates have died usually mate with other widowed birds (Jouventin 
et al (1999)). Furthermore in many monogamous birds examples of divorcing 
appear (Green et al (2004)). Examples of "divorcing" and "remarrying" can 
also appear in sociology and economics between humans or organisations.
Further research could also be devoted into incorporating search costs in 
our model. In economics, there are examples of frictionless markets (Eeckhout
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(1999)); nevertheless, in most cases search, lost opportunity or signalling costs 
are taken into account (Burdett and Coles (1999)). In biology often costs are 
not taken into account during the analysis of mating behaviour (Alpern and 
Reyniers (2005), since it is very difficult to measure them empirically (Kokko et 
al (2003)) and draw conclusions on their exact effect.
Finally our model could be modified to assume a different type of preferences. 
As was argued in chapter 4, in many cases animals prefer older partners. Hence 
a new model could try  to analyse the equilibrium behaviour given a preference 
for older types.
6 .6  F in a l R em ark s
We have analysed the effect of different preferences on equilibrium strategies. 
We tried to examine the effects of different factors on equilibrium behaviour. 
In all our models, we had to make simplifications. The addition of new factors 
possibly im portant for couple formation, can lead to an increase in complexity 
th a t can make it impossible to reach general results. Even in our analysis, many 
results are computational since it is difficult to find analytical results.
Our work has applications in different fields and we are particularly inter­
ested to check whether examples verifying our results appear in real life. How­
ever, we take into account tha t models are always approximations of reality, 
and their results simply provide an intuition into what might happen in real 
circumstances.
Further research can extend and modify our analysis. We are already plan­
ning to modify the common preferences model. We hope our work can provide 
the motivation for new research tha t will reveal new interesting results. Fur­
thermore, our results should be combined with observations and experimental 




A ppendix A. H om otypic Preferences
Appendix A provides material tha t can facilitate the understanding of chapter 
2 .
A . l  C o n tin u o u s  T y p e  M o d e l
In the continuous type 2 period model in sections 2.2 and 2.3, types are initially 
distributed in [—1,1]. According to (1) s(:c) denotes the strategy of a type x. 
Let xl  =  m axjx  : —x  +  s(x) =  x}.
L em m a A .l  / /  0 <  x <  x/, then x  — s(x) always accepts x.
P ro o f, x  — s(x)  is an increasing function in [0,1], since its derivative is always
nonnegative. Therefore since
x  <  xl ==> x — s(:r) < xl  — s(xb) 
and xl — s(x l ) =  xl 
Then x — s(x) < —x l -
We know th a t s in decreasing in the interval [—1,0], thus
s{x — s(:r)) >  s ( — x l )  
s(x — s(x)) >  2XL’
In order to  prove tha t x — s(x)  accepts x, we just have to prove tha t
(x — s(x)) +  s(x — s(x)) >  x
Hence it is sufficient to prove tha t
( x  — s ( x ) )  +  2 x l  >  x
Hence
( x  — s(z)) +  2 x l  >  x
2 x l  >  s ( x )  
s ( x l ) >  s ( x ) ,
which is true, since xl  >  s(x).
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A . 2 D isc r e te  T y p e  2 P e r io d  G a m es - M o re  S ign ifican t F ig u res  o f  
th e  A n a ly s is  o f  th e  M a tin g  P r o b a b ility  a n d  o f  th e  E x p e c te d  C ost  
a t E q u ilib r iu m
We analysed the discrete type two period games where non negative types m  
range from 1 to 9. In section 2.6, we presented in Figure 2.7 the probability 
that a type is mated in period 1 as a percentage and we illustrated in Figure 
2.8 the normalised cost and a type expects to receive when he enters the game. 
Figures A.  1 and A .2 present more significant figures of the probability tha t a 
type is mated in the first period and of the cost th a t a type expects to receive 
when he enters the game respectively.
typeO typel type2 type3 type4 type5 type6 type7 type8 type9
m=1 1 0.667
m=2 0.6 0.6 0.4
s1 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.286
m=3 s2 0.429 0.714 0.429 0.429
s3 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.429
m=4 0.556 0.556 0.556 0.444 0.333
s1 0.455 0.455 0.545 0.455 0.364 0.364
m=5 s2 0.455 0.636 0.636 0.455 0.455 0.364
s3 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.545 0.455 0.364
m=6 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.462 0.385 0.308
m=7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.533 0.467 0.4 0.467
m=8 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.588 0.529 0.471 0.412 0.353 0.353
m=9 0.579 0.579 0.579 0.579 0.579 0.526 0.474 0.421 0.368 0.316
Figure A.  1: Probability of getting mated in the first period at
equilibrium.
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Figure A.2: Expected cost at equilibrium.
A .3 M ix e d  P referen ces- P lo ts  o f  th e  eq u ilib r iu m  s tr a te g ie s
We analysed the discrete 10-type two and three period games with mixed pref­
erences, where the weight u  of homotypic preferences takes values between 0
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and 1. In section 2.8, we presented in Figures 2.11 and 2.14 the strategies at 
equilibrium in the two and three period models respectively. In the following 
figures (A 3 and A 4) we plot the equilibrium strategies in order to help the 











type 0 type 1 type 2 type 3 type 4 type 5 type 6 type 7 type 8 type 9
(jU-0 - b - oo=0.1 oo=0.2 -<— 00=0.3 00=0.4 oo=0.5
—h - oo=0.6  oo=0.7  oo=0.8 -♦ -0 0 = 0 .9  to=1
Figure A3: Plots of equilibrium strategies in the 2 period game for m  = 9.
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type 0 type 1 type 2 type 3 type 4 type 5 type 6 type 7 type 8 type 9
(0=0 — (0=0 (0=0.1 — (0=0.1 - * — (0=0.2 — (0=0.2
(0=0.3 — ■— (0=0.3 -------(0=0.4 (0=0.4 (0=0.5 (0=0.5
(0=0.6 —B— (0=0.6 - • — (0=0.7 (0=0.7 -------(0=0.8 ------ (0=0.8
(0=0.9 —■— (0=0.9 —* —(0=1 —* - (0=1
Figure A.4: Plots of equilibrium strategies in the 3 period game for m  = 9 .
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Appendix B. Common Preferences
This Appendix provides additional material tha t can help the better under­
standing of the results presented in chapter 3.
B . l  E q u ilib r ia  on  th e  F , M  L in es an d  o n  T h e ir  P o in t  o f  In te rsec ­
t io n  ( ( 9 /8 ) ,1 )
The following figures (B . l  and B . 2) illustrate some special cases of equilibria 
appearing on the F  and M  lines or on their intersection. We analyse the equi­
libria
•  at the point ( | ,  1) in the (r, c) space; at this point F  and M  lines coincide; 
hence this point is the intersection of regions I,  I I  and I I I
• on the part of the F  line where c < 1, being the intersection of regions I  
and I I
•  on the part of the F  line where c > 1, being the intersection of regions I I  
and I I I , and
• on the M  line where c > 1, which is the intersection of regions I I  and I.
In figure B. l ,  the equilibria are given as the intersection of the female equi­
librium condition (29) drawn in red (thin) and the male equilibrium condition 
(23) drawn in green (thick). In figure B . 2 though, the equilibria are described 
as intersections of L\  and L 2 and the polynomial q(u) (42) as described in the 
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Li  =  {(0,i/ ) , - 0 0  <  y <  0
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Figure B.l:  Equilibria as intersection points of the female 
equilibrium condition (23) drawn in red (thin) and the male 







Figure B . 2: Equilibria as intersections of L\  and L 2 and the 
polynomial q{u)(42)
At ( | ,  1) =  I  D l l  D l l  I  the easy, the choosy and the female equilibria coincide; 
hence there exist a unique female choice equilibrium of the form (0,0.25).
For c < 1, on the F  line, (I  fl I I  D I I I  =  {(rp ,c) : c < 1}), the choosy 
equilibrium coincides with the female choice equilibrium; hence there exist a 
unique female choice equilibrium.
For c > 1, on the F  line, ( I I  fl I I I  D I I  = { (rp ,c) : c >  i}), the easy 
equilibrium coincides with the female choice equilibrium; as a result there exist 
two equilibria: one female choice equilibrium and one mutual choice equilibrium 
(the choosy equilibrium).
On the M  line, (I  fl I I I  D l l  = {(t m , c) : c > 1}), the easy and the choosy 
equilibrium coincide; as a result there exist two equilibria: one female choice 
equilibrium and one mutual choice equilibrium.
B .2  N um erical R esults on the D ynam ical Stability  o f the Equi­
libria
In chapter 3, equilibria are defined as fixed points of the mapping T  (52). A 
fixed point is described as dynamically stable if AT-7 <  1 (53).
If an equilibrium is dynamically stable, iterations of T  applied to nearby
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points, converge back to it in j  steps where
j  =  mi n  {i : N 3 ( u , v ) <  1}
We consider a point dynamically stable if and only if N 3 < 1 for j  < 2.
As it is already noted in chapter 3, only the female and the choosy equi­
librium seem to be dynamically stable while the easy equilibrium shows un­
stable behaviour. For the female and the choosy equilibrium, we found tha t 
N 2(u, v) < 1 for all values of (r, c) in (1,0) x (2.5,2.5), fact th a t is not true 
for v). By noting (r, c) such tha t N l (el {r, c)) > 1 and (r, c) such tha t
AT1(e1(r, c)) <  1 we were able to approximate the areas of I I I  and I  and I I  
where female choice and choosy equilibria are attracting in one step or in two 
steps.
B .2 .1  Fem ale C hoice Equilibrium
We analysed the behaviour of the female equilibrium in I  and I I I .  We divided 
the area I  U I I I  of (1,0) x (2.5,2.5) in (r, c) space into 40,000 points and we 
calculated A 1(e1(r, c)). We found that in the bigger part of I I I  and around the 
M  line in J, we have iV1(e1(r, c)) > 1. Our results are illustrated in figure B. 3, 
where female equilibria having A’1(e1(r, c)) > 1 are represented as pink points. 
In order to check our results, we focused further on the area where iV1(e1(r, c)) > 
1, calculating the A 1(e*(r, c)) for 10,000 points where 1 <  r < +  0.2 and 0 <
c < 2.5; our further examination confirmed our initial results. Our additional 
analysis is shown in figure B. 4, where all points where A'1(e1(r, c)) > 1 are 
illustrated in pink as well. It is worth mentioning tha t it appears tha t in I  
there exist an almost parallel line (where r  ~  1.092) below which we have 
iV1(e1(r, c)) > 1.
155
1.12




Figure B. 3: Points where 7V1(e1(r, c)) > 1 for 
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Figure BA:  Points where AT1(e1(r, c)) > 1 for 1 < r < vm 
and 0 < c < 2.5 (illustrated in pink)
Having pointed out the areas where AT1(e1(r, c)) < 1, it is interesting to 
examine how the value of the norm N l {el (r, c)) changes as r and c vary. Figures 
B. 5, B .6 and B .7 show the values of A^ 1(e1(r, c)) in different areas where female 
equilibrium appears. For c < 1, m a x N 1 (e1 (r,c)) < 0.4 as shown in figure 
BA.  However, this is not always true for c >  1; in I  for c >  1 we have 




even be higher, reaching the value of 2 in some cases. For illustration purposes, 
we normalised the value of r in all figures so that it ranges between 0 and 1. In 
figure B . 5, rf = 0 corresponds to r = rp  and r' = 1 corresponds to r = 2.5. 
In figure B. 6, the normalised r  takes its minimum value for r = and its 
maximum for r  =  vm +  0.2. In figure B. 7, rt = 0 corresponds to r = rp  and 
r' — 1 corresponds to r  =  t m  .
Figure B. 5: N l (el {r, c)) for rp < r  < 2.5 and 0 <  c < 1
157
Figure B.6: A^ 1(e1(r, c)) for rM < r <  r M +  0.2 and 1 < c < 2.5
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Figure B.7: AT1(e1(r, c)) for rp < r  < r \ i  and 1 < c < 2.5
Although we have A/'1(e1(r, c)) > 1 at many points around and between the 
F  line and between the F  and the M  lines, female equilibrium is always stable. 
As it is shown in the figure B. 8, we have N 2 {el {r, c)) < 1 in all cases. As before, 
in figure B .8 r  is normalised so that r' = 0 corresponds to r =  1 and r' — 1 
corresponds to r  =  2.5. Taking into considerations the values of A’1(e1(r, c)) in 
I I I , it is expected that the higher values of iV2(e1(r, c)) are reached close to the 
F  line.
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Figure B.  8: AT1(e1(r, c)) for rp < r  <  r \ j  and 1 < c < 2.5
B .2.2 E asy  E qu ilib rium
The easy equilibrium is not a stable equilibrium. We calculated N l (e2 {r, c)) and 
iV2(e2(r, c) for 1 < c < 2.5 and rp < r < tm-  For illustration purposes, for given 
c, we rescaled r so that r' = 0 corresponds to r = rp  and r' = 1 corresponds to 
r — tm- Hence as in the previous figures for any two points A and B in (c, r, N)  
space, where r/A = r'B but ca ^  cp, then we have ta ^  f'Bi since the value of r 
depends on the particular c it is related to.
As we can see from the two figures below (figures B .9 and B.10), both 
norms A 1(e2(r, c)) and AT2(e2(r, c) are higher than 1 in all cases, apart from 
the limiting cases, where either c =  1 and r = rp = r^j (represented by the 
point (1,0,1)) or where r = vf (represented by the points of the form (c, 0, N )) 
or where r = r^j (represented by the points of the form (c, 1,1)). As we are 
going to show in the next section, our proposition on the instability of the 
easy equilibrium is supported by analysis of the basins of attraction of the each
160
equilibrium is region III .
N1 (si2 (r,c)
rv
Figure B.9: N x{e*{r,c)) for rF < r  < r M and 1 <  c < 2.5
N 2 fe?(r,c)
Figure B.  10: iV2(r, c) for rF < r  < and 1 < c <  2.5.
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B .2.3 C hoosy E qu ilib rium
Choosy equilibrium is attracting in one step in most of the cases; however, there 
seems to exist a small area in regions I I  and I I I  where it is attracting in two 
steps. In order to examine its behaviour in detail, we analysed separately regions 
I  and I I I .
The following figures (£.11 and £.12) describe the behaviour of N 1 (e3 (r, c)) 
in region I I I .  From figure £.11, it becomes apparent that for points close to 
the F  line (when c is close to 1) and for points close to the M  line (when c 
is close to 2.5), we observe that Airl(e3(r, c)) > 1 and A/’1(e3(r,c)) even reaches 
values higher than 1.2 in some cases. Given these results, we analysed the 
values of A^ 1(e3(r, c)) for 10,000 points in region I I I  so that we get a better 
approximation of the line above which A^ 1(e3(r, c)) > 1 in region I I I  (illustrated 
in green in figure £.12).
In figure £.13 it is graphed iV2(e3(r, c)) and it is shown that iV2(e3(r, c) < 
1 for all points in region I I I .  Therefore we can conclude that the choosy equi­
librium is stable in region I I I .
Figure £.11: iV ^e^r, c)) in region I I I , where rp < r  < vm and
1 < c < 2.5
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Figure £.12: Line above which we have A/'1(e1(r, c)) >  1 in regi
I I I
Figure £.13: iV2(e3(r, c)) in region I I I ,  where rp < r  < tm and
1 < c < 2.5
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Figures £ . 14, B.  15 and B.  16 describe region II] there seem to exist an area 
close to the F  line where A/rl(e3(r, c)) >  1; the size of this area is quite small 
though as illustrated in the second graph of figure B.  14. In the second graph 
of Figure B.  14, we duplicated the first graph of figure B.  14 and we added a 
plane that is parallel to (r, c) and it includes all points where A/’1(e3(r, c)) =  1 
(it can be seen in blue colour in figure B.  14). In that way, it is easier to focus 
on the region where A/’1(e3(r, c)) > 1 and appreciate how high are the values of 
the A^’1(e3(r, c)). A clearer image of the points where AT1(e3(r, c)) > 1 is given 
in figure B.  15. Analysing the values of iV1(e3(r, c)) for 10,000 points in region 
I I  gave as a better estimation of the area where AT1(e3(r, c)) > 1 in region II .  
The points where A’1(e3(r, c)) > 1 and c < 1 are illustrated in dark green and 
the points where A'1(e3(r, c)) > 1 and c >  1 are illustrated in purple in figure 
£.15.
Next we illustrate Ar2(e3(r, c)) in figure £.16 where it is shown tha t is is less 
than 0.5 for all points in region II .
c
Figure £.14: AT1(e3(r, c)) in region I I ,  where rp < r  < 2.5 
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Figure 5.15: Points where AT1(e1(r, c)) > 1 in region I I I  (in green and
purple colour).
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CFigure 5.16: iV2(r, c) in region I I , where rp  <  r  <  2.5 and
0 < c < 2.5
Figure 5.17 combines figures 5.12 and 5.15, showing all points where 
AT1(e3(r, c)) > 1 in regions I I  and I I I .
N 1 (s3 (r,c)>l
0 . 75 l . S  1 .7 S 2
M
N 1 (s3 (r,c)<l F
Figure 5.17: Points where A^ 1(e3(r, c)) > 1 in regions I I I  and I I
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Figure B. 18 combines figures B.4, B. 12 and B. 15, showing all points where 
AT1(e1(r, c)) > 1 and N l (e3 (r, c)) > 1 in / ,  I I  and I I I .
N1fe3(r,c)>l
N1 fe1 (r/c)>lM \
liLn 11
Figure B.  18: Points where AT1(e1(r, c)) >  1 and iV1(e3(r, c)) >  1 
in regions / ,  I I  and I I I
B .2.4 B asins o f A ttra c tio n
We proved that multiple equilibria exist in region I I I  and we showed that both 
female and choosy equilibria are stable. Therefore, it would be interesting to 
examine which equilibrium would be more probable to appear in reality. We 
analysed the basins of attraction of each equilibrium, assuming that there exist 
a positive relation between the size of the basin of attraction of an equilibrium 
and the probability it appears in real life.
A basin of attraction of a point (u, v) is defined as the set of points (u, v) (the 
region) such that any iterations of the mapping T(u,  v) (52) will finally converge 
to (u,v).  For given (r, c) in region I I I , we chose 10,000 uniformly distributed 
points (u, v ) in the [0,0.25] x [0,0.25] space and we examined whether a mapping 
T starting from any of these points converges to an equilibrium point5; for the 
points that converge to an equilibrium, we noted what type of equilibrium they 
converge to.
5  I n  r e a l i t y  w e  c h e c k e d  w h e t h e r  t h e y  c o n v e r g e  t o  a  p o i n t  ( u , v )  s u c h  t h a t
\u —  u |  <  0 . 0 0 0 0 1  a n d  | t )  —  n |  <  0 . 0 0 0 0 1  
w h e r e  (u, v) i s  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .
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For any pair (r, c) we examined in I I I , all mappings starting any of the 
(u,v)  points analysed, converged to an equilibrium. In no case though this 
equilibrium was the easy, apart from the mapping of the easy equilibrium point 
to itself. This observation comes into accordance with our claim tha t the easy 
equilibrium is unstable. Our claims of stability of the female choice and the 
choosy equilibrium were also confirmed since in all examined cases a number 
of mappings converged to the female choice equilibrium and all the rest of the 
mappings to the choosy equilibrium. It is im portant to  note tha t the basin of 
attraction of the female choice equilibrium was significantly smaller than the 
one of the choosy equilibrium in all cases examined. This fact may indicate tha t 
choosy equilibrium is more probable to be found in real circumstances. The 
basin of attraction of the female choice equilibrium included mostly points were 
the male strategy was very close to 0.
We present some examples in order to permit to the reader to gain an intu­
ition on our partial results on the basins of attraction.
• Example B.l: r = 1.08388 and c = 1.32
In this case IV1 (e1 (1.08388,1.32)) > 1 and AT1(e3(1.08388,1.32)) >  1 while 
A/”2 (e1 (1.08388,1.32)) < 1 and iV2(e3( 1.08388,1.32)) <  1
The following graph (figure B.  19) shows in green all the points belonging 
to the basin of attraction of the female equilibrium. The female equilibrium 
is marked with red and the easy equilibrium is marked in blue. All the rest 
of the points, marked in yellow belong to the basin of attraction of the choosy 
equilibrium; the choosy equilibrium is not appearing in the graph (the female 
strategy in this case is higher than 0.25). The second part of the graph permits 
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Figure B.  19: Basins of attraction of the female 
and the choosy equilibrium in [0,0.25] x [0, 0.25]
We chose two random initial points and starting from those, we repeatedly 
calculated T  up to the point that it converged to an equilibrium. In the following 
figure (B.20), we illustrate the steps of the iteration of T  from these points to 
the equilibria.
In the upper graph, we chose a point very close to the easy equilibrium (left 
blue point) as a starting point and we proved that the iteration of T  converges 
to the choosy equilibrium (right blue point).
In the lower graph we chose a point (marked in pink) tha t is not part of 
points proved to belong to the basin of attraction of the female equilibrium 
(marked in green) but it lies between them. As it becomes obvious from the 
graph, iterations of T  starting from this point converge to the female equilibrium 
(marked in red). This and analogous results permit to us to claim that all points 
in the area between the green points (which we know that belong in the basin 
of attraction of the female equilibrium) belong to the basin of attraction of the 
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Figure B .20: Examples of iterations of T  converging 
to the choosy and the female equilibrium
The following figure (B.21) allows us to gain an insight of how the iteration 
of T  converges to the equilibria points starting from different points in the (u, n) 
space. The equilibria are marked in red (female equilibrium) and in blue (easy 
(lower dot) and choosy (upper dot)). As it becomes apparent, the majority of 
the points tend to converge to the choosy equilibrium and a few points, mostly 











Figure 5.21: Vectorfield of T  for 
r = 1.08388 and c =  1.32
• Example B.2: r = 1.0817 and c = 1.32
In this case N 1 (e1 (1.08388,1.32)) > 1 and AT1(e3(1.08388,1.32)) < 1 while 
AT^e1 (1.08388,1.32)) < 1 and JV2(e3(1.08388,1.32)) < 1
The following graph (figure B .22) illustrates the steps of the iteration of T  
from a random point (marked in pink) to the choosy equilibrium (represented 
by the right blue point). The female equilibrium is marked in red and the green 
points represent its area of attraction. All the rest of the points belong to the 
basin of attraction of the choosy equilibrium, apart from the point corresponding 
to the easy equilibrium (the left blue point). The area of attraction of the female 
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Figure B. 22: Example of iterations of T  converging to 
the choosy equilibrium
The size of the basin of attraction of each equilibrium can also be analysed 
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Figure 5.23: Vectorfield of T  for r = 1.0817 
and c =  1.32
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• Example B.3: r = 1.086 and c = 1.3
In this case JV1(e1(1.08388,1.32)) <  1 and /V '^fl-OSSSS, 1.32)) > 1 while 
IV2(e1(1.08388,1.32)) < 1 and JV2(e3(1.08388,1.32)) < 1
Figure B. 24 shows in green all the points belonging in the basin of attraction 
of the female equilibrium. The female equilibrium is marked with red and the 
easy equilibrium is marked in blue. The rest of the points (yellow area) belong 
to the basin of attraction of the choosy equilibrium; the latter is not appearing 
in the graph (since the female strategy in this case is higher than 0.25). The 
second part of the graph focuses on a smaller area of the (u , v) space in order 
to allow a more detailed look at the female basin of attraction.
0 .25  ‘
' • f0 .15  f




Figure B.24: Basins of attraction of the 
female and the choosy equilibrium in 
[0,0.25] x [0,0.25]
In the following figure (B.25), we chose 2 random initial points and we 
illustrate the steps of the iteration of T  from the these points to the equilibria.
In the upper graph, we chose a point below the area of attraction of the 
female equilibrium (pink point) as a starting point and we proved that the 
iteration of T  converges to the choosy equilibrium (right blue point).
In the lower graph we chose a point (marked in pink) lying between the 
points that belong to the basin of attraction of the female equilibrium (green
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points). Iteration of starting from this point converge to the female equilibrium 
(marked in red).
v
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Figure B. 25: Examples of iterations of T  
converging to the choosy and the female 
equilibrium
The vector field of T, shown in the figure (B.26) gives us the opportunity to 
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Figure B.  26: Vectorfield of T  for 
r — 1.0817 and c = 1.32
B.3 D istribution  of Couples
In chapter 3, we examine the marital stability of the couples created at equi­
librium. Before analysing the marital stability of a mating game, we need to 
calculate first the distribution of mated couples when any pair of strategies (it, v) 
is used by the male and the female population respectively.
For reasons of simplicity, we call males (females) of a type lower than v(u)  
low type males (females) and males (females) of a type higher than v  (u ) high 
types males (females).
The fraction 7Ti of couples (x, y ) where x < v  and y < u is




v  +  u (l — v) + i—  1
In the first period no lower type male or female is accepted, hence they all 
enter the second period unmated. Hence in the second period there are u low 
type females and vr  low type males. Hence, the probability that a low type 
female is mated with a low type male is where r — k is the total male
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population in the second period, since k are the number of pairs created in the 
first period (21).
The fraction 7T2 of couples (x, y) where x  < v  and y > u is
7T2 =  P r(x  <  v , y  > u)
= L>(1 — u)
vr
r — k 
v 2(l  — u)r
v  +  u( 1 — v)  +  r  — 1
All high females who meet low type males in the first period, enter the second 
period unmated. Hence in the second period there are v ( l —u) high type females 
who have a chance of be mated with a low type male.
The fraction 7T3 of couples (x, y) where x > v  and y > u is
7T3 =  P r(x > v , y  > u)
j ( „  u ( l - u )  +  ( r - l ) ( l - t ; )
=  fc +  v ( l - « ) ------------- ^ -------------
(u - l ) ( v -  1)
r + u + v  — uv  — 1
(r +  u +  rv — 1)
The fraction of couples where x > v  and y > u created in the first period 
is k while the faction of couples of high type created in the second period is 
v ( i - u ) ( v + u ( i - v ) + r - i - r v )   ^ s n^ce there are v ( l  — u) high type females and (u (l —
v ) +  0—  1)(1 — v)) males having a type greater than v in the second period. 
The fraction 7T4 of couples (x, y) where x  > v  and y < u
7T4 =  P r(x  >  v , y  < u)
« ( l - u )  +  ( r - l ) ( i - t ; )
_  r — k
_  u( l  — v)(r  +  u — 1) 
v  +  u( 1 — v)  +  r  — 1
All high type males who either meet low type females or remain unpaired in 
the first period enter the second period unmated. Hence in the second period 
there are (w(l — v) +  (r — 1)(1 — t;)) of high type males and u low type females.
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The following table summarises our results.
* 1  =  „ + u / 1-" r)+ r _ 1 for  x < v  a n d y <  u
*2 =  for  x < v  a n d y > u
K3 = (r + u + r u -  1 )  for  x > v  and y > u
* 4  =  “ ^ ( l - v t + r - 1! for  x > v  and y < u
7ri+7l‘2+fl'3+7r4 =  l
Taking into account the fractions (7Ti,7T2, 7T3, ^ 4), we can estimate the distri­
bution f (x ,  y) of mated couples. So,
^ ^ y 7 T i  for  x < v  and y < u
(l-lttv)'*2 for  x < v  and y > u
Ji-vj(T-u)71-3 f or  x > v  and y > u
( 1  f or  x > v  and y < u
for  x < v  a n d y < u  
« + t t ( i ^ ) + r - i  f or  x < v  a n d y > u  
r l t l t - u Z - 1 f or  x > v  a n d y > u  
v+u(i-~ )lr-i fo r  x > v  a n dy  < u
B.3.1 D istribution  o f M ated M ales and Fem ales
All females are mated after the end of the second period. Hence the distribution 
of females y in the couples created under the pair of strategies(u, v)  is the same 
as the initial distribution of females. Hence after the game is finished, mated 
females are uniformly distributed in [0 , 1] and
f (y )  =  1 for every 0 <  y < 1
The distribution of the mated male population though differs from the initial 
male distribution. Only £ of males is mated after the end of the second period. 
From those mated males, k males are of high type mated in the first period, 
and (r — 1 +  u )(l — v are males of high type m ated in the second period. 
Therefore, there are
/ 1  w -  \ /  „ w „ x l  — k — v ) ( r +  u + rv — r u v — \)
1 -  t » ) ( l  -  u) +  r  -  1 +  u )( l -  v )    =  i  ----------------------
r — k r + u + v — uv — 1
males having a type higher than v,  in the couples created.
No male having a type less than v  is mated in the first period. Hence the 
number of males having a type less than v  in the couples created is equal with 
the number of males who are mated in the second period and have a type less
177
than v  and it is
1-Jfevr-
(u +  t;( l — u))vr
r — k v  +  u( 1  — v) +  (r — 1 ) 
Hence the distribution of males in the couples created is
f ( x )
S ( x )
1 ( u + i» ( l—u))vr  
v  t ; + u ( l —t>)-t-(r—1)
1 (1 —v ) { r + u + r v —ru v—1)
1— v  r + u + v —u v —1
(u + v ( l—u))r  
v + u ( l —1>)+(9— 1) 
r + u + r v - r u v - 1  f  
r + u + v - u v - 1  J Ul X V
f o r  x  < v  
f o r  x  > v
fo r  x < v
B.4 M arital Stability of Couples
The marital stability a  of a given distribution of couples is defined in chapter 
3 as the probability tha t given two random couples x \ y \  and X2 IJ2 , either the 
pairing x \ y 2 provides a greater utility to both x\  and ?/2 than x\y\  and #2 2 /2  
respectively, or the pairing £2 2 /1  provides a greater utility to both X2  and 2/1 
than £ 2 2 /2  and£i2/i respectively.
We saw tha t Sij is the probability tha t a pair of couples is stable when one 
belongs in Ri and the other one belongs in R j . Hence we constructed in chapter 












So, given tha t the distribution over the table is 7r =  7r( u ,  v ) =  (7Ti, 7r2, t t s ,  ^ 4 ) 
then the stability index <7 is
o  =  o(u , v) = n S n  =  i ( l  — 2 7 ^ 4  +  2^ 4773)
z
- /  -1 _  o  v 2( l - u ) r  u ( l - y ) ( r + u - l )  \
  _  I v + u (T ^ v ) + r —T j
2 V + 2„+„(l-'J)+r-l r+ " (r + u + r v - 1 )  )
r + u + v — uv  — 2ru v 2 — 2ru2v  +  2ru 2 v 2 +  2ruv  — 1 
2 (r +  u  4- v  — uv — 1)
It is obvious tha t the female choice equilibrium has m arital stability cr(e1 (r, c) 
^ for all (r, c).
r +  t> — 1 1
c r ^ r ,  c) =  <7(0, v i) =
2 (r + v -  1) 2
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Focusing in region I I I , it is interesting to find which equilibrium has the 
highest marital stability for given (r, c). We divided the region I I I  where rp  < 
r < rM and 1 <  c <  2.5 into 10,000 points and we compared the marital 
stability of the choosy equilibrium with that of the easy equilibrium; in all cases 
(apart from the extreme case where r — tm and choosy and easy equilibrium 
coincide) choosy equilibrium had a higher marital stability index than the choosy 
equilibrium. Next we compared the marital stability of the easy equilibrium with 
the one of the female choice equilibrium. In no case (apart from the extreme 
case where r =  rp  and easy and female choice equilibrium coincide) the stability 
of the easy equilibrium was larger or equal with
Therefore, we may end up into the conclusion that for any examined (r, c) 
in I I I  the choosy equilibrium is the most stable one and the female equilibrium 
the most unstable one.
0.5 =  <r(e1(r, c) <  cr(e2(r, c) <  c(e3(r, c)
We plotted the stability index of the mutual choice equilibria in order to get 
some upper limits for it. As it can be seen in the following figures
<r(e2(r, c) <  0.54 and cr(e3(r, c) <  0.59
Figure B .27 focuses in region II;  the first graph refers to the equilibrium 
marital stability for c <  1 and the second graph for c > 1. In both graphs r  is 
normalised in such a way tha t rf =  0 corresponds to r  =  1 and r ' =  1 to r  =  rp . 
It becomes apparent from the two graphs that tr(e3(r, c) < 0.59 in region I I .  
Stability a  takes its highest values for r close to 1. However, for large c , a  also 
takes high values for higher r. As we see from the graphs, a  takes high values 
for all (c, r') below the line =  r ' (and above this line for c higher than 1) 
while it takes its lowest values near the F  line and above the line =  r f (for 
c low).
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cFigure B .27: Marital stability index a(e3 (r,c) of 
choosy equilibrium in region I I
Figures B.28 and B.  29 graph the marital stability index of the choosy and the 
easy equilibria respectively in region I I I .  Figure B .29 illustrates the difference 
cr(e3 (r, c)) — cr(e2(r, c) between the marital stability of the choosy and of the 
easy equilibria for given (r, c) in region I I I .  In all figures, rf = 0 corresponds 
to r = rp and r' =  1 to r = rM-
As we can observe from figure B .28 and B .29, a(e3 (r,c)) is the lowest for 
c =  1 and the highest for r close to F  (especially for c close to 2.5), while 
cr(e2(r, c)) is the lowest close to the F  line and the highest close to the M  
line, (especially for c =  2.5). From the analysis of chapter 3 we know that for 
given c, choosy equilibrium strategies take their maximum values on the F  line 
and their minimum values on the M  line, while the opposite is true for the 
easy equilibrium. This observation in combination with Figures B .28 and B .29 
indicates tha t the choosier the populations are at equilibrium, the highest is the 
marital stability of the couples created.
This claim is also supported by Figure B. 30, where we can see that the
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marital index of the choosy and the easy equilibrium is the same on the M  line 
and on the F  line for c = 1, since in these cases the two equilibria coincide, 
while in all other cases, the marital stability of the choosy equilibrium is higher, 





Figure B . 28: Marital stability index a(e3 (r,c)) of choosy 
equilibrium in region I I I
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C 2.S 0
Figure B.29: Marital stability index <r(e2(r, c)) of easy equilibrium
in region I I I
Figure B.30: Difference of marital stability indices 
cr(e3(r, c)) — cr(e2(r, c)) of the choosy and the easy equilibrium in
region I I I
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B .5  Discrete Type n  Period M odel, W here n > 2
Assuming that the game is played a small number of periods n  > 2 and there 
are m  male and m  female types, it is easy to calculate all the equilibria for given 
(r, c).
Let males use strategy sm = (smi, sm2, s mn_i),  where smi denotes the 
strategy males use in period i. In the same way, let female strategy be Sf = 
(sf i,  s /2, s / n_i).  Given strategy s =  (sm, S f ) it is easy to calculate the ex­
pected utilities Vmi and Vfi tha t a male and a female expect to  receive in period 
i.
Let Vm = Vm,s and Vj  =  denote the utilities th a t males and females 
respectively expect to receive in each period when strategy s is used. Vm =  
(V r n 2 iV r r& ,'-- '> V riin )  a n d  V f  —  ( V f 2 i  ^ ] F 3 , • • • ?  V f n )
At equilibrium, it must be true that
Smi =  l/rm+l and Sfi — Vf{-(-1
Therefore, we can define equilibria as fixed points of the mapping
T n ( ( S m i ,  Sm 2 , Smn_ i  )> ( s / l ?  s /2> s f n —l ) )  —
=  ( ( s m l i  s m 2 i  • • • 5  ^ m n -1  ) i  ( s / l ?s / 2 ,  « / n - l ) ) »
Sm 2,  •••5 s m n —l  )? ( s / l >  s /2> •••? s f n - 1 ) ) )
Since types are discrete, there exist a finite number of strategies we need to 
check in order to specify whether they are equilibria or not. Hence for given 
pair (r, c), we just have to analyse ra2(n_1) strategies and point out the equilibria 
where
T n ( ( s m l? Sm 2f . . . ,  S m n—l  
=  ( p K n ( ( s m l5 s m2? ••• j S m n —l  )? ( s / l 5  s f 2 i  ' " i  s f n —l ) ) ]  j
F ^ jf((^ m lj Sm 2 , . . . ,  Sm n _ i  )? ( s / l 5  s /2?  S f n —l ) ) l )
Taking under consideration tha t in the last period, Vmn < y  and tha t 
strategy cutoff points are decreasing in each period, the number of potential 
equilibrium strategies we need to check becomes even smaller.
In order to conclude to the results concerning the discrete type 3 period 
model presented in chapter 3, we found all the fixed points of given (r, c) of the 
mapping T3 (52).
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B.6 Truncated Norm al D istribution
We analyse the discrete 8 type model played over 3 periods. We assume a 
truncated normal distribution of the population in the first period, so that 
middle types are more common than extreme types. The following figure (B.31) 








Figure B. 31: Truncated normal distribution f ( x ) 
in the first period.
Using exhaustive search, we found the equilibria for different (r, c). The 
equilibria are described in the following figure and table.
Figure B .31 charts, for m  = 8, the qualitative aspects of this search, for r  
and c in the grid. Here, F represents just a female choice equilibrium, M just a 
male choice equilibrium, and B the presence of both types.
c = 0 .8 o n M c = l  2 o II I-1 c = l  .6
33=1.6 F F F F F
r=15 F F F F F
33=1.4 M F F F F
33=1 3 M M M F F
13=12 M B B F F
33=12 M M M B F
33=1 M M M M M
Figure B.32:. Equilibria for n = 3, m  =  8
To obtain a more quantitative analysis of the equilibria, as functions of r 
and c, we describe in Figure J5.33 the equilibria corresponding to a grid of r
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and c values. We construct Figure B .33 in the same way as Figure 3.16. The 
reader can first study Figure 3.15 in order to be able to understand better how 
to interpret Figure B .33.
t
4f -  >
J >
x.
C=1 c = l  2 0=1.4
Jr !
1 r




Figure B.33: Equilibria for discrete truncated normal 
distribution, m  = 8.
It is obvious that multiple equilibria appear as well when the distribution is 
not uniform and it is possible to have both female and mutual choice appearing.
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A ppendix C: Age Dependent Preferences
This Appendix offers the complete analysis of the equilibria presented in chapter 
4.
C .l A =  r =  2 and r > 1
The equilibrium strategy profile is ((1,1), (1,1)) and the distribution of males 
and females should be such that
1 r — 1 r2 r2 — r
a i ( l  -  -(&i +  b2) = a2 =>a2 = a i   => a i =   -----   and a2 =  ----- -r r Zr — 1 Zr — 1
6i (1 — (— +  — ) =  b2 =*> b2 = 0 and b\ = 1r r
The ratio R  of the incoming population is
T2 I------------
R  = ai =   -------  ^  r (R ) =  R +  y / R 2 - R
2 r — 1
The population sex ratio r  is an increasing function of the incoming popu­
lation sex ratio R.  Given tha t we assume the sex ratio is male biased (r > 1), 
R  > 1.
1 .5 2 .5 3 .5
R
Figure C.l: Population sex ratio r (R ), when
As expected, both a i and a2 are increasing functions of R.  Nevertheless, the 
fraction of males of age 1, decreases as R  increase, while the fraction of males of 
age 2 increases as R  increase. As we can see from figure C.2, as we move further 
from R  =  1, the faction of males of age 1 and age 2 come very close; however, 
the number of males in the first period of their fertile life will always exceed the
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Figure C.2: Number ai of males of 
type i in the male population (top 
picture) and male distribution 
(bottom picture) at equilibrium, when 
A =  2, t  =  2, r  >  1.
C.2 A =  3, r  =  2 and r < 1
All male types and female of age 2 and age 3 are non choosy (from observation 
(i) and observation(u)). Therefore our only concern, is whether male of age 1 
accepts females of age 2 or not.
The expected utility of males in the second period of their fertile life is
U2 = 6i2 +  b2l > 1
Since U2 > 1, males of age 1 are not willing to accept any type offering them 
a utility less than 2, hence they only accept females of age 1.
The equilibrium strategy profile is ((2,1,1), (1,1)).
Given ((2,1,1), (1,1)), the distribution of males and females should be such 
tha t
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a i ( l - & i )  =  a,2 =>• - — — — a\
2 — b\
02(1 — b\ — 62) — a3 ^  a3 — 0
1 1  — r
6i ( l  — (ai +  a,2 +  0 3 )) =  62 (1 — r)b\ — 62 hence bi =    and 62 — *-----
2  — r L — r
(2 - r ) r  ( 1  - r ) r
Hence a\ = —— -— and <22 =  ~—3 - 2 r  3 -  2r
The incoming population sex ratio is
( 2 —r ) r
* = ^  =  3 ^ - 2 ) ’
l —r
Let
=  -3 /2  +  (4 +  2tf)r -  4 r2 +  r 3
Then r  is the first root given by Mathematica for the polynomial A  and it 
is an increasing function of R. Hence
r(n> = i -  ^ 2 ( - 4  +  6tf)
3 3 ^ - 1 6  +  9R  + 3V3V32R -  61R 2 +  32R 3
| y -1 6  +  9i? +  3 7 3 \ / 32i ? - 6 1 ^ 2 +  32/?3
3v/2
Since, we assume that the population sex ratio r is male biased, at equilib­






0 .2 0 .4 0 .6 0 .8 1
R
Figure C.3: Population sex ratio r(R),  
when A =  3, r  =  2 and r  < 1.
The proportion of males of age 1 increases as the incoming population sex
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ratio R  increases, while the opposite is true for the proportion of males of age 2, 
which is decreasing in R. At R  = 1, the proportion os males of age 1 becomes 
maximum (ai =  1) while the proportion of males of age 2 becomes minimum
(a2 =  0).
Female distribution behaves similarly. It is interesting to note tha t for R  
close to 0, female population is almost equally divided between females of age 1 







Figure C.4: Number ai of males of type i 
in the male population (top picture) and 
male distribution (bottom picture) at 








Figure C.5: Female distribution at 
equilibrium, when A =  3, t  — 2 and r < 1.
C .2.1 E x ten sio n  of th e  M odel A > 3, r  =  2 an d  r  < 1
We have found that the equilibrium strategy pair when A =  3 and r  =  2 
is ((2 ,1,1), (1,1)). If we assume that males are fertile for A > 3, then from 
observations (i) and observation (i i) we know that males of age A and A — 1 
and female of age 1 and 2 are non choosy. From observation (iv) we know that 
strategies cannot be decreasing sequences. Hence any type lower than A — 2 has 
to be at least as choosy as A — 2. From A =  3, r  — 2 model, we know that male 
of age A — 2 accepts only females of age 1. Hence any male younger than A — 2 
has to accept only females of age 1. So the unique equilibrium strategy pair has 
to be the ((2,2,2, ...,2 ,1,1), (1,1)).
The distribution of the population is such that
ai (1 — b\) = a*+i for i < A — 2 
a A—i ( l  —b \ — b2) = ax = 0




1 — r j -1
ai = ai (  ------ ) for i < A and a\ = 0
\ 2  ~ r )
1 1 — T
bi = r   and b2 =  -----
2  — r 2  — r
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C.3 A =  3, r =  2 and r > 1
All females and males of ages 2 and 3 are non choosy (from observations (z) and 
(zz)). We want to find conditions so tha t males of age 1 are choosy.
The expected utilities of a male of age 3 and age 2 are
u 3 =  - ( h  +62)1 =  -r r
1. 1. „ r — 1 1, 1 r —11
U2 — —b\ 2 H— 621 H-------- C/3 — — 612 H— 621 H------------
p  p  p  rp p  p  p
Male of age 1 rejects females of age 2 iff C/2 >  1- Hence
U2 > 1 <=> 1 < r < 2.61803 and 0 <  h  <  l ~ 2-r + —r
•  We will check if there is distribution where 0 < b\ < 1~2^ +T’2 tha t supports 
the strategy profile ((2,1,1), (1,1)) when 1 <  r  <  2.61803.
For strategy pair ((2,1,1), (1,1)) to be an equilibrium, the distribution has 
to  be such tha t
a i ( l - i & i )  =  a2
( 1 1 . r — 1
a2( l  b \  b2 ) = --a 3 = > a 2---------=  a3
r r  r
6 i(l — — — — — — ) =  b2 => b2 =  0 thus b\  =  1
r  r  r
Hence
r3
a 1 1 — 3r +  3r2 
a 2 =  a i ( l  )
r  — 1
cl 3 =  a \
r
2
Since b\  =  1 > l --2t±r_2? ((2,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium when r  < 2.61803.
•  We will also check whether there is a distribution tha t supports the strat­
egy profile ((1,1,1), (1,1)) for r  > 2.61803.
For the trivial strategy pair ((1,1,1), (1,1)) to be an equilibrium, the distri­
bution has be such tha t
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/I 1U 1 7 \ r  — 1a i ( l ---- 0 1----- 0 2 ) = CL2 =>-a i ------ =  0*2r r  r
r, 1 t \ r - 1
0 2 ( 1 ------ 0 1 --------0 2 ) =  0 3 ==>-<22---------  =  03r r r
01 (1 — — — — — — ) =  02 => &2 =  0 thus 01 =  1r r r
Hence
7*3
01 1 — 3r +  3 r 2 
02 =  01 (1  )r
2
0 3  =  0 1 ( ^ )
Since 0i =  1 > l~r~^~‘rT*, the pair of strategies ((1,1,1), (1,1)) is an equi­
librium for all r > 2.61803.
Since the distribution is of the same form at both equilibria, the incoming 
population sex ratio at both equilibria is
* «  *-31 -  3r +  3 r2 
Let
B  = - R  + 3Rr -  3R r 2 +  r 3
Thus r  is the first root given by M athematica for the polynomial B  and it is an 
increasing function of R.  Hence
r{R) = W * R - & )
9 y / R -  3R 2 +  2R? +  y /R 2 -  2R? +  R 4 
y / R  -  3R 2 +  2R3 +  V R 2 -  2R 3 +  R 4
\ / 2
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Figure C.6: Population sex ratio r(R),  when 
A =  3, r  =  2 and r > 1.
The following picture reveals the behaviour of the number ai of males of age 
i in terms or R  . In each period, independently of R,  all females are of age 1 
at both equilibria, as expected from observation (vi ). Therefore, both strategy 
pairs ((2,1,1), (1,1)) and ((1,1,1), (1,1)) result in the same couple distribution.
,0 .7
ax <R )V (R)
0.1
1 .5 2 .5
Figure C.l: Number ai of males of type i in the male 
population (top picture) and male distribution (bottom 
picture) at equilibrium, when A =  3, r  =  2 and r > 1.
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Hence the equilibria are the following
((2,1,1), (1,1)) for 1 <  R  <  1.30902 hence for r  <  2.61803 
((1,1,1), (1,1)) for R  > 1.30902 hence for r > 2.61803
and the distribution has the following form at both equilibria
r3 (R)
1 -  3r(R) +  3r2 (R)
C.3.1 E x ten s io n  o f  th e  M o d el A >  3, r  — 2 a n d  r  >  1
We have found the equilibrium strategies when A =  3 and r  =  2. If we assume 
that males are fertile for A >  3, then obviously males of ages A and A — 1
observation (u))>
For r < 2.61803, for any A >  3, there is an equilibrium strategy pair of the 
form ((2,2..., 2 ,1,1), (1,1)) (from observations (iv ) and (v)), while the distribu­
tion of the population is such that
(from observation (vi)).
For r > 2.61803, knowing th a t females are universal acceptors, the distribu­
tion at equilibrium has to be of the same form (81)(from observation (vi)).
If r > 2.61803, when a type x < A — 3 accepts female type 2, then all types 
higher than x  must be universal acceptors as well (from observation (iv)). In 
order to check whether a strategy is an equilibrium, we just have to  find r such 
that males one period older than the maximum male type that is choosy, have 
an expected utility tha t is higher than 1. A male type x  < A — 3 expects tha t if
and all females are universal acceptors at equilibrium (from observation (i) and





he enters in the next period unmated, he will receive
A strategy
((2 ,2 ,2 ,2 , ,2 ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,- ,1 ,1 ,1 ) ,  (1,1))V v ✓ S v .1/
a number x  of 2’s a number A—x  of l ’s 
is an equilibrium if
Ux+1 >  1 and Ux + 2 <  1
W ith the help of Mathematica, we found the equilibrium strategy for A large 
for different r. Hence for A large,
- ((2 ,2 ,......... , 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 2.618 < r <  4.08
- ((2 ,2 ,....... , 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 4.08 <  r < 5.53
- ((2 ,2 ,....., 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 5.53 <  r < 6.977
- ((2 ,2 ,..., 2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1)) is an equilibrium for 6.977 < r < 8.423
etc
C.4 A =  r =  3 and r >  1
Both males and females of ages 2 and 3 are universal acceptors (from observa­
tions (i) and (n))- We want to check whether both females and males of age 1 
are choosy.
The expected utility of a female of age 2 is
V2 =  — 2 +  — 2 +  — 1 > 1r r r
Therefore females of age 1 never accepts males of age 3.
The utility tha t a male of age i expects to receive if he does not find a partner 
and enters in the next period i +  1 unmated is the following
A male of age 2 does not accept female of age 3 if t /2 > 1-
1 <  r < 2 
U2 > 1 <=> < or
2 < r  <  2.61803 and <  =l ± ^ n l— r r —1
We will check if there is a distribution tha t supports strategy profile ((2,1,1), (2 ,1 ,1)) 
when 1 <  r  <  2.61803.
For the strategy ((2,1,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium, the distribution has 
to be such that
1 / ,  , , u  r  - 1  +  63a i ( l  (61 +  02)) =  a2 =>  ai =  a,2r r
1 t  — 1
( 1 -------(61 +  62 +  63 )) =  a 3-= > ---------- a 2 =  03r r
6 x ( l - ^ - ^ )  =  *>2 
62( 1 -  —  -  —  - — )  =  6 s = s - ( > 3  =  0r  r  r
r 3
Hence a\ =      —k
1 -  3r +  3r2
_  (—1 +  r ) r 2
2 1 — 3r +  3 r 2
( — 1 +  r)2r
a3 1 — 3r +  3r2
1 -  3r +  3r2 (—1 +  r )2
1 2 — 5r +  4r 2 &n 2 2 — 5r +  4r2
Since ^ 2  =  1 =>. >  - 1^ fr~r2, the strategy pair ((2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is
an equilibrium for 1 <  r < 2.
We will check if strategy pair ((1,1,1), (2,1,1)) is an equilibrium for r > 2 . 
For the strategy profile ((1,1,1), (2 ,1,1)) to be an equilibrium, the distrib­
ution has to be such that
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1 r — 1
a i ( l  ( 6 1  +  62  +  ^ 3 ) )  =  CL2 = >  a \  =  d 2r r
1 r  -  1
a i ( l  (&1 + & 2 + & 3 ) )  =  a 3 = > - -------------« 2  =  a 3
r r r
M !  -  ^  -  ^  -  ^ )  =  6 3 ^ 6 3 = 0r r r
„3
Hence ai =  
fl2 =  
a3 =
1 -  3r +  3r2 
(—1 4- r ) r  
1 — 3r 4- 3r2 
(-1 + r)2 
1 -  3r 4- 3r2
, l - 3 r  +  3r2 JL ( - l  +  r ) :
Oi =  - —   —r and 02 =
2 — 5r 4- 4r2 2 - 5  r  +  4r2
Since =  1 =► > ~1'}jr1~r2, the st rategy profile ((1,1,1), (2,1,1))
is indeed an equilibrium for r  > 2.
At both equilibria,
R  =  i - 3r + 3r* 2r2 -  5r 3 4- 4r4
1-3r+3r; \ ^ r 2 _  Qr  _  18r3 +  gr 4 +  X
2 —5 r + 4 r2
Let
C =  - R  4- 6ifr -  15.Rr2 4- 2r 3 +  18i?r3 -  5r4 -  9 ifr4 4- 4r5
Then r is the third root given by Mathematica for the polynomial C  when 
1 < R  < 1.21403 and the first root given by Mathematica for the polynomial C  
otherwise; r(R ) is an increasing function.
rfe
L.S 2 2 .5 3 3.S  R  4
Figure C.8: Population sex ratio r(R), 
when A =  r  =  3 and r  > 1.
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Figures C .9 and C. 10 describe the behaviour of the number ai of males of 
type i and the number bi of females of type i in terms of R. Figure C .9 is similar 
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Figure C.9: Number a* of males of type i in the 
male population (top picture) and male 
distribution (bottom picture) at equilibrium, when 
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Figure C.IO: Female distribution at 
equilibrium, when \  — r  — 3 and r > 1.
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Hence the equilibria are
((2,1,1), (2,1,1)) for 1 <  R  <  1.30612 hence for 1 <  r <  2 
((1,1,1), (2,1,1)) for R  > 1.30612 hence for r > 2
and the distribution at both equilibria is
1 1 — 3r(R) + 3r2(i?)
( - l  + r  (R))r(R)
2 1 — 3r(R) +  3r2(R)
(-1  +  r(fl))2
3 1 -  3r(R) +  3r2(R) 
l - 3 r ( R )  +  3r2(R)
1 ~ 2 -  5r(R) +  4r2(R) 
( - 1  + r (R))2
2 2 - 5 r ( R )  +  4r2(R)
C .5  A =  4, r  =  3 a n d  r <  1
The expected utility of a male of age i is
U3 =  (&i +  £>2) 2 +  &3 > 1
U2 — bi% +  622 +  63C/3 =  613 +  622 +  63 ((61 +  £>2) 2 +  63) > 1 (82)
Males of age 2 do not accept females of age 3, expecting th a t if they enters 
in age 3 they will receive a utility higher than 1. Consequently, males of age 1 
reject females of age 3 as well (from observation (iv )). If U2 > 2, males of age 1 
reject females of both age 3 and age 2, otherwise they reject only females of age 
3. Since we know tha t at equilibrium males of age 2 are always choosy and as 
a result that males of age 1 have only two possible equilibrium strategies, there 
are only 4 potential strategy pairs left for us to check.
C .5 .1  A ssum ing  th a t  M ales o f A ge 1 A ccep t Fem ales o f A ge 1 O nly  
(2 < U 2 <  3)
If males of age 1 accepts only females of age 1, the expected utility of a female 
entering in period i of her fertile life is
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Vs = as +  04 < 1
V2 = (a2 +  0 3 )  2 +  a4 +  (1 -  r +  a i )  V3 (83 )
V2 = ( 0 2  4* as) 2 -4- 0 4  +  (1 — r +  0 1 )  {as +  0 4 )  <  2
If V2 >  1, females of age 1 reject males of age 4; otherwise they are universal 
acceptors.
•  If V2 > 1 and females of age 1 reject males of age 4, the equilibrium 
strategy pair is of the form ((3,2,1,1), (2,1,1)) and the distribution that 
supports it is the following
M l  -  &i) =  a2 
a2{ 1 -  h  -  b2) =  03
M l  — (&i +  &2 +  bs)) =  04 04 =  0
M l  -  (a \ +  o2 +  03)) = b2 <& M l  -  r )  =  62
M l  — ia 2 +  as +  04)) =  63
For ((2,1,1), (3, 2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution, it is necessary tha t V2 > 1 and 2 < U2 <  3.
Given (83) and (82) then
V2 < 1 when r < 1 
U2 > 2 when r < 1
Since V2 < 1 for r  <  1, the strategy pair ((2,1,1), (3 ,2 ,1 ,1)) is not an 
equilibrium.
• If V2 <  1 and females of age 1 are universal acceptor, the equilibrium 
strategy pair is of the form ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)) and the distribution that 
supports it is the following
M l  ~  M  =  a 2 
M l  ~ h ~  h )  = as 
0 3 ( 1  — (&i +  &2 +  M )  =  0 4  4=> 0 4  =  0
6 i ( l  -  (0 1  +  0 2  +  0 3  +  o 4 ) )  =  b2 M l  -  r ) =  &2
6 2 ( 1  — (0 2  +  0 3  +  0 4 ) )  =  63
2 0 0
For ((1,1,1), (3 ,2 ,1 ,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the 
above distribution it is necessary tha t t/2 <  1 and 2 < V2 <  3.
Given (83) and (82) then
U2 <  1 when r > 1 
2 < V2 <  3 when r  >  1
Hence for r  >  1 the strategy profile ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1 ,1 ,1)) is an equilibrium 
and the distribution at equilibrium is such th a t
ai is the first root given by M athematica for the polynomial D , where
(84)
D  =  —9r +  18r2 — 15r3 +  6r4 — r 5 +  ((17 — 46r +  50r2 — 24r3 +  5r4) R  
+  (14 -  32r +  25r -  7rs)R2 +  (3 -  6r +  3r 2)R3 (85)
3ai +  a? — 3r — 4 a ir — a?r +  3 r2 +  2 a ir2 — r 3an = ---------- --------------------------------------- --------------
—4 — 2ai +  5r +  2 a ir  — 2 r 2 
03 =  r  — a\ — 0,2
C14 =  0
ai -  a2 
bx = ----------
ai
ijj =  1 -  -  —
CL2
63 =  
a^  2
C .5.2 A ssum ing that M ales o f  A ge 1 R eject Fem ales o f A ge 3 Only 
(1 < U 2 < 2)
If males of age 1 reject females of type 3 (but accept the rest of the females), 
the expects utility of a female of age i is following
V3 =  («3  +  <2 4 ) <  1
V2 =  (ai + a 2 +  a3)2  +  a4 +  (1 -  r)V$ «=>
V2 =  (ai +  o>2 +  <13) 2 +  0,4 +  (1 — r) (<23 +  04) <  2 (86)
If V2 > 1, females of age 1 reject males of age type 4; otherwise they are a
universal acceptors.
•  If V2 > 1 and females of age 1 reject males of age 4, the equilibrium
2 0 1
strategy pair are of the form ((2 , 2 , 1, 1), (2, 1, 1)) and the distribution that 
supports it is the following
a i( l  — (bi +  62)) =
<*2(1 — {h  +  ^2)) =  a3
03(1 — (b\ +  b2 +  b3)) =  a4 <=> 04 =  0
6 i ( l  -  ( a i  +  a<i +  0 3 ) )  =  62 <=> h i ( l  -  r )  =  62
6 2 ( 1  — ( a i  +  0 2  +  0 3  +  o 4 ) )  = b3 <& 6 2 ( 1  — r) =  63
For ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary tha t 1 < V 2 < 2  and 1 <  U2 <  2 .
Given (82) and (86) then
V2 > 1 when 0.497781 < r < 1 
U2 > 2 when r  <  1
Since for all r  >  1, U2 > 2, the strategy profile ((2, 2,1,1), (2 ,1, 1)) cannot 
be an equilibrium.
• If V2 <  1 and females of age 1 are non choosy, the equilibrium strategy 
pair is of the form ((2 , 2 , 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)) and the distribution tha t supports 
it is the following
<3-i(l -  (bi + 62)) =  a 2 
<22(1 — (h  +  62)) =  a3 
<23(1 — ( b\ +  62 +  6 3 ) )  =  a 4 4+  o 4 =  0 
6 i ( l  — ( a i  + a 2  +  0 3  +  o 4 ) )  =  62 +>  6 i ( l  — r) =  62 
6 2 ( 1  -  ( a i  +  0 2  +  ^3 +  ^ 4 ) )  =  h  &  &2(1 — r) = b3
For ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary tha t V2 <  1 and 1 < U2 <  2 .
Given (82) and (86) then
2 0 2
Vz =  (cli +  CL2 +  (1 3 ) 2 +  a4 +  (1 — r) (as +  £14) < 1 when r > 0.497781 
U2 =  b\3 +  622 +  6 3  ((b\ +  6 2 )  2 +  6 3 )  > 2 when r  < 1
Since t /2 > 2 for r < 1, the strategy profile ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) is not an 
equilibrium.
Hence strategy profile ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)) is the unique equilibrium for r < 1 
and the equilibrium distribution is the one described in (84).
Let
E  = 4R +  32i?2 -I- 9R3 +  (—54 — 1517? — 92R2 — 18R3)r
+(189 +  278R  +  107i?2 +  9R 3 )r2 +  (-297  -  273R  -  62R2)r3 
+(270 +  158R  +  17i?2)r4 +  (-153 -  55R  -  2R 2 )r5 +  (54 +  ll i? ) r6 
+ (—11 — R )r 7 +  r 8
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Figure C .ll: Population sex ratio r(i?), when 
A =  4, r  =  3 and r < 1.
The behaviour of ai and b{ in terms of R  is similar to the ones described in 
Figures CA  and C.5. It is worth noting that the number a 2 of males of type 
2 increases for 0 < R  < 0.7658, but decreases for R  > 0.7658, a fact that is 











Figure C. 12: Number a* of males of type i in the 
male population (top picture) and male 
distribution (bottom picture) when A =  4, r  =  3 
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Figure C. 13: Female distribution when A =  4, 
t  = 3 and r  <  1.
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C.6 A = 4, r = 3 and r > 1
The expected utility of a female in age i is
^  0 1  + 0 2  +  0 3 2  +  0 4  < 2
r r
If V2 > 1, then females of age 1 do not accept males of age 4; otherwise they 
are universal acceptors.
C .6.1 A ssum ing that Fem ales o f A ge 1 R eject M ales o f  A ge 4 (V 2 > 1)
If females of age 1 do not accept male of age 4 then the expected utility of 
females of age 2 is the following
y  < ° 1 + ° 8 + ° 3 2 + g«v  (g7 )
r r
where
^  +  0-2 +  <23 +  <24
V3 < -----------------------  =  1r
The utility tha t a male of age i expects is the following
U i  =  -  (62 +  6 3 ) 1 <  -r  r
u s =  -  (b1 + b 2) 2  +  \  + r- ^ U ir r r
U3 = - ( h  + bi) 2 + -bi + r ~ l  b2- bz <» (88)r r r r
If Us > 1, then males of age 2 reject females of age 3, otherwise they are a
universal acceptors.
C.6.1.1 Assuming that Males of Age 2 Reject Females o f Age 3 (1 < U3 )
The expected utility of a male of age i is the following
tt l i o  r- — l  +  63rr .U2 — —6j3 H— b2 2  H----------------U3 > 1r r r
tt I 7 0  I j r .  r —1 +  6 3 / 1 . .  . N _ 1. r — 162+^3 \U2 =  — 613 H— 622 H ( — (61 +  b2) 2 H— 63 -j------------------------- J (89)r r r \ r  r r r J
If U2 > 2 then males of age 1 accept only female of age 1, otherwise they 
reject females of age 3 and accept all younger females. We are going to check
whether males of age 1 can use either of these strategies at equilibrium.
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When males of age 1 accept only females of age 1, the equilibrium strategy 
pair is of the form ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1 ,1)) and the distribution that supports 
it is such tha t
fei/ l _ a 1 + a2 +  a3\ =fe2 
^  A  _  0 2  +  0 3  +  0 4  V
“i (*  -  7 )  =  a 2 
02 ( l — ~ (i>i +  h ) J  = “3
0 3  f  1  ~  “  ( 6 1 +  &2 +  &3 n  =  0 4  0 3 — ^ —  =  0 4
For ((3,2,1,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary th a t V2 > 1, U3 > 1 and U2 > 2.
Given (87), (88), (89), then
fl2 +  0 3  0 4  Oi 0 3  +  0 4  n o /io nV2 =  2 H-------1----------------- > 1 when r > 1.93489
r r r r
U3 > 1 when 1 < r < 2.01676
U2 > 2 when 1 < r < 1.92264
There is no r where all necessary conditions are true simultaneously, hence 
the strategy pair ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is not an equilibrium.
• When males of age 1 reject females of age 3 and accept all younger females, 
the equilibrium strategy pair is of the form ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) and the 
distribution tha t supports it is such tha t
^  O ! + 0 2 + 0 3 , &2
M l _ O i + 0 2  +  a 3  +  o4 | ^ b3^ fc3 =  0
1 1  b i + hOi 1 ----------------=  a2
a2 ( 1 ------(&i +  fr2) ) =  a3
0 3  ^ 1  -  i  ( 6 1  +  b2 + 6 3 ) ^  = a4 O a 3 =
r — 1■0,4
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For ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary that V2 > 1, U3 > 1 and 1 < U2 <  2.
Given (87), (88), (89), then
0 1 + 0 2  +  03 04
V2 = ---------------- 2 H > 1  when r > 1r r
U3 > 1 when 1 < r < 2.03285 
1 < U2 <  2 when 1.96931 < r <  4.49959
Hence for 1.96931 < r < 2.03285 the strategy profile ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is 
an equilibrium with a support of a distribution such that
- 1  +  4r -  6r2 +  4r3
1 “  - 2  +  7r -  9r2 +  5r3  ^ '
—1 +  4r — 6r2 +  4r3
2 1 — 2 +  7r — 9r2 +  5r3
63 =  0
62 r 4
—b\ +  3b\r — 3b\r2 +  bir3  






—CL2 +  CL2 V
r
-a s  +  a3r
Hence
=
 62 T*4 ___
—6i+36ir—36ir2+6ir3 
—l + 4 r —6 r ^ + 4 r 3 
—2 + 7 r —9r2+ 5 r 3
5r7 — 9r6 +  7 r5 — 2r4 
(4r3 — 6r2 ■+■ 4r — l ) 2
Let
F  =  —R + 8 R 1— 28i?r2+ 56 iJr3+ ( —2—68i?)r4+ (7 + 4 8 il) r5+ ( —9 —16iJ)r6+ 5 r7
(91)
Then r  is the first root given by M athematica for the polynomial F  and it 
is an increasing function of R.
C.6.1.2 Assuming that Males of Age 2 Accept Females of Age 3 (Us < 1)
207
The expected utility of a male of age i is
Ui =  —6i3 +  -b22 + — 1 +  -— -U3r r r r
1, „ 1, ^ 1, „ i—  1
U2 =  —b\3 H— 622 H— H---------r r r r
1/7  7 \ « 17 r  — 1 62 +  63-  (61 +  b2) 2 +  - 6 3  H-------------------------r r r r
(92)
If U2 < 1 males of age 1 are universal acceptor; if 1 < U2 < 2 they reject 
females of type 3 and accept all younger females; otherwise they accept only 
female of age 1. We will check whether it is possible for males of age 1 to use 
any of these strategies at equilibrium.
•  When males of age 1 accept only females of age 1, the equilibrium strategy 
pair is of the form ((3,1,1,1), (2,1,1)) and the distribution tha t supports 
it is such that
(■-
( -
a l +  a 2 +  a 3
a 2 +  a 3 +  U4
CLi [ 1 -  - b i
=  b2 
=  bs 
=  a 2
r — 1
=  <13 a 2-------- =  as
r
r — 1
— 0^4 0*3 ' — ^4
For ((3 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary that V2 > 1, U3 < 1 and U2 > 2.
Given (87), (88), (92), then
0.2 ^ 1  — -  (61 +  b2 +  bs) 
<13 ( l  -  ~ (bi + b 2 +  b3)
V2 > 1 when r > 1.64991 
Us < 1  when r > 2.01622 
U2 > 2 when 1 < r < 1.92324
There is no r where all necessary conditions are true simultaneously, hence 
the strategy pair ((3 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is not an equilibrium.
•  When males of age 1 accept only females of ages 1 and 2, the equilibrium 
strategy pair is of the form ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2 ,1 ,1)) and the distribution that 
supports it is such that
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M l - a l  +  a 2 +  a 3
b2 1 -
a l +  a 2 +  <23 +  a 4
a 2
a3
ai ^1  -  -  (h  +  62) 
^ 1 - ^ ( 6 1 + 6 2 + 63)
h  — I  (&! +  62 +  63)
=  6 j
=  6 3  6 3  =  0
=  <22
r — 1
=  <23 <22--------  =  <23r
r — 1
— ^4 ^3 =
For ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary th a t V2 >  1, C/3 <  1 and 1 < U2 <  2.
Given (87), (88), (92), then
01  +  0 2  +  0 3  04
V2 = -----------------2 H > 1  when r > 1r r
U3  <  1 when r  >  2.03285 
2 >  U2 > 1 when 1.96931 < r <  4.49959
Hence for 2.03285 <  r < 4.49959 the strategy profile ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is 
an equilibrium with the support of a distribution as the one described in (90).
•  W hen males of age 1 are not choosy, the equilibrium strategy pair is of 
the form ((1, 1 , 1, 1), (2 , 1 , 1)) and the distribution tha t supports it is such 
tha t
bi 1 -
a l +  a 2 +  <23
62 1 “
a i  ^1 — i  (61 +  62 +  63)
a2 ^1  -  ~ (bi +  62 +  bs)
0 3  ^ 1  —  -  ( 6 1  +  b 2  +  b s )
=  b2
= bs 63 =  0 
r — 1
=  02 4=> a \  =  02r
r — 1
=  0 3  <=> 0 2 --------- =  03
r
r  — 1
=  0 4  4=> 0 3 --------- =  04
For ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary th a t V2 > 1, Us <  1 and U2 < 1 .
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Given (87), (88), (92), then
f l l+ f l 2 +  fl3 0 . «4  . , , . -V2 =  2 H-----> 1  when r > 1r r
Us < 1  when r >  2.03285 
U2 < 1 when r >  4.49959
Hence for r > 4.49959 the strategy profile ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (2,1,1)) is an equilib­
rium with the support of a distribution as the one described in (90).
C .6.2 A ssum ing that Fem ales o f  A ge 1 A ccept M ales o f  A ge 4 (V 2 <  1)
The expected utility of a female of age 2 is at most 1. We know that
V2 < a i + a 2  + a32 + ^ l  (93)r r
The expected utility of a male of age i is the following
£/4 =  i ( 6 1 + 6 2  +  63 ) l  =  -r r
U3 =  -  (61+62)2 + ^3 + T- ^ U ir r r
[/3 =  I (6 1 + 62)2  +  ^63 +  — -^ (94)r  r r r
If 1 < Us then males of age 2 reject females of age 3; otherwise they are 
universal acceptors.
C.6.2.1 Assuming that Males of Age 2 Reject Females o f Age 3 ( 1 < Us)
If males of age 2 reject females of age 3, their expected utility is the following
1 1 r — 1 +  bs
U2 =  -6 i3  +  -b 22 +  — Us > 1r r r
l i o  1 , n r  —l +  6 3 / l  1 r — 1 1 \— — 613 H— 622 H I — (61 +  62) 2 -|— 63 -\------------ 1
r r r \ r  r r r J (95)
If 2 < U2 < 3 then males of age 1 do not accept females of age 2; otherwise 
they only reject females of age 3. We are going to check whether males of age 1 
can use either of these strategies at equilibrium.
•  When males of age 1 accept only females of age 1, the equilibrium strategy 
pair is of the form ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) and the distribution that supports
2 1 0
For ((3,2,1,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the 
above distribution it is necessary th a t V2 < l , l < £ / 3 < 2  and 2 < <  3.
Given (93), (94), (95), then
0 2  +  . <*4 _ f l l  G3 +  0 4
V2 = ---------- 2-H-------1-----------------<  1 when 1 <  r < 2.0781r r r r
1 < U3 <  2 when 1 <  r < 2.61803
2 < U2 < 3 when when 1 < r < 2.19149
Hence for 1 <  r  <  2.0781 the strategy profile ((3 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) is an 












—1 +  4r — 6r2 +  4 r3 
—a\ +  a\r
r
—02 +  027*
r
- a s  +  <237*
(96)
Hence
Thus r(R ) is increasing in R  and R  > 1 so that r > 1.
•  When males of age 1 reject females of age 3 and accept all younger females, 
the equilibrium strategy pair is of the form ((2 , 2 , 1 , 1) , ( 1 , 1 , 1)) and the 
distribution tha t supports it is such that
bi 1 -
+  Q-2 4" &3 +  0>4
b2 1 - a l +  a 2 +  a 3 +  &4
fll 1 -
b\ 4- b2
a2 — -  (&i +  b2)
as ^1 — -  (b\ +  b2 +  63)
=  b2 <=> b2 =  0 




=  <24 <13-------- =  <14
For ((2, 2,1,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary tha t V 2 < l , l < £ / 3 < 2  an^ 1 < U2 < 2.
Given (93), (94), (95), then
a\ 4- a2 4- as« . a 4 . , , ^  ,V2 =  2 4------ > 1  when r > 1r r
Us > 1 when r > 2.618 
1 < U2 < 2 when 2.19149 < r <  5.27804
Since V2 > 1 for all r > 1, the strategy pair ((2 ,2 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) is not an 
equilibrium.
C .6 .2.2 Assuming that Males of Age 2 Accept Females of Age 3 (Us < 1)
If males of age 2 are universal acceptors, their expected utility (taking into 
account (94)) is the following
1 . « 1 , „ 1 , r — 1
U2 =  -&i3 4— ^ 2  4— bs 4 Usr r r r
1 , « 1 , r — 1 ( \  n t 1 r — 11
=  —6i3 4— 522 4— bs 4 I — (5>i 4- 52) 2 H— 63 4-----------tp rp p  p  I r  ' ' p  p  p (97)
If U2 < 1 then males of age 1 are universal acceptors; if 1 < U2 < 2 then they 
reject females of age 3 and accept all younger females; otherwise they accept
2 1 2
only female of age 1. We are going to check whether males of age 1 can use 
either of these strategies at equilibrium.
•  When males of age 1 accept only females of age 1, the equilibrium strategy 
pair is of the form ((3,1,1,1), (1,1,1)) and the distribution tha t supports 
it is such that
^  ^  _  a H ^ 2 ± a s ± ^  = b 2 ^ b 2  =  0  
b2 ^ _ a 2 + a3 +  a 4j = b 3 ^ 63 =  ()
ai ^1 -  =  a2
a2 ^1 — -  (b\ +  b2 +  63)^ =  <23 -o- a2—- — =  <23
<23 ^1 -  i  (fei +  b2 +  63)^ =  a4 <=> ^  = 0-4
For ((3 ,1,1,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary th a t V2 <  1, C/3 < 1 and 2 < U2 < 3 
Given (93), (94), (97), then
^ 2  +  <23 a 4  a i  a 2 +  <23 +  a 4V2 =  2 -\------- 1 <  1 false when r > 1
r  r r r
C/3 < 1 when r > 2.618 
2 < U2 < 3 when 1 < r < 2.19149
Since V2 > 1 for r  >  1, the strategy pair ( (3 ,1,1,1), (1,1 ,1)) is not an 
equilibrium.
•  If males of age 1 reject females of age 3 and accept younger females, the 
equilibrium strategy pair is of the form ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1 ,1 ,1)) and the dis­
tribution that supports it is such tha t
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h  1 - a l  +  a 2 "I" a 3 a 4
b2 1 - a l  +  a2 +  a3 +  <2 4
ai ( 1  (bi +  b2)
a2 ^1  — -  (6i +  b2 +  63)
<23 ( 1 ------(61 +  b2 +  £>3)r
b 2 <=> b 2 =  0
&3 ^  — 0
= a2
r — 1
03 <=> <22--------=  <23r
r — 1
(24 <*=> <23--------=  <24r
For ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary tha t V2 < 1, U3 < 1 and 1 < U2 <  2 
Given (93), (94), (97), then
ai +  <22 +  03 04V2 =  2 H-----> 1  when r  >  1
r  r
C/3 <  1 when r > 2.618 
1 <  U2 <  2 when 2.19149 <  r  < 5.27804
Since V2 > 1 for r  >  1, the strategy pair ((2 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) is not an 
equilibrium.
•  If males of age 1 are non choosy, the equilibrium strategy pair is of the 
form ((1 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) and the distribution tha t supports it is such that
^  ^1 _ a1 +  a2 +  a3 +  a4^ = f e 2 ^ b2 =  0
b2 ( l  -  gi + .Q2- t ^ 3 _+ Q4 j  = h ^ b3 = 0
a i  ^1 — i  (bi +  b2 +  63)^ =  a 2 <& ai ~  fl2
02 ^1 — -  (bi +  b2 +  63)^ =  a3 O  a 2—-— =  03
a3 ^ 1  — -  (bi +  62 +  63)^ =  a 4 ^  03—~— =  a 4
For ((1 ,1 ,1 ,1), (1,1,1)) to be an equilibrium under the support of the above 
distribution it is necessary tha t V2 < 1, U3 < 1 and U2 <  1
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Given (93), (94), (97), then
a \  +  a 2  4 - a s  a *V2 =  2 H-----> 1  when r  > 1
r  r
C/3 < 1 when r  >  2.618
C/2 < 1 when r  >  5.27804
Since V2 > 1 for r > 1, strategy pair in not an equilibrium.
When the female equilibrium strategy is the (2,1,1), the population distri­
bution is of the form of (90), while when the female equilibrium strategy is the 
(1,1,1), the population distribution is of the form of (96).
The following table summarises the equilibria. Hence
((1,1,1), (3 ,2,1,1)) for 1 < R  < 1.078 hence for 1 < r < 2.078
((2,1,1), (2,2,1,1)) for 1.131 <  R  < 1.145 hence for 1.969 < r <  2.033
((2,1,1), (2 ,1, 1,1)) for 1.145 < R < 1.837 hence for 2.033 < r < 4.5
((2,1,1), (1,1,1,1)) for R  > 1.837 hence for r > 4.5
The following figures present the population sex ratio r, the number of males
of age i and the male and female distributions at equilibrium in terms of R. The
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Figure C.14: Population sex ratio r(R) when A =  4, 
r  = 3 and r > 1.
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Figure C. 15: Number a* of males of type i when 







1 .2 1 .4 1.6 1.8
R
Figure C. 16: Male distribution when A =  4, t  — 3 and
r  > 1.
b,(R:
1.2 1.4 1 .6  l . a
R
Figure C. 17: Female distribution when A =  4, 
t  = 3 and r  > 1.
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